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THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE
Hatred may be dormant, but never static. It unavoidably
turns into a cancerous cell that invades a limb, then another,
then the entire body, then the environment. Its aim is to
conquer in order to destroy. Its principle target is human
dignity and freedom.
An ancient, if not eternal, plague routed in somber and
fathomless ground, hate ignores frontiers and walls, ethnic and
social differences, racial origins and religious beliefs.
A human disease, it cannot be stopped even by God himself.
Man alone can prevent it for man alone can produce it. Man
alone can limit its progression. Hence, no group may consider
itself immune against its poison. No community is shielded
from its arrows.
Blind and blinding, hatred is a dark sun which, under
heavens laden with ashes, fights and maims and humiliates
anyone who forgets that all human beings, irrespective of their
origin, color or faith, are sovereign, and thus are bearers of
promise and worthy of respect.
... [T]o learn what evil hatred can do, listen to what evil
hatred has already done not so long ago. Just close your eyes
and try to imagine endless nocturnal processions converging to
a place over there in Poland, where, as a result of government-
planned hatred, heaven and the human heart were on fire.
Close your eyes and listen, listen to the frightened victims
of manhunts in the ghettos, the silent screams of terrified
mothers, listen to the tears of starving children and their
desperate parents, friends, teachers in agony, as they walk to
where dark flames are so gigantic that the planet itself seemed
in danger.
Think of them today.... remember them tomorrow. Think
of their legacy. Just as the hatred must disappear, the legacy
of its victims must remain.'
-Elie Wiesel, Nobel Peace Laureate,
Survivor of Auschwitz and Buchenwald
1 The Legacies of the Holocaust: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations, 106th Cong. 4-6 (2000) (statement of Elie Wiesel, Professor,
Boston University).
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INTRODUCTION
This is a story of crime and punishment. Specifically, it
concerns the development of a crime, its definition and
codification, and the slow movement toward punishing it. While
genocide has only recently exposed sovereigns to criminal
sanctions on the international scene, many believe it to be the
crime of crimes.2 If this is true, then the world has long been
negligent in pursuing its perpetrators, many of whom reasonably
thought they could hide behind the age-old shield of sovereign
immunity. Now that calculus is changing.
The conviction of Rwanda's Prime Minister and the arrest
and prosecution of Yugoslavia's President on charges of genocide
represent a watershed moment in the development of
international law. The political will has finally been summoned
to pursue those in power who monstrously direct forces under
them to commit genocidal atrocities. Now it can be legally
asserted that blood on the hands of lieutenants travels back up
the chain of command to their masters and stains them most
assuredly as if the masters had committed the physical acts
themselves.
I. HISTORICAL CONTEXT
For most, mere utterance of the word "genocide" chills the
conscience. Naturally, the question follows: Whence does this
terrible concept spring? While the term itself is only a half-
century old, its origins are as ancient as its results are
horrifying.3 Planned mass human annihilation has been with us
from the beginning, or at least the beginning, according to the
commonly accepted Judeo-Christian-Islamic tradition. The first
book of the Old Testament recounts the first genocide-that of
God against His people, or the entire "race" of man.4 In many
2 See WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 385 (2000).
3 See LEO KUPER, GENOCIDE: IT'S POLITICAL USE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
11 (1981).
4 See Genesis 6:5-7 (King James) ("God saw that the wickedness of man was
great in the earth and that every imagination of the thoughts of his heart was only
evil continually .... And the Lord said, I will destroy man whom I have created
from the face of the earth."); Genesis 6:17 (King James) ("[Blehold I, even I, do bring
flood of waters upon earth, to destroy all flesh, wherein is the breath of life, from
under heaven; and every thing that is in the earth shall die."); Genesis 7:10-12
(King James) ("And it came to pass after seven days, that the waters of the flood
were upon the earth .... [Tihe windows of heaven were opened .... And the rain
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ways Genesis is regarded as the book of creation and, therefore,
a book of beginnings. Yet, it is also a book of endings, for God,
disappointed in His creation, wiped the earth clean of every
land-dwelling organism except Noah, his family, and the animals
that were directed onto the Ark.5 Thereafter, the Bible recounts
further genocides committed by man against his fellow man
under God's direction.6
God's justice by its divine nature is philosophically and
theologically considered just and, consequently, not open to
challenge by humanity. Thus, genocidal acts, whether visited
upon humanity by God or pursuant to divine direction, are
beyond human comprehension, judgment, reproach, and to a
large extent, questioning. Genocide perpetrated by man against
man, however, under god-like delusions but without any divine
was upon the earth for forty days and nights."). The Old Testament then recounts
the effect of the flood:
[T]he waters prevailed and were increased greatly upon the earth... and
all the high hills, that were under the whole heaven, were covered ....
[A]nd the mountains were covered. [All flesh died that moved upon the
earth, both of fowl, and of cattle, and of beast, and of every creeping thing
that creepeth upon the earth, and every man: all in whose nostrils was the
breath of life, of all that was in the dry land, died .... [Elvery living
substance was destroyed which was upon the face of the ground .... [Tihe
waters prevailed upon the earth a hundred and fifty days.
Genesis 7:18-24 (King James).
5 See Genesis 6:5-22 (King James).
6 See Joshua 10:40 (King James) ("So Joshua smote all the country of the hills,
of the south, and of the vale, and of the springs, and all their kings: he left none
remaining but utterly destroyed all that breathed, as the Lord God of Israel
commanded."). Under God's direction, the Israelites invaded the land of Canaan and
exterminated seven nations: the Frigashites, Amorites, Canaanites, Perizzites,
Hivites, and Jebusites, laying waste to various cities. See Joshua 6:21 (King James)
(describing the destruction of Jericho); Joshua 8:24 (King James) (describing the
destruction of Ali); Joshua 10:28-39 (King James) (describing the destruction of
Makkedah, Libnah, Lachish, Gezer, Elgon, Hebron, and Debir); see also
Deuteronomy 2:34 (King James) ("[W]e took all his cities at that time, and utterly
destroyed the men, the women, and the little ones, of every city, we left none to
remain ...."); PETER DU PREEZ, GENOCIDE: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MASS MURDER 4
(1994) ("We read in the Old Testament: 'Now go and smite Amalek, and utterly
destroy all that they have, and spare them not, but slay both man and woman,
infant and suckling, ox and sheep, camel and ass.' " (quoting Samuel 15:3 (King
James))); Leonard B. Glick, Religion and Genocide, in 3 THE WIDENING CIRCLE OF
GENOCIDE 46 (Israel W. Charny ed., 1994) ("The Book of Joshua provides us with
one of the earliest texts in which a diety quite plainly promotes a destruction of the
people."); Dan Gifford, The Conceptual Foundations of Anglo-American
Jurisprudence in Religion and Reason, 62 TENN. L. REV. 759, 806 (1995) ("Hebrews
later slaughtered many of the existing residents of Palestine. At Jericho, the
Hebrews were ordered to commit genocide ....").
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direction, such as Hitler's Final Solution, 7 clearly falls within the
realm of human questioning, reproach, and judgment.
Human history is replete with examples of people
perpetrating genocide against one another.8 The psychology
underlying ancient genocides, however, differed dramatically
from genocides committed in the later half of the twentieth
century. Historically, in fact, there was something approaching
a "nothing personal" attitude when one society visited this
atrocity on another.9 For example, the long drawn-out Roman
conflict with Carthage was not premised on ethnic disdain so
much as it was based on power, politics, and economics. As its
power increased, Rome fought a series of Punic Wars over a one
hundred and eighteen-year period against its chief rival in the
Western Mediterranean. Ultimately, the Punic Wars resulted in
the final obliteration of the city of Carthage and its culture. 10
While the First Punic War (264-241 B.C.) was about power,
prestige, and political control over Sicily, the Second Punic War
(218-202 B.C.) diminished Carthage's military and territorial
threat by defeating Hannibal, Carthage's military leader." The
Third Punic War (149-146 B.C.) was undertaken to annihilate
Carthage's resilient economic expansion. 12 Despite Carthage's
entreaties for peace, Rome implemented a plan for Carthage's
destruction' 3-a decision, it should be noted, that was made by
the Senate of democratic Rome, one hundred and fifty years
prior to the rise of imperial Rome under the dictator-like
Caesars. 14 In the summer of 149 B.C., an order for the final
assault on Carthage was given.15
7 See WOLFGANG BENZ, THE HOLOCAUST: A GERMAN HISTORIAN EXAMINES THE
GENOCIDE 61-66 (Jane Sydenham-Kwiet trans., 1999) (describing the Nazi plan to
exterminate Jews through the Holocaust).
8 See Roger W. Smith, State Power and Genocidal Intent: On the Uses of
Genocide in the Twentieth Century, in PROBLEMS OF GENOCIDE 225 (1997).
9 See V.A. Nadien-Rayevsky, The Problem of Historical Responsibility, in
PROBLEMS OF GENOCIDE 201 (1997).
10 See KUPER, supra note 3, at 11.
11 See SIR GAVIN DEBEER, HANNIBAL, CHALLENGING ROME'S SUPREMACY 82,
120-24(1969).
12 See Richard Hooker, Rome: The Punic Wars, Washington State University,
World Civilizations: An Internet Classroom and Anthology (1996), available at
http://www.wsu.edu/-dee/ROME/PUNICWAR.HTM.
13 Id.
14 F.E. Adcock, Caesar's Dictatorship, in 9 THE CAMBRIDGE ANCIENT HISTORY,
THE ROMAN REPUBLIC 133-144 B.C. at 740 (1932).
16 Id.
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2002] THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE
The Roman legions "stormed the town and the army went
from house to house slaughtering the inhabitants in what is
perhaps the greatest systematic execution of non-combatants
before World War IL Carthaginians who weren't killed were
sold into slavery. The harbor and the city [were] demolished,
and all the surrounding countryside was sown with salt in order
to render it uninhabitable."16 Scipio's siege and final assault on
the city was truly one of the most brutal accounts of genocide in
ancient recorded history,17 perhaps even more brutal than the
Greek destruction of Troy.'8
16 Id.
17 ALAN LLOYD, DESTROY CARTHAGE! THE DEATH THROES OF AN ANCIENT
CULTURE (1977).
The total population of Carthage at the start of the siege ... has been
estimated at 200,000 .... Some had perished in the fighting over three
years; more by starvation. [Tihe Roman general remained in personal
command, without sleep through the entire attack .... Carthaginian fury
was matched by Roman savagery. In the buildings, the attackers
slaughtered everyone they came across, tossing many of the disarmed to
troops below, who impaled them on raised pikes. Dead and dying citizens
were used to fill ditches across which advanced Scipio's transport.
On the sixth day, Scipio, pausing wearily on an 'elevated place,'
surveyed the results of the most protracted and ferocious street battle
recalled in ancient history. Behind him, the docks were in ashes. Once-rich
temples and monuments had been torn apart in the scramble for loot.
Smoking rubble replaced scores of former dwellings. Everywhere, bodies
festooned the tortured city: young and old, male and female-protruding
amid crumbled masonry and charred beams. [Of the city's survivors]
150,000] tragic people emerged... [and] were sold as slaves.
What remained of Carthage was burned, and the empty ruins
flattened. Demolition complete, the ceremony of sowing salt in a furrow
was enacted to symbolize eternal desolation. Scipio solemnly cursed the
site .... Thus, at a stroke as final in effect as a nuclear missile strike, an
entire city, the centre of imperial government-indeed, of a civilization-
was blotted from the earth's face.
So extraordinary, even in antiquity, did it seem that Carthaginian
civilization should have vanished virtually without trace that legend cast
her, like Atlantis, as a lost realm, the repository of untold riches lying
undisclosed .... In fact, Carthage's treasures had departed with Scipio. Of
racial posterity, there was none .... For a state once unrivaled as the
mercantile hub of the western world, doomsday had arrived 2,091 years
before the atom-bomb.
Id. at 178-83.
18 See Russ VerSteeg, A Contract Analysis of the Trojan War, 40 ARIZ. L. REV.
173, 176 n.15 (1998) ("[A]round 1250-1240 B.C.... the city was sacked and burned
to the ground." (quoting ANDRE MICHALOPOULOS, HOMER 29 (1966))); MICHAEL
WOOD, IN SEARCH OF THE TROJAN WAR 114-18, 164-66, 243 (1985). See generally
CARL W. BLEGEN, TROY AND THE TROJANS 117 (1963) ("[Troy] was besieged and
captured by enemies and destroyed by fire, no doubt after being thoroughly
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The Romans exterminated the race, culture, religion, and
customs of the Carthaginians. 19 Even though great orators such
as Cato hated Carthage and persuaded the Roman Senate to
crush it, the Senate did not act out of hate.20 Rather, Rome
decided to destroy Carthage as a preemptive strike against an
economically resurgent Mediterranean city that could soon
become a potential military enemy.21
Conversely, today genocide is generally directed out of
hatred. The victims are dehumanized to rationalize the act.22
The Armenian genocide of 1915, the Ukrainian famine of 1933,
the Holocaust, the 1994 Rwandan genocide, and the ethnic
cleansings of Bosnia in 1992-1994 and Kosovo in 1998
underscore this conclusion. While the international legal
response to the perpetration of this atrocity has been slow, it has
also been steady in its increasing sensitivity and condemnation.
Eventually, it is hoped that this legal response will take on an
even greater, more predictable judicial quality by way of more
formalized investigation, prosecution, and punishment for the
crime of genocide.
II. CONCEPTUAL EVOLUTION OF GENOCIDE AS
INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED CRIME
Philosopher Jean-Paul Sarte noted "the fact of genocide is as
old as humanity."23 Yet, the legal prohibitions against it arose
only in Medieval times.24 During the Middle Ages, custom,
rather than formal treaties, first regulated genocide based upon
the combatants involved.25
Historically, Christian rulers selectively sanctioned mass
killing of certain civilian populations. For instance, the rulers
sanctioned killing during Bellum Romanum, wars against
pagans, while they spared civilians subject to Bellum Hostile,
pillaged...."); R.M. FRAZER, JR. THE TROJAN WAR: THE CHRONICLES OF DICTYS OF
CRETE AND DARES THE PHRYGIAN (1966).
19 See LLOYD, supra note 17, at 183.
20 See H.H. SHULLARD, ROMAN POLITICS (200-150 B.C.) 240-45 (1951) ("[Cato]
convinced himself that Roman security required the elimination of Carthage.").
21 See T.A. DOREY, ROME AGAINST CARTHAGE 156-59 (1971).
22 See KUPER, supra note 3, at 85.
23 See WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (2000).
24 KUPER, supra note 3, at 12 (noting that "the war practices of 'civilized'
peoples in the Middle Ages were often marked by genocidal massacres").
25 See id.
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wars between only Christians.26 Inconsistent application of this
rule yielded mixed results.
At the urging of Pope Urban II, hordes of Christian knights
employed this norm during the First Crusade to liberate the
Holy Land and capture Jerusalem.27 But it was later disregarded
during the Albigensian Crusade against the Cathars, a purist
Christian sect in the Languedoc region of Southern France that
Pope Innocent III considered heretical.28  Indeed, when
confronted with the question of how to discern non-believers
from the devout, the papal legate, the Abbot of Citeaux, famously
replied, "Strike [all] down; God will recognize his own."29
Rules of war designed to protect non-combatants first found
their way into documentary form through President Lincoln's
promulgation of General Order No. 100 during the American
Civil War.30 These rules, however, did little to dissuade General
Sherman from burning Atlanta in 1864 and then conducting a
scorched-earth march to the sea that left behind a devastating
trail of rubble and carnage. 31  Irrespective of the Sherman
exception, the principles articulated in General Order No. 100
provided the basis for its codification in treaties between states
that were negotiated at both of the Hague Conferences convened
in 1899 by Czar Nicholas II and again in 1907 by President
Theodore Roosevelt. 32
Indeed, the annex to the 1907 treaty specifically prohibited
attacking or bombarding undefended towns, villages, or
26 See HOWARD BALL, PROSECUTING WAR CRIMES AND GENOCIDE: THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY EXPERIENCE 13 (1999).
27 See C. WARREN HOLLISTER, MEDIEVAL EUROPE: A SHORT HISTORY 186-87
(5th ed. 1982) (recounting a Christian eyewitness' description of the sack of
Jerusalem by the Crusaders: "If you had been there you would have seen our feet
colored to our ankles with the blood of the slain .... None of them were left alive;
neither woman nor children were spared .. "); see also Smith, supra note 8, at
228-31.
28 See Glick, supra note 6, at 51-52 (citing WALTER L. WAKEFIELD, HERESY,
CRUSADE AND INQUISITION IN SOUTHERN FRANCE, 1100-1250 (1974)).
29 See KUPER, supra note 3, at 13.
30 BALL, supra note 26, at 14 (citing Instructions for the Government of the
Armies of the United States in the Field, General Order No. 100, Adjutant General's
Office, April 24, 1863).
31 See Union General William T. Sherman, Carl Vinson Institute of
Government, The University of Georgia, at http://www.cviog.uga.edu/Projects/
gainfo/sherman.htm (last visited July 19, 2002).
32 See BALL, supra note 26, at 14-15 (discussing the Hague Conferences).
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dwellings or making declarations of no quarter.33 The treaty,
however, lacked enforcement provisions. Article III merely
stated that "a belligerent party which violates the provision of
the said Regulations shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay
compensation. It shall be responsible for all acts committed by
persons forming part of its armed forces."34
None of these tentative efforts, however, could allay the
occurrence of three of the greatest genocides during the first half
of the twentieth century that led to eventual international
recognition, definition, and proscription of the crime. These
atrocities were perpetrated during the First World War (against
the Armenians in 1915), during the inter-war period (against the
Ukrainians in 1932-1933), and during the Second World War
(the Jewish Holocaust). 35
A. Genocide and the Period of World Wars (1915-1945)
No previous epoch in history witnessed the shock and
revulsion of mechanized carnage than that of the World War I
generation.3 6 While the war began with conflicts between
cavalry units armed with rifles and lances, it soon escalated.37
Science and the industrial revolution brought forth new weapons
of war such as grenades, mortars, and flamethrowers, as well as
airplanes outfitted with bombs, machine guns, tanks, and poison
gas.38  Chemical weapons alone accounted for 1.3 million
33 Id. at 15.
34 Id. at 16.
35 Although the author discusses several occurrences of genocide throughout
the twentieth century as this Article progresses, it is not his intent to treat these
episodes in a deep analytic manner individually. Indeed entire volumes have been
written about each crime from various, sometimes conflicting perspectives. Given
the space constraints and ultimate aim of this Article, it is only his intent to provide
the reader with salient examples of genocide in a variety of cultures and contexts to
explore the premise of changing international legal and political responses through
time. Thus, abbreviated explanation and significant reduction in treatment of the
various crimes should not be taken as a dismissive attitude on the part of the
author.
36 The First World War began after the assassination of Austrian Archduke
Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo on August 14, 1914, and it ended with the surrender of
Germany in Paris on November 11, 1918. See S.L.A. MARSHALL, WORLD WAR I 33,
443-44 (1964).
37 GUY HARTCUP, THE WAR OF INVENTION: SCIENTIFIc DEVELOPMENTS 1914-18
1 (1988).
38 See generally ROBERT L. 0' CONNELL, OF ARMS AND MEN, 241-69 (1989)
(discussing weapons introduced and utilized in World War I).
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casualties during the War.39  By November 1918, this
exponentially increased the decimation of humanity.40 During
those four years of butchery, casualties between the Allies 41 and
the Central Powers42 mounted to record levels: 7,485,600 battle
deaths.43
It was in the context of this horrific opening to the twentieth
century that a great tragedy unfolded in the mountainous region
of the Caucasus controlled by the Ottoman Empire. This came
as a pretextual response to both participation by a Christian
Armenian division in a Russian-sponsored action against Turkey
and the declaration of a provisional Armenian government in
April 1915. 44  The Turkish government undertook an
"undeclared campaign of genocide against [its] Armenian
subjects."45  The resulting genocide of the Armenians was
organized as a march "into the desert to die of starvation and
thirst."4 6 This brutal action led to the deaths of approximately
700,000 men, women, and children.47
39 Kevin J. Fitzgerald, The Chemical Weapons Convention: Inadequate
Protection from Chemical Warfare, 20 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 425, 430 (1996)
(citing David B. Merkin, The Efficiency of Chemical Arms Treaties in the Aftermath
of the Iran-Iraq War, 9 B.U. INT'L L.J. 175, 176 (1991)); see also Leonhard S. Wolfe,
Chemical and Biological Warfare: Medical Effects and Consequences, 28 MCGILL
L.J. 732, 736 n.7 (1983); Philip Louis Reizenstein, Note, Chemical and Biological
Weapons-Recent Legal Developments May Prove to be a Turning Point in Arms
Control, 12 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 95, 99 (1986) (citing PRENTISS, CHEMICALS IN WAR
(1937)).
40 HARTCUP, supra note 37, at 61-68, 80-91, 94-117, 145-65.
41 The Allies were lead by the British Empire, France, Italy, and the United
States beginning in 1917, and Czarist Russia until its withdrawal in 1917. See
MARSHALL, supra note 36, at 21-22 (discussing the formation of the Triple
Alliance).
42 The Central Powers were lead by Germany, the Austro-Hungarian Empire,
and the Ottoman Empire. See id. at 17-18.
43 LEONARD P. AYERS, THE WAR WITH GERMANY: A STATISTICAL SUMMARY 119
(1919) (giving U.S. War Department estimates on battle deaths).
44 JOHN KEEGAN, THE FIRST WORLD WAR 223 (2000).
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id.; see also DU PREEZ, supra note 6, at 5. Some, however, put the death toll
as high as 1.5 million. See H.R. REP. NO. 106-933, sec. 2, at 1 (2000) (noting the
Armenian genocide killed 1.5 million men, women, and children); Robert F. Melson,
The Armenian Genocide as Precursor and Prototype of Twentieth-Century Genocide,
in IS THE HOLOCAUST UNIQUE?: PERSPECTIVES ON COMPARATIVE GENOCIDE 89
(Alan S. Rosenbaum ed., 1996) (stating that approximately one million Armenians,
out of a total population of two million, were killed between 1915 and 1918);
SHAVARSH TORIGUIAN, THE ARMENIAN QUESTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 9 (2d
ed. 1988).
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In fact, in 1915, the regime of the Young Turks that had
replaced the centuries-old Sultanate cleverly used the outbreak
of war in 1914 to affect this atrocity as an ultimate solution to
the "Armenian question," which had long nagged the Turkish
government.48 Although the process was supposed to be carried
out in secret, 49 dispatches from foreign officials clearly reflected
the magnitude of what was happening.50 Henry Morgenthau,
America's Ambassador to Constantinople at the time, recounted
after the war:
The final and worst measure used against the Armenians was
the wholesale deportation of the entire population from their
homes and their exile to the desert, with all the accompanying
horrors on the way. No means were provided for their
transportation or nourishment. The victims ... had to walk on
foot, exposed to attacks of bands of criminals especially
organized for that purpose. Homes were literally uprooted;
families were separated; men killed, women and girls violated
The Turkish government still denies that the Armenian Genocide ever took
place despite its recognition by countless historians and governments. See Henry R.
Huttenbach, The Psychology and Politics of Genocide Denial: A Comparison of Four
Case Studies, in STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE GENOCIDE 217-19 (Levon Chorbajian &
George Shirinian eds., 1999); William H. Honan, Princeton is Accused of Fronting
for the Turkish Government, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1996, at BI (calling Armenian
deaths "the unintended result of wartime deprivation"); Stephen Kinzer, Turks
Fume Over Stance by French on Armenia, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 1998, at A4
(explaining Turkey's denial of France's public recognition of the Armenian
genocide); International Affirmation of the Armenian Genocide, Armenian National
Institute, available at http://www.armenian-genocide.orgaffirmation /resolutions/
index.php (last visited Aug. 5, 2002) (listing nations which have publicly recognized
the Armenian genocide).
Moreover, Turkey, currently a candidate for membership in the European
Union, continues to strenuously lobby against recognition of the Armenian massacre
as "genocide" by the United States. See Douglas Frantz, Some in Turkey See
Minefield Along Road to European Union, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2000, at A13
(discussing Turkey's progress with European Union admission); Eric Schmitt, The
House Races; Republican's Unusual Gift: A Vote on the House Floor, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 7, 2000, at All (describing Turkey's acknowledgment of Armenian deaths as
the result of "civil unrest"); Eric Schmitt, House Backs Off on Condemning Turks'
Killing of Armenians, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2000, at All (explaining how Turkey will
take political action to prevent United States recognition of Armenian genocide).
48 TORIGUIAN, supra note 47, at 9-12.
49 Id. at 12-13.
60 Id. at 18-22 (excerpting correspondence of the German Foreign Ministry
between 1914 and 1918 on the Armenian question); see also Vahakn N. Dadrian,
Documentation of the Armenian Genocide in German and Austrian Sources, in THE
WIDENING CIRCLE OF GENOCIDE: A CRITICAL BIBLIOGRAPHIC REVIEW 77-125 (Israel
W. Charny ed., 1994).
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daily on the way or taken to harems. Children were thrown
into rivers or sold to strangers by their mothers to save them
from starvation. The facts contained in the reports received at
the Embassy from absolutely trustworthy eye-witnesses surpass
the most beastly and diabolical cruelties ever before perpetrated
or imagined in the history of the world.51
Telegrams from the Interior Ministry collected after the
capitulation of Turkey confirmed the government's intention to
destroy the Armenian population.52  The United States
subsequently dispatched Major General James G. Harbord to
Anatolia and the Caucasus on a fact-finding mission in the
summer of 1919; his report to the Senate the following year
confirmed the extent of the massacres. 53
51 TORIGUIAN, supra note 47, at 13 (quoting HENRY MORGENTHAU, THE
TRAGEDY OF ARMENIA 6-8 (1918)).
52 Id. at 15-18. Two particularly telling communications from the Interior
Minister, Talaat Pasha, were directed toward the destruction of Armenian children:
To the Government of Aleppo,
January 15, 1916-We hear that certain orphanages which have been
opened receive also the children of the Armenians. Whether this is done
through some ignorance of our real purpose, or through contempt of it, the
Government will regard the feeding of such children or any attempt to
prolong their lives as an act entirely opposed to its purpose, since it
considers the survival of these children as detrimental. I recommend that
such children shall not be received into the orphanages, and no attempts
are to be made to establish special orphanages for them.
March 7, 1916-Collect the children of the indicated persons who, by order
of the War Office, have been gathered together and cared for by the
military authorities. Take them away on the pretext that they are to be
looked after by the Deportations Committee, so as not to arouse suspicion.
Destroy them and report.
Id.
53 Id.
Massacres and deportations were organized in the spring of 1915 under a
definite system, the soldiers going from town to town. The official reports
of the Turkish Government show 1,100,000 as having been deported.
Young men were first summoned to their Government building in each
village and then marched out and killed. The women, old men, and
children were, after a few days, deported to what Talaat Pasha called
'agricultural colonies,' from the high, cool, breeze-swept plateau of Armenia
to the malarial flats of the Euphrates and the burning sands of Syria and
Arabia .... Mutilation, violation and death have left their haunting
memories in a hundred beautiful Armenian valleys, and the traveller [sic]
in that region is seldom free from the evidence of the most colossal crime of
all ages.
Id. at 22-23 (quoting MAJOR GENERAL JAMES G. HARBORD, CONDITIONS IN THE
NEAR EAST: REPORT OF THE AMERICAN MILITARY MISSION TO ARMENIA, 66th Cong.,
S. DOC. No. 266 at 7 (1920)).
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Following the war, an effort was mounted to bring the
responsible members of the Turkish government to trial for the
perpetration of these horrible crimes.54 The political will of the
international community, however, proved insufficient to sustain
the momentum for judicial redress, 55 and it was decided that the
new Turkish government would investigate, prosecute, and
punish the wrongdoers. 56 This process was undertaken in a half-
hearted manner, resulting in a meager record of conviction and
no state admission of responsibility.57 The modern state of
Turkey continues to maintain its innocence. 58
During the inter-war period, the next great genocide to occur
was that of Stalin's Soviet regime against ethnic Ukrainians.
Forced agricultural collectivization of the peasantry undergirded
this process.5 9 Beginning in 1929, liquidation of the more
prosperous peasant class, known as the Kulaks, who hired labor
on their large farms, was the first step.60 In the first two months
of 1931, "300,000 Ukrainians were shipped out of the Ukraine to
Siberia, Kazakhstan, and to the Far North."61
This was followed in 1932 and 1933 by a government-
engineered famine of unprecedented proportions.62 This planned
54 See SCHABAS, supra note 2, at 21.
55 Id. at 21-22 (explaining that "the failure of the signatories to bring the
[Treaty of Sbvres] into force [establishing a Tribunal to prosecute the war criminals]
'resulted in the abandonment of thousands of defenceless [sic] peoples ...
(quoting KAY HOLLAWAY, MODERN TRENDS IN TREATY LAW 60-61 (1967))).
56 Id. at 21 (indicating that Allied pressure greatly influenced the decision).
67 Id.; see also KUPER, supra note 3, at 112-13 (discussing the trial and
Turkey's continued denial of the Armenian genocide); Vahakan Dadrian, Armenian
Genocide, Court-Martial of Perpetrators, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GENOCIDE 87
(Israel W. Charny ed., 1999) (explaining that of all tried, only three were convicted
and hanged).
68 See generally Taner Akgam, The Genocide of the Armenians and the Silence
of the Turks, in PROBLEMS OF GENOCIDE 349 (1997); Turkey and the Armenians:
That Controversial G-Word, ECONOMIST, Feb. 3, 2001, at 55 (capturing the Turk's
fierce response to France's official recognition of the Armenian genocide).
59 LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, Revelations from the Russian Archives: Ukrainian
Famine, available at http://lcweb.loc.gov/exhibits/archives/ukra.html (last modified
Jan. 4, 1996).
60 See WASYL HRYSHKO, THE UKRAINIAN HOLOCAUST OF 1933 72-79 (Marco
Carynnyk ed. & trans., 1983) (detailing the liquidation process).
61 Ethnocide of the Ukrainians in the U.S.S.R., 7-8 UKRAINIAN HERALD: AN
UNDERGROUND JOURNAL FROM SOVIET UKRAINE 45 (Maksym Sahaydak ed., Spring
1974) (reprinted by Smoloskyp Publishers, 1976) [hereinafter Ethnocide of the
Ukrainians in the U.S.S.R.].
62 Id. However, in their zeal to establish the Jewish Holocaust of 1941-1945 as
the ultimate genocide, some scholars prefer to consider the famine an unfortunate
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natural disaster63 decimated the Ukrainian peasantry, which
had been incorporated into the U.S.S.R. after Lenin's seizure of
power in 1917. While there is disagreement as to what
precipitated Moscow's draconian action against the
Ukraine-resistance to Soviet collectivization policy 64 or rising
Ukrainian nationalism and political independence 65-no one
contests that it was both planned and devastating. 66
by-product of misguided communist policies.
It is important to bear in mind that Stalinist measures, when viewed only
in terms of their impact on Ukraine, may appear as if they were directed
specifically at Ukraine and Ukrainians. These measures were, however,
intended as a means of transforming peasant society and solving the
Soviet Union's serious grain problem, rather than as a policy directed at
Ukrainians for genocidal reasons. Millions died during the famine of 1932-
33, but not all mass deaths are genocide ....
Unlike the Holocaust, the Great Famine was not an intentional act of
genocide. The purpose was not to exterminate Ukrainians as a people
simply because they were Ukrainians. Extermination was not an end in
itself. The famine was the result of Stalin's effort to... rapid[ly]
industrializ[e]. The burden of industrialization, of necessity, fell most
heavily on peasants. Since Ukrainians were overwhelmingly a peasant
people, they suffered disproportionately.
Barbara B. Green, Stalinist Terror and the Question of Genocide: The Great Famine,
in IS THE HOLOCAUST UNIQUE?: PERSPECTIVES ON COMPARATIVE GENOCIDE 138,
156 (Alan S. Rosenbaum ed., 1996).
63 R.J. Rummel, Democide in Totalitarian States: Mortacracies and
MegaMurderers, in THE WIDENING CIRCLE OF GENOCIDE: A CRITICAL
BIBLIOGRAPHIC REVIEW 27 (Israel W. Chany ed., 1994).
64 George J. Andreopoulos, Introduction: The Calculus of Genocide, in
GENOCIDE: CONCEPTUAL AND HISTORICAL DIMENSIONS 6 (George J. Andreopoulos
ed., 1994) (examining the persecution of peasant groups sharing the generic label
"enemies of collectivization"); Helen Fein, Genocide, Terror, Life Integrity, and War
Crimes: The Case for Discrimination, in GENOCIDE: CONCEPTUAL AND HISTORICAL
DIMENSIONS 99 (George J. Andreopoulos ed., 1994) (discussing that Stalin labeled
victims as enemies of the state).
65 HRYSHKO, supra note 60, at 105, 112-14 (stating that the Twelfth Congress
of the Communist party of Ukraine declared, in 1934, "the chief danger" to be "local
Ukrainian nationalism").
66 RESOLUTION OF THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISARS OF THE UKRAINIAN
SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC AND OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST
PARTY (BOLSHEVIK) OF UKRAINE ON BLACKLISTING VILLAGES THAT MALICIOUSLY
SABOTAGE THE COLLECTION OF GRAIN.
In view of the shameful collapse of grain collection in the more remote
regions of Ukraine... [t]he Council of People's Commissars and the
Central Committee resolve: to place the following villages on the black list
for overt disruption of the grain collection plan ... (list omitted). The
following measures should be undertaken with respect to these villages:
1. Immediate cessation of delivery of goods, complete suspension of
cooperative and state trade in the villages, and removal of all available
goods from cooperative and state stores.
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Estimates of the death toll range from 4.8 million 67 to 15
million if the liquidation of the Kulaks and deaths resulting from
the mass deportations are included. 68  While countless
Ukrainians starved to death during the winter of 1932 through
the following summer, Russians, even those directly across the
border, were unaffected by the famine. 69 Almost immediately, a
process of repopulation began with ethnic Russians moving into
vacated areas of the Ukraine.70  This redistribution was
encouraged into the 1970s.71
Because the Ukrainian tragedy did not occur in the context
of an international conflict, Stalin's regime was never held
accountable for the crimes it perpetrated within its own borders.
In the 1930s, the concept of collective security translated into
collective responsibility for humanity did not yet exist. Indeed, it
remains arguable whether this concept concretely exists today.
The third great genocide, and the most significant by
measure of the premeditated, systematic butchery inflicted on
innocent people, arose during World War II. It has been said
that the Second World War was in large measure a continuation
of the First.72 Ironically, the war itself provided the perfect
camouflage to commit genocide. 73 Prior to the outbreak of war in
2. Full prohibition of collective farm trade for both collective farms and
collective farmers, and for private farmers.
3. Cessation of any sort of credit and demand for early repayment of credit
and other financial obligations.
4. Investigation and purge of all sorts of foreign and hostile elements from
cooperative and state institutions, to be carried out by organs of the
Workers and Peasants Inspectorate.
5. Investigation and purge of collective farms in these villages, with
removal of counterrevolutionary elements and organizers of grain
collection disruption.
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, Revelations from the Russian Archives: Ukrainian Famine:
Grain Problem (translation) (Dec. 6, 1932), available at http://lcweb.loc.gov/exhibits/
archives/k2grain.html (last modified Nov. 13, 1995).
67 See HRYSHKO, supra note 60, at 102.
68 See DU PREEZ, supra note 6, at 5; see also Richard C.O. Rezie, Note, The
Ukrainian Constitution: Interpretation of the Citizens'Rights Provisions, 31 CASE W.
RES. J. INT'L L. 169, 177 (1999) (discussing the Ukrainian deaths resulting from the
state-engineered famine and de-Kulakization in 1932-33).
69 See HRYSHKO, supra note 60, at 103.
70 See id. at 102.
71 See Ethnocide of the Ukrainians in the U.S.S.R., supra note 61, at 67-94.
72 See KEEGAN, supra note 44, at 9. See generally A.J.P. TAYLOR, THE ORIGINS
OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR (1962).
73 RITA STEINHARDT BOTWINICK, A HISTORY OF THE HOLOCAUST: FROM
IDEOLOGY TO ANNIHILATION 182 (2d ed. 2001) (noting that the circumstances of war
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1939, occasioned by Germany's invasion of Poland, there arose a
dark power based on hatred and racism in the heart of Germany
known as the Nationalist Socialist Party, or the Nazi party. Led
by Adolf Hitler, the Nazis embodied and propagated an intense
revulsion for Jews,7 4 blaming them for all that was wrong both
socially and economically in Germany.75
The German people responded to this self-reinforcing and
scapegoating tactic and elected the Nazis to a large number of
seats in the 1932 Reichstag elections, which would have
constituted a clear majority were it not for proportional
representation.76  Shortly thereafter, Hitler was appointed
Chancellor by President von Hindenburg, and the stage was set
for the terror of the Jews to ensue. 77
It was always Hitler's aim to replace the dysfunctional
republic with a popular authoritarian regime.78 Yet, he wanted
this to occur through a legal and, therefore, legitimate process. 79
Indeed, after Hitler's accession to dictatorship, even the Jewish-
owned newspaper Frankfurter Zeitung recognized that "[t]he
movement [had) won power in a legal, democratic way."80 Upon
Hitler's appointment, the road from weak republic to popular
dictatorship proved to be a short one:
surrounding the Holocaust is responsible for causing discrepancies in the estimates
of the death tolls).
74 Id. (stating that the ideology of hatred, specifically Hitler's conviction that
the Jews were the enemy of Germany, was at the core of the Holocaust).
75 JOHN WEISS, IDEOLOGY OF DEATH: WHY THE HOLOCAUST HAPPENED IN
GERMANY 301 (1996).
76 Id. ("Everywhere calls resounded for a Hitler dictatorship .... The Nazis had
achieved what no political party ever had in Germany, and it was anti-Semitism
that enabled them to unite all Germans from all segments of society but the left.").
77 Id. at 304.
On January 30, 1933, Adolf Hitler became the last chancellor of the
Weimar Republic. Wild enthusiasm broke out in the army and the civil
service, champagne celebrations lit up the homes of estate owners, all-
night celebrations exploded at every university. The SA terrorized leftists,
looted and burned Jewish stores and synagogues, desecrated Jewish
cemeteries.., and dragged Jews out of cafds and shops and beat them.
Posters demanded death. As the Nazi deputies marched to the Reichstag,
they chanted the familiar cry: Germany awake. Death to the Jews!
Id.
78 Id. at 288.
79 Id. (stating Hitler's belief that "[w]ith Nazi support the republic could be
legally replaced").
80 RICHARD LAWRENCE MILLER, NAZI JUSTIZ: LAW OF THE HOLOCAUST 1 (1995).
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On February 27 [19331 the Reichstag burned down. Blaming
the communists, Hitler issued a Decree to Protect the German
People and the State. But the decree suspended the civil rights
of all citizens, not just communists, and ended the powers of
state governments as well, though none were pro-communist.
The decree also gave the Nazis full power to terrorize anyone
designated an enemy .... Hitler then requested an Enabling
Act to give him full power for four years. Hindenburg and his
cabinet approved .... [Tihe Social Democrats [voted against
it]. Communists were unrepresented. All other parties
unanimously approved Hitler's dictatorship, and the bill passed
in March .... In July 1933 the Nazis declared themselves the
only legal party.8 '
An equally short road was the one from antagonizing the
Jewish population, to outright persecution, confiscation of
property, relocation, and isolation.8 2  This was done via a
rationalized legal process, 8 3 with all the proper statutes and
judicial acquiescences in order.8 4 Professor Raul Hilberg of the
University of Vermont outlined the social progression of this
process: 85
81 WEISS, supra note 75, at 306-07.
82 SCHABAS, supra note 2, at 39.
With the seizure of power, the persecution of the Jews was intensified. A
series of discriminatory laws were passed, which limited the offices and
professions permitted [them]; and restrictions were placed on their family
life and their rights of citizenship. By the autumn of 1938, the Nazi policy
towards Jews had reached the stage where it was directed towards the
complete exclusion of Jews from German life.
Id.
83 See generally MILLER, supra note 80 (discussing Nazi treatment of Jews
throughout the Holocaust).
A person having the status of Jew was forbidden to do things permitted to
other persons. Such conduct was criminal for Jews; they were forbidden to
engage in activities inherent to normal life, from driving a car to holding a
job. Such a policy allowed Jews to roam through a community but excluded
them from community life. They were the living dead.
Id. at 43.
84 See id. at 135 (stating that "Courts took judicial notice of ostracism, and
expressed civic duty by citing it as legal grounds for geographical concentration of
victims").
85 See id. at 3 (adapting outline of destruction process from RAUL HILBERG, THE
DESTRUCTION OF THE EUROPEAN JEWS 762 (1st ed. 1961)).
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- Local Killing8 6
- Mobil Killing87
- Centralized Killing88
Indeed, dehumanization of the Jews was the order of the
day.8 9 Its impact on and acceptance by German society at large
was greatly facilitated by expanding the sources of anti-Jewish
rhetoric beyond the Nazis and their supplicants to include
86 Local killing occurred in places like the Jewish ghetto of Warsaw or in the
terrible, but short-lived gas vans:
Fifty... men, women, and children... climb[ed] aboard each van. They
had no inkling that a hose had been attached to the exhaust pipe of the
diesel motor so that the deadly carbon monoxide fumes emptied into the
interior .... [T]he driver rode around for fifteen minutes to poison his
cargo.
See BOTWINICK, supra note 73, at 191.
87 Mobil killing was carried out at the hands of Heinrich Himmler's
Einsatzgruppen, which followed the German regular army eastward into the Soviet
Union in four waves, "their mission was the slaughter of innocent civilians on a
hitherto unprecedented scale. The Einsatzgruppen shot between 1.5-2 million Jews,
as well as many hundreds of thousands of non-Jews, within a period of less than two
years." Id. at 184-88.
88 Centralized killing refers to the notorious death camps that were established
by Germany's Nazi regime during the war. See generally PETER PHILLIPS, THE
TRAGEDY OF NAZI GERMANY 161-205 (1969) (describing first-hand what life was
like within a Nazi death camp).
89 MILLER, supra note 80, at 34 ("The 'necessity' to kill all Jews becomes easier
to accept if one believes they are not human.").
I
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"highly regarded scholars and scientists."90  Perpetuating
popular myths was also integral to this process:
Stories of ritual murder by Jews were widely believed by the
German populace. Years later a man related a childhood
memory from 1941: One day, while I pretended I was playing in
a corner while the adults spoke to each other in low voices, I
heard them say that the German army in Czechoslovakia had
captured a nest of Jews who had kidnapped and killed little
Christian boys and girls and used their blood in baking matzos.
They said they had found the small carcasses in a kosher
butcher shop hanging from hooks like pigs and cows. I was a
little Christian boy ....
My mind assembled from various elements what my ears had
extracted from the adults' conversations-lurid scenes of terror
over and over again. I was always on the verge of being
captured by dark hairy Jews who wanted to hang me from a
hook.91
The status of "Jew" evolved through definitional
adjustments and moved beyond religious identification to ethnic
identification regardless of religion. Therefore, Jews could not
be saved simply by abandoning their religion. An early directive,
issued in 1933, ordered companies to dismiss Jewish employees
stating, "It is not religion but race that is decisive. Christianized
Jews are thus equally affected."92 By shifting the definition from
one based in religion to one based on lineage, the number of Jews
in 1930s Germany may have tripled "from 600,000 by religious
profession to two million by genealogy,"93 thereby concomitantly
increasing the number of potential victims.
As Hitler consolidated his power, especially during the war,
his openly racist Nazi regime brought this persecution to a
horrifying climax through its implementation of the "Final
Solution"--mass extermination of the Jews in Germany and all
areas controlled by Germany. 94 Recalling the world community's
historic lack of political will to hold states accountable for
atrocities-demonstrated by the light treatment of Turkey for
90 Id. at 36.
91 Id. at 34 (quoting WINFRIED WEISS, A NAZI CHILDHOOD 44-45 (1983)).
92 Id. at 18 (quoting Nazi Orders Jews Dismissed by American Film Companies,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1933, at 1).
93 Id. (citing James Wilford Garner, Recent German Nationality Legislation, 30
AM. J. INT'L L. 96-99 (1936)).
94 See BOTWINICK, supra note 73, at 182-83.
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the Armenian genocide, Hitler callously remarked, "Who still
speaks of the extermination of the Armenians?"95
By 1941, the Third Reich occupied a large swath of
continental Europe. Throughout Germany's territorial area of
domination, the Nazis established a system of concentration
camps for slave labor. The camps were mostly filled with Jews,
captured partisans, political dissidents, communists,
homosexuals, and other enemies of the Reich.96  The
concentration camps were easily converted into death camps
with a more sinister purpose. 97
Most of the camp conversions took place in the Reich's
conquered eastern sector of Poland, in the vicinity of the Polish
cities of Warsaw and Lublin.98 (See map below).






95 Chris Hedges, As a Language Erodes, Armenian Exiles Fear a Bigger Loss,
N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2000, at A22. This famous remark is a powerful statement of
the degree to which history informs contemporary action.
96 See WOLFGANG SOFSKY, THE ORDER OF TERROR: THE CONCENTRATION CAMP
33-37 (William Templer trans., 1993).
97 See id. at 37. This is not to say that many thousands did not also die in the
work camps due to starvation, disease, exhaustion, and relentless death marches at
the end of the war. Id. at 36-43. However, the main purpose of the work camps was
not extermination as was the purpose of death camps like Treblinka, Belzec, or
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The concentration camps were outfitted with more efficient
mass killing and cadaver disposal technologies, such as multiple
crematoria and widened gas chambers with large capacities
disguised in the form of showers that emitted poisonous doses of
Zykon-B.99 In short, they evolved into sinuous monsters of
horror for the wretched masses that were led into them. For
example, the following table illustrates the terrible technological
capacities employed at the largest and most oppressive'00 of the
extermination camps-Auschwitz: 10 1
AUSCHW~TZCOSTRUCTION: & DAILY PERIb OF




. .. people; Disrobing rooms;
... ... ... . M ass graves
BUNKER II ,Four gas chambers for 1200 1942-1944
people; Disrobing rooms;
___________., __ : Burning pits
CREMATORIUM: Gas chamber + three ovens Early 1942-
_,__._________ for 340 bodies Spring 1943
CREMATOIRIUM I Gas chamber for up to 3000 March 1943-
people; Subterranean November 1944
installation with five ovens
.. . . _ _ .. for 1440 bodies
CREMATOR III Gas chamber for up to 3000 June 1943-
people; Subterranean November 1944
installation with five ovens
....... ___.______ _ . for 1440 bodies
CREMATORIUM W.I Four gas chambers for up to March 1943-
3000 people; Above-ground October 7, 1944
installation with two ovens
___._. __ _..._.... ,, for 768 bodies
CREM.TORI UM9 V9: Four gas chambers for up to April 1943-
3000 people; Above-ground November 1944
installation with two ovens
____...___________; :for 768 bodies
Sobib6r. Id. at 260.
98 See BOTWINICK, supra note 73, at 205; SOFSKY, supra note 96, at 260.
99 See BOTWINICK, supra note 73, at 205; SOFSKY, supra note 96, at 260.
100 See BENZ, supra note 7, at 139.
101 See SOFSKY, supra note 96, at 263.
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"The machinery of destruction was in place. Now the
ghettoes were emptied, and the trains from Nazi-occupied
Europe began to roll toward the Polish countryside."10 2 The
sheer mass of humanity fed into the jaws of Hitler's
extermination camps is truly astonishing. Auschwitz alone had
the capacity to kill 12,000 prisoners a day.10 3 While countless
other victims of widely varying ethnicity (Gypsies [aka "Roma"],
Hungarians, Russians, Slavs, etc.) were murdered by this
system, it was the Jewish population that proportionally
suffered the worst. It is estimated that four million Jews were
put to death in the camps. 10 4 When added to the two million
Jews slaughtered by the mobile killing squads, 10 5 this accounts
for about six million total 0 6 eradicated from the face of
Europe. 107
Indeed, the concentration camp proved a much higher level
of sophistication in the commission of genocide than merely
marching victims into the desert, as the Turks had done to the
Armenians, or starving them to death, as Stalin did to the
Ukrainians. 08 Perhaps one of the most striking aspects of the
Holocaust is the cold-blooded manner in which it was
methodically carried out, as documented by the state
bureaucratic machinery, as if it were just another normal
function of government.
In many ways the Holocaust has become the benchmark for
what people think of when they think of genocide. 10 9 It has been
argued that the Holocaust was unique in history,110 that it rises
102 BOTWINICK, supra note 73, at 192.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 194.
105 Id.
106 Id; see also BENZ, supra note 7, at 152.
107 See BENZ, supra note 7, at 152-53 (stating that on a country by country
basis, the estimates of Jewish victims include: "165,000 Jews from Germany, 65,000
from Austria, 32,000 from France and Belgium, more than 100,000 from the
Netherlands, 60,000 from Greece, the same number from Yugoslavia, more than
140,000 from Czechoslovakia, half a million from Hungary, 2.2 million from the
Soviet Union, and 2.7 million from Poland").
108 See generally SOFSKY, supra note 96.
109 See Matthew Lippman, The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide: Fifty Years Later, 15 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 415, 512
(1998).
110 See Steven T. Katz, The Uniqueness of the Holocaust: The Historical
Dimension, in IS THE HOLOCAUST UNIQUE?: PERSPECTIVES ON COMPARATIVE
GENOCIDE 19-37 (Alan S. Rosenbaum ed., 1996).
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above all other massacres, genocides, or large scale human
tragedies, by virtue of its character, the social context of its
occurrence, and the scale of its operation."' I would agree that it
took something as shocking and undeniable as the Holocaust to
spur the international community into formally outlawing
genocide and establishing a special war crimes tribunal, like
Nuremberg, on the international plane to prosecute the
perpetrators of genocide.112
In fact, it was near the end of World War II that genocide
received its sobriquet. Raphael Lemkin, a Jewish jurist who fled
the Nazi's 1939 invasion of Poland, coined the term "genocide" in
his 1944 book Axis Rule in Occupied Europe.113 This new word
used to describe a very old practice was formed by the fusion of
the Greek genos (race or tribe) with the Latin cide (killing).114
According to Lemkin, this was a two-step process: "In the first
111 Id. at 37 (distinguishing the massacre of Native Americans, the Ukrainian
famine and the Armenian genocide from the Holocaust, and stating that "in all
other cases that are said to parallel the Holocaust... they also are dissimilar
insofar as they, too, would not be examples of an unlimited war that required
complete annihilation-the death of every man, woman, and child--of the victim
population. he Holocaust is a unique historical reality.")
112 Perhaps because nothing like the Nuremberg tribunal had been successfully
established before, the Allies were reluctant to proceed against the defeated Nazi
leadership solely on the basis of their crimes. Horrific though they were, that did
not occur in the context of international hostilities. As U.S. Supreme Court Justice
and American Prosecutor at Nuremberg, Robert Jackson, explained:
It has been a general principle of foreign policy of our Government from
time immemorial that the internal affairs of another government are not
ordinarily our business; that is to say, the way Germany treats its
inhabitants, or any other country treats its inhabitants is not our affair
any more than it is the affair of some other government to interpose itself
in our problems. The reason that this program of extermination of Jews
and destruction of the rights of minorities becomes an international
concern is this: it was part of a plan for making an illegal war. nless we
have a war connection as a basis for reaching them, I would think we have
no basis for dealing with atrocities. They were part of the preparation for
war or for the conduct of the war in so far as they occurred inside of
Germany and that makes them our concern.
SCHABAS, supra note 2, at 35 (quoting Minutes of Conference Session of 23 July
1945, in REPORT OF ROBERT H. JACKSON, UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MILITARY TRIALS 331 (1949)).
113 KUPER, supra note 3, at 22; see also SCHABAS, supra note 2, at 14, 24-30, 38;
LAWRENCE J. LEBLANC, THE UNITED STATES AND THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION 18-
19 (1991). In 1946, the French Prosecutor at the Nuremberg trial, Champetier de
Ribes, stated: "This crime is so monstrous, so undreamt of in history through the
Christian era up to the birth of Hitlerism, that the term 'genocide' had to be coined
to define it." Id. (quoting France v. Goering 22 I.M.T. 431 (1946)).
114 See KUPER, supra note 3, at 22.
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stage, the oppressor seeks to destroy the 'national pattern' of the
oppressed group; in the second stage, the oppressor seeks to
impose its own national pattern on the oppressed group."115 This
leads to the destruction of the group as an identifiable entity.116
This term was given its first official use in 1945 by the
prosecution in the International Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg, empanelled to try the Nazi leadership after the
war." 7 The indictment of the war criminals charged them with
having "conducted deliberate and systematic genocide, viz., the
extermination of racial and national groups.... ",18 While the
Tribunal's judgment clearly concerned the substance of genocide,
it did not use that term.119 The term's first use in a trial and
judgment came in 1946 when the Supreme National Tribunal of
Poland convicted Rudolf Franz Hoess, the former commandant of
Auschwitz, of the crime of genocide. 120
Given its long history, a workable definition of genocide had
to be created within a criminal statute. This was achieved in
1948 with the international community's adoption of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide. 121
B. Genocide Convention Defines the Crime (1948)
The Genocide Convention was negotiated and drafted in
direct response to the systematic genocide conducted by the Nazi
Regime in Europe. 22 In fact, it was at the first session of the
new U.N. General Assembly, in the fall of 1946 in London, that
115 LEBLANC, supra note 113, at 18 (quoting RAPHAEL LEMKIN, Axis RULE IN
OCCUPIED EUROPE at 79 (1944)).
116 Id. at 18.
117 See KUPER, supra note 3, at 22.
118 Id. at 22 (citing Law Reports of the Trials of War Criminals, vol. VII, 8).
119 Id.; see also SCHABAS, supra note 2, at 38 (stating that "[miore than fifty
years later, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda noted that 'the crimes
prosecuted by the Nuremberg Tribunal, namely the holocaust of the Jews or the
'Final Solution,' were very much constitutive of genocide, but they could not be
defined as such because the crime of genocide was not defined until later' " (citing
Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR 97-23-S, Judgment and Sentence 16
(September 4, 1998))).
120 See KUPER, supra note 3, at 22-23; SCHABAS, supra note 2, at 49.
121 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
122 See Timothy L.H. McCormack, Selective Reaction to Atrocity: War Crimes
And The Development of International Criminal Law, 60 ALB. L. REV. 681, 723
(1997); see also LEBLANC, supra note 113, at 61.
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three countries asked for the question of genocide to be put on
the agenda. 123 Coincidentally, this was the same day that the
Nuremberg Tribunal handed down its judgment on the surviving
Nazi war leaders. 124
The resolution that emerged in December of that year from
the United Nations fleshed out Lemkin's concept significantly. 125
Adopted unanimously and without debate Resolution 96(I)
stated:
Genocide is a denial of the right of existence of entire human
groups, as homicide is the denial of the right to live of
individual human beings; such denial of the right of existence
shocks the conscience of mankind, results in great losses to
humanity in the form of cultural and other contributions
represented by these human groups, and is contrary to moral
law and to the spirit and aims of the United Nations.
Many instances of such crimes of genocide have occurred when
racial, religious, political and other groups have been destroyed,
entirely or in part.
The punishment of the crime of genocide is a matter of
international concern. The General Assembly, therefore
Affirms that genocide is a crime under international law which
the civilized world condemns, and for the commission of which
principals and accomplices-whether private individuals,
public officials or statesmen, and whether the crime is
committed on religious, racial, political or any other
grounds-are punishable;
Invites the Member States to enact the necessary legislation for
123 SCHABAS, supra note 2, at 42 (stating the three requesting states were
Cuba, India, and Panama).
124 Id. at 42.
125 Compare the language of the General Assembly Resolution 96(I) with
Lemkin's much narrower definition of genocide that focuses on "national groups" yet
also contemplates destruction of culture and livelihood.
[A] coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of
essential foundation of the life of national groups, with the aim of
annihilating the groups themselves, he objective of such a plan would be
disintegration of the political and social institutions of culture, language,
national feelings, religion, and the economic existence of national groups
and the destruction of the personal security, liberty, health, dignity and
even lives of the individuals belonging to such groups. enocide is directed
against the national group as an entity, and the actions involved are
directed against individuals, not in their individual capacity, but as
members of the national group.
Id. at 25 (quoting RAPHAEL LEMKIN, AXIS RULE IN OCCUPIED EUROPE 79 (1944)).
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the prevention and punishment of the crime;
Recommends that international co-operation be organized
between States with a view to facilitating the speedy
prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide, and, to
this end,
Requests the Economic and Social Council to undertake the
necessary studies, with a view to drawing up a draft convention
on the crime of genocide to be submitted to the next regular
session of the General Assembly.' 26
Within two years, an international treaty outlawing
genocide was negotiated, drafted, redrafted, debated, and
adopted. Using Resolution 96(I) and two initial drafts as a
springboard, the drafters of the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide criminalized the act
itself,127 outlined the consequences for its commission, and
defined its occurrence. 128 It is with the definition that emerged
in the treaty that most scholars have been concerned since the
Genocide Convention came into force in January of 1951.129
While this definition generally tracked the resolution, it
departed from it in one significant manner-political groups
were dropped from the protected class of individuals. 130 This was
done at the Soviet Union's insistence and the rest of the parties'
acquiescence. 13 1 Several alternate reasons were given for the
exclusion of political groups from the definition. Some of these
include: (1) the instability of political groups compared to
national, ethnic, racial, or religious groups into which people are
generally born and which by their very nature are more
enduring groups, and (2) the possibility that support for the
treaty itself may be jeopardized in many states if political groups
126 Id. at 45 (quoting G.A. Res. 96(I), U.N. Doc. (1946)).
127 Genocide Convention, supra note 121, at 280.
128 STEVEN R. RATNER & JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY 27-
28 (2001).
129 Id. at 26; see also LEBLANC, supra note 113, at 57-67. Some academics have
recommended either revising and expanding the definition of the crime or defining
new, related crimes such as ethnocide, demicide, or politicide. Such ideas have been
widely circulated, but not embraced by the international community. It remains
unlikely that they will find their way into international law individually; however,
they may be incorporated into broader human rights agreements in future. See
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GENOCIDE, supra note 57, at 3, 5, 7, 581.
130 LEBLANC, supra note 113, at 57.
131 Id. at 62.
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were included. 132
Consequently, the only groups protected under the new
treaty were national, ethnic, racial, and religious groups. 133
Thus, the legal definition of genocide since 1951 has been:
[A]ny of the following acts committed with the intent to destroy,
in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious
group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the
group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in
part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the
group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another
group. 34
While simultaneously attenuating the initial definition of
the crime, 135 the treaty broadened its criminal applicability. 136
Beyond the actual commission of the genocide, Article III makes
it a crime to serve as an accomplice in any genocidal act or to
conspire, attempt, or directly and publicly incite others to
commit any genocidal act.137 Furthermore, Article IV effectively
strips away any defense of immunity that could be raised on the
traditionally accepted sovereign immunity or head of state
grounds.138
132 Id. at 61-63. The instability argument was strongly supported by the
representatives from Venezuela, Iran, Egypt, and Uruguay. However, "[C]ritics ...
[argue] that the deletion of the word 'political' from Article II created a loophole in
the definition... that could be easily abused by totalitarian states .... [They] could
commit genocide against a national or ethnic group but claim [their] actions were
not genocidal ... because they were aimed at political enemies .... " Id. at 57-58.
133 Id. at 58-59.
134 Genocide Convention, supra note 121, at 280.
135 Not all scholars have accepted this definition of the crime. The debate on
expanding the definition is a continuing one and several alternative definitions have
been proposed, including reinsertion of the political group as a protected class. See
SAMUEL TOTTEN & WILLIAM S. PARSONS, CENTURY OF GENOCIDE: EYEWITNESS
ACCOUNTS AND CRITICAL VIEWS XXIV (Samuel Totten et al. eds., 1997);
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GENOCIDE, supra note 58, at 3-7 (coining the term "democide").
136 TOTTEN & PARSONS, supra note 135, at XXIV.
137 Genocide Convention, supra note 122, at 280.
138 Id. (stating" that "[plersons committing genocide or any of the other acts
[Vol.76:257
THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE
As any lawyer will observe, this crime, as defined,
constitutes a crime of specific intent. 39 Mens rea, however, is
widely considered to be the most difficult element to prove. 140
Nonetheless, it may be successfully inferred through context.
Thus, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, in the
Akayesu case, its first conviction on charges of genocide, stated:
[Ilt is possible to deduce the genocidal intent inherent in a
particular act charged from the general context of the
preparation of other culpable acts systematically directed
against the same group, whether these acts were committed by
the same offender or by others. Other factors, such as the scale
of atrocities committed, their general nature, in a region or a
country, or furthermore, the fact of deliberately and
systematically targeting victims on account of their
membership of a particular group, while excluding the
members of other groups, can enable the Chamber to infer the
genocidal intent of a particular act.141
The Tribunal also isolated the specific intent requirement to
the act of genocide and disposed of this high threshold for
establishing the guilt of accomplices:
[Tihe mens rea, or special intent, required for complicity in
genocide is knowledge of the genocidal plan, coupled with the
actus reus of participation in the execution of such plan.
Crucially, then, it does not appear that the specific intent to
commit the crime of genocide ... is required for complicity or
accomplice liability. [Consequently] an accused is liable as an
accomplice to genocide if he knowingly aided or abetted or
instigated one or more persons in the commission of genocide,
while knowing that such a person or persons were committing
genocide, even though the accused himself did not have the
specific intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national,
ethnical, racial or religious group, as such .... 142
enumerated in article III shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally
responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals").
139 M. Cherif Bassiouni, Observations Concerning the 1997-1998 Preparatory
Committee's Work, 25 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POLY 397, 413 (1997) (indicating that the
requirement for specific intent is a flaw in the definition of Genocide).
140 Id.
141 Johan D. van der Vyver, Prosecution and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, 23 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 286, 310 (1999) (quoting Prosecutor v. Akayesu,
Case No. ICTR-96-4-T (1998)).
142 EDWARD M. WISE & ELLEN S. PODGOR, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW:
CASES & MATERIALS 582 (2000) (quotingAkayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T).
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Ultimately, the Tribunal did find the defendant guilty of
both genocide and public incitement to commit genocide, but not
complicity in genocide, on the logical grounds that "the same
person cannot be both a principal and an accomplice to the same
offense."143 As significant as the Tribunal's opinion was, it took
forty-five years, from the Genocide Convention's entry into force
in 1951 to the Akayesu case in 1996, for the crime to be
adjudicated and enforced by an international criminal court.
Shortly after its adoption, many nations that signed and
ratified the treaty did so with published reservations 144 or
understandings. 145 Some have argued that such conditional
acceptances of the treaty undermined its intent, and several
states lodged official objections to such actions. 146 The U.N.
General Assembly sought clarity on this point by requesting an
advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice (the
"Court").147 The Court responded that reservations to the treaty
were allowed so long as they did not undermine the object and
purpose of the treaty itself.148 Despite vehement dissents from
the minority of judges on the Court, 149 this opinion carried the
day, yet the majority failed to delineate what kind of reservation
a state would have to make in order for it to be invalid.150
It is, therefore, apparently up to individual states in their
relationship with one another to determine whether a
reservation reached such an "undermining" threshold. 151 It has
been argued that this dissolves the Genocide Convention as a
true multilateral treaty regime and reconstitutes it as a series of
bilateral regimes between individual states. 5 2 Article IX of the
143 Id.
144 LEBLANC, supra note 113, at 210, 218.
145 According to the U.S. State Department, a reservation is a condition
attached to a country's acceptance of a treaty that "excludes or varies the legal effect
of one or more of the provisions of [the] treaty in their application to the reserving
state; an understanding merely explains or clarifies the meaning of one or more
provisions of a treaty but does not exclude or vary their legal effect." Id. at 10
(citing Hearing on the Genocide Convention before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm.
on Foreign Relations, 92d Cong., 106-107 (1971)).
146 Id. at 210, 218, 219-22.
147 Id. at 214.
148 Id. at 216-17.
149 Id. at 215-16.
150 Id. at 217-19.
151 Id. at 216-17.
152
The object-and-purpose test implies.., that a reservation could be
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Convention, empowering the Court to resolve disputes or
interpretations between state parties, is the most reserved from
article. 153 Twenty percent of the states that are parties to the
treaty have ratified it while denying the Court's jurisdiction. 54
Article IX likewise triggered a reservation by the United
States when it became a party to the treaty in 1988.15 Part of
the reason for the U.S. reservation was the Court's handling of
the 1985 case Nicaragua v. United States,5 6 wherein the Court
found jurisdiction to hear the case even after the U.S. withdrew
its consent to jurisdiction, and a decision resulted that was
adverse to the U.S. 157 Mistrust of the Court and its potential use
"for blatant political attacks or that it would allow itself to be
used for such attacks" was a driving force in the Senate coalition
that ultimately granted advice and consent for President Reagan
to ratify the treaty. 58 The result:
Other parties to the Genocide Convention could object to the
U.S. reservation on the ground that it is incompatible with the
object and purpose of the convention, and even declare, as the
Netherlands already has, that they do not recognize the United
States as a party to the convention because of the reservation.
And any of the other parties could, in accordance with the
doctrine of reciprocity, invoke the U.S. reservation should it
ever attempt to bring a case of genocide against them before the
I.C.J. This effectively guts the U.S. ratification. 159
incompatible with the convention. If a party to the convention should find
the reservation of another party incompatible, it could object. he reserving
state might then either withdraw its reservation or maintain it. If it were
to maintain the reservation, the objecting state could consider the
reserving state not to be a party to the convention. That matters in the
case of an objection, then, is how the objecting state views the status of the
one making the reservation. Does the objecting state consider the reserving
state not a party to the convention? Or does it object to the reservation but
still consider the state a party to the convention? Because not all parties to
the convention would necessarily object to the same reservations, the effect
of the object-and-purpose test could be to convert a multilateral treaty into
a series of bilateral agreements with varying terms.
Id. at 219.
.15 Id. at 218.
154 Id. at 217-19.
156 Id. at 228, 235.
15G LEBLANC, supra note 113, at 228.
157 Id. at 228, 239.
158 Id.
159 Id. at 228; see also id. at 221 (indicating that the Netherlands precisely and
clearly objected to reservation, unlike the other states that object, but has not
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Unfortunately, by the time the Genocide Convention entered
into force, weakened as it was by a series of reservations and
objections, the world had become a bipolar one-one that would
remain locked for forty years in a state of cold war that
discouraged any meaningful implementation of the treaty.
C. Genocide and Inaction During the Cold War (1950-1990)
As both the United States and the Soviet Union squared off
against one another, the globe became a chessboard. New states,
emerging through the process of decolonization in Africa and
Asia, were accordingly transformed into pawns of the two great
superpowers. 160 Despots were promoted in these states by one
power or the other in an effort to outmaneuver an ideological
adversary.161 Neither power had a genuine national interest in
promoting the Genocide Convention's applicability against the
other's pawn-thereby empowering the other to do the same-' - 62
or in promoting military intervention on a humanitarian basis to
stop genocide-thereby upsetting the fragile military status
quo. 163 This political/military tension tended to ensure a roughly
balanced bi-polar world,16 4 contributing to international stability:
carried their objection to the level of dispute).
160 See generally MICHAEL HAAS, GENOCIDE BY PROXY: CAMBODIAN PAWN ON A
SUPERPOWER CHESSBOARD (1991); Philip C. Aka, Africa in the New World Order:
The Trouble with the Notion ofAfrican Marginalization, 9 TUL. J. INTL & COMP. L.
187, 192 (2001) (citing Thomas M. Callaghy, Africa and the World Political
Economy: More Caught Between a Rock and a Hard Place, in AFRICA IN WORLD
POLITICS: THE AFRICAN STATE SYSTEM IN FLUX 43, 44 (John W. Harbeson & Donald
Rothchild eds., 2000)); Isaak I. Dore, Constitutionalism and the Post-Colonial State
in Africa: A Rawlsian Approach, 41 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1301, 1312 (1997); Ravi
Mahalingam, Comment, The Compatibility of The Principle of Nonintervention with
the Right of Humanitarian Intervention, 1 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 221,
240 (1996); Editorial, Unlikely Allies, WASH. POST, Oct. 2, 2001, at A24.
161 HAAS, supra note 160, at 76, 160-84.
162 Judith Miller, Iraq Accused: A Case of Genocide, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Jan.
3, 1993, at 13 ("No genocide case has ever even been argued before the World Court.
Such cases are enormously difficult to bring, let alone win. They must be sponsored
by a government against a government-not by or against individuals-and few
governments are willing to accuse another of such heinous conduct.").
163 Jules Lobel, Benign Hegemony? Kosovo and Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter,
1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 19, 22-23 (2000).
164
It is unlikely that the Gulf Crisis would have occurred in a bipolar world,
where the dynamics of mutual deterrence induced greater prudence in
relation to challenges directed at obvious strategic interests and more
effective control by superpowers over the initiatives undertaken by
secondary states such as Iraq. It is also unlikely that the internal tensions
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The second half of the twentieth century has demonstrated that
the prevention of genocide, mass killing, and ethnic cleansing is
a secondary value in the post-Holocaust world community. The
comforts of inaction and the maintenance of relative 'peace,'
non-interference in the internal affairs of nations, and geo-
political alliances and balances of power rank substantially
higher in the operational values of the world community.165
Indeed, since the United States did not even become a full
party to the Convention until its ratification took effect in
1989,166 America was in no legal position to argue for
enforcement of the treaty in any case. This dynamic, combined
with the general lack of political will by state parties to the
Convention to bring genocide charges against other states, 167
effectively curtailed the treaty's enforceability.
Thus, the treaty was essentially stillborn when it came into
effect in 1951. That is not to say, however, that atrocities did not
occur during the Cold War period. The 1950s and 1960s were a
time of turmoil; as the Cold War was beginning, the European
powers simultaneously released their colonial holdings and
largely withdrew from their self-created responsibilities in
Africa, Asia, and the Pacific. Preparation for self-government of
these peoples was spotty and/or nonexistent. 68 Into this vacuum
in Bosnia and Somalia would have spiraled out of control, as each country
was of strategic importance within a Cold War setting; that is, they would
have warranted the expenditure of lives and resources by superpowers to
maintain a given alignment.
Richard Falk, Regionalism And World Order After The Cold War, 1995 ST. LOUIS-
WARSAW TRANSATLANTIC L.J. 71, 73-74 (1995).
165 David M. Smolin, Essay, The Future of Genocide: A Spectacle for the New
Millennium?, 23 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 460, 464 (1999).
166 LEBLANC, supra note 113, at 235.
167 Paul W. Khan, American Hegemony and International Law, Speaking Law
to Power: Popular Sovereignty, Human Rights, and the New International Order, 1
CHI. J. INT'L L. 1, 13 (2000) ("[Tlhe most prominent symbol of the gap between
institutions and substantive law was the failure to replicate the Nuremberg
Tribunal at any point throughout the Cold War, despite the proliferation of human
rights law and the countless violations of that law."). For example, the flimsy official
argument that Australia presented when it backed out of pressing charges against
the Khmer Rouge for genocide in Cambodia centered on its unwillingness to
recognize the Khmer Rouge in any form as the legitimate government of Cambodia.
LEBLANC, supra note 113, at 208.
168
Institutions of European origin were superimposed on traditional African
institutions. The last thing on the political and social agenda of the
colonizing power was to allow the inhabitants of the colonized territories to
benefit from the values and rights associated with classic constitutionalism
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crept despotism, 169  which would be supported by the
superpowers so long as the proxy rulers were obedient. 170
After witnessing the eruptions of violence that immediately
followed the independence of India in 1947, and the partition of
Palestine to create Israel in 1948, subsequent hard-line leaders
were determined to seize power within the fading colonial
apparatus in an attempt to head off violent cleavages such as
these. Once ensconced in power, they brutally held onto it and
expanded their control to the artificially drawn borders of their
respective countries' 17 as a means of propping themselves up and
perpetuating their regimes. As a result, the 1970s witnessed a
series of genocides in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. In
Bangladesh and Burundi, the killings were precipitated by
coming elections wherein the ruling ethnic minority was likely to
succumb to the long-subjugated ethnic majority.172
In Bangladesh, this took the sinister form of a state-
engineered and military-produced genocide against Bengalis by
Pakistanis. The withdrawal of the British from the Indian
as practiced in the metropolitan power, namely, responsible, limited
government, with respect for the principle of equality and respect for
political and individual liberty. The policy of divide and rule, as applied in
the colonies, pitted one group against the other in every sphere of life, thus
exacerbating ethnic tensions. African scholars have attributed many of
Africa's current ethnic tensions to this policy. Indeed, the recent genocidal
massacres in Rwanda involving the Hutu and the Tutsi have been tied to
the colonial policy of Belgium. An additional reason why the ethnic
divisions of Africa have always loomed large is the way in which Africa
was carved up by the European powers during the great "scramble for
Africa" after the Berlin Conference of 1885 organized to harmonize the
various imperial powers' claims over the continent. Colonial boundaries
were drawn up without regard to ethnic, linguistic, religious, cultural,
economic, demographic or other social bonds in the various regions of
Africa. The legacy of this callousness and the cynical disregard of the
principle of ethnic integrity set the scene for the emergence of a series of
conflict-ridden and highly unstable states in the post-independence era.
Dore, supra note 160, at 1303-04.
169 Id. at 1307-11.
170 HAAS, supra note 160, at 77 ("After . . . [America's] abortive effort to
overthrow... Castro in Cuba, a more sophisticated strategy was devised for South
Vietnam. Evidence of CIA involvement in the assassination of ROV Premier Ngo
Dinh Diem in 1963 alerted [Cambodia's Prince] Sihanouk to the reality that
Washington preferred proxy, not independent, rulers.").
171 W. Michael Reisman, Comment, International Law After The Cold War, 84
AM. J. INT'L L. 859, 864 (1990).
172 James D. Wilets, The Demise of the Nation-State: Towards a New Theory of
the State Under International Law, 17 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 193, 202 (1999).
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subcontinent in 1947 resulted in a religion-based partition of the
former colony into Muslim Pakistan, divided into East and West
Pakistan, and a larger Hindu India in between the two
Pakistans. 173 In 1971, General Yahya Khan, the Pakistani
leader based in West Pakistan, dispatched thousands of military
forces across the subcontinent into East Pakistan to quell
growing nationalist sentiment among the Bengalis 7'L---the
ethnically, linguistically, and culturally distinct majority in East
Pakistan that was nevertheless disenfranchised and persecuted
by the ruling elite.175
While the initial intent of the Pakistani army was to stage
mass killings and liquidate nationalist leaders in order to cow
the Bengalis into submission, events spun out of control and the
intent evolved into one of group destruction, 176 thus vaulting the
massacres into the realm of genocide. As Professor Jahan,
formerly of Dhaka University, noted, "A policy of genocide
against fellow Muslims was deliberately undertaken by the
Pakistanis on the assumption of racial superiority and a desire
to cleanse the Bengali Muslims of Hindu cultural linguistic
influence.' 77
In the course of the next nine months, Pakistan's army
unleashed a genocide that resulted in the death of approximately
three million people; 178 the violation of a quarter million girls
and women, both in their homes in front of family members, and
in specially designed rape camps situated near barracks; 179 the
creation of ten million Bengali refugees who fled to India; and
the internal displacement of thirty million people. 80
173 Rounaq Jahan, Genocide in Bangladesh, in CENTURY OF GENOCIDE:
EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS AND CRITICAL VIEWS 291 (Samuel Totten et al. eds., 1997).
174 Id. at 294.
175 Id. at 292-93.
176 Id. at 294-95 ("IT]he military commander in charge of the Dhaka operations
reportedly claimed that he would kill four million people in forty-eight hours and
thus have a Tmal solution' of the Bengal problem." (citing ROUNAQ JAHAN,
PAKISTAN: FAILURE IN NATIONAL INTEGRATION (1972))).
177 Id. at 296.
178 Fox Butterfield, Mujib Resentful of Nixon's Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15,
1972, at A7; Jahan, supra note 173, at 291.
179 Jahan, supra note 173, at 291, 298.
180 Id. at 291 (citing MOHAMMAD AYOOB & K SUBRAHMANYAN, THE
LIBERATION WAR (1972), DAVID LOSHAK, PAKISTAN CRISIS (1971), ANTHONY
MASCARENHAS, THE RAPE OF BANGLADESH (1971), CHARLES PETER O'DONNELL,
BANGLADESH (1984), & ROBERT P. PAYNE, MASSACRE (1973)).
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Due to the Cold War, the world's response was cautious.
India favored Bangladesh in the conflict; consequently, so did the
U.S.S.R. as an aspiring ally of India. China, however, favored
Pakistan and so did the United States-who was using Pakistan
as an intermediary to open the door to China at the time.' 8'
Thus, only India itself intervened, sending in troops to defeat the
Pakistani army and thereby liberate Bangladesh, which emerged
as a separate country. 8 2 A trial was planned for the captured
Pakistani war criminals, but ultimately, India and Bangladesh
agreed not to prosecute the 195 Pakistani perpetrators for
commission of genocide in a quid pro quo for Pakistan's
recognition of Bangladesh as a separate country. 83
This dynamic of repressing a threatening ethnic majority
was repeated during the following year in central Africa. Unlike
the failed attempt of the ruling elite in East Pakistan to
maintain control over the Bengali population, the ruling Tutsi
minority of Burundi (twenty percent of the population)
successfully maintained themselves in power after the genocide
they committed against the Hutu majority (eighty percent of the
population). 84 This mass killing eventually claimed the lives of
between 100,000 and 150,000 people throughout the spring and
summer of 1972.185
Both Burundi and Rwanda were part of the German colony
of East Africa that was converted into a Belgian-administered
League of Nations Mandate after Germany's defeat in World
War I, and then a United Nations Trust Territory after World
War 11.186 But as independent statehood approached in 1962,
both countries experienced far different emergences onto the
world stage. While Burundi emerged in relative peace, Rwanda
emerged from bloody ethnic turmoil that resulted in a Hutu-
dominated republic. 187
181 Id. at 300-01.
182 Id.
183 Kristin Henrard, The Viability of National Amnesties in View of the
Increasing Recognition of Individual Criminal Responsibility at International Law,
8 MSU-DCL J. INT'L L. 595, 640 (1999).
184 Ren6 Lemarchand, The Burundi Genocide, in CENTURY OF GENOCIDE:
EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS AND CRITICAL VIEWS 317-18 (Samuel Totten et al. eds.,
1997).
185 Id.
186 Id. at 319; Linda Maguire, Power Ethnicized: The Pursuit of Protection and
Participation in Rwanda and Burundi, 2 BUFF. J. INT'L L. 49, 54-58 (1995).
187 Lemarchand, supra note 184, at 319-20. See generally L. Christian Marlin,
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Mindful of the graphic example of Hutu violence against
Tutsis, Burundi's ruling Tutsis became oversensitive to any
perceived threats from their own Hutu majority population. 88
Thus, in April 1972, when a Hutu-led insurrection occurred in
the southern towns of Rumonge and Nyanza-Lac, which claimed
the lives of two to three thousand mostly Tutsi victims, the Tutsi
regime overreacted. 8 9
President Micombero declared martial law and requested
assistance from the Zairean dictator, Mobuto-whose
paratroopers occupied the airport, freeing the Burundian army
to move en masse into the countryside and begin the slaughter of
Hutu civilians. 90 Some suggest this was of a pre-arranged plan
for mass annihilation that was put into effect by Foreign
Minister Simbananiye, with the assistance of the Interior
Minister and the leader of the ruling political party.191 Even if
such a plan did not exist, the decision by the government to
eradicate all "educated Hutus," from professionals to university
and trade school students all the way "down to the level of
secondary, and in some cases even primary school children,"192
clearly constitutes the intent to commit genocide under the
treaty definition of the term.
That the horrors wrought by the government on the
ethnically distinct masses were based on the "exigencies of self-
A Lesson Unlearned: The Unjust Revolution in Rwanda, 1959-1961, 12 EMORY INT'L
L. REV. 1271 (1998) (discussing the internal war fought to bring the Hutu to power
in Rwanda).
188 Lemarchand, supra note 184, at 318-21.
189 Id. at 322-23.
190 Id. at 323.
191 Id. For many Hutu, 'le plan Simbananiye' is the key to an understanding of
the killings. According to this master plan, conceived long before the Hutu uprising,
the aim was to provoke the Hutu into staging an uprising so as to justify a
devastating repression and cleanse the country once and for all of the Hutu peril.
There is little evidence of any such provocation; nor is it at all clear that any such
plan existed prior to the Hutu uprising. What is beyond question, however, is that
Simbananiye used the 'clear and present danger' posed by the Hutu insurgency as a
pretext to go far beyond the immediate exigency of restoring peace and order. As the
social profile of the victims clearly shows, the ultimate objective was to
systematically kill all educated Hutu elements, including civil servants, university
students, and school children, and in so doing, eliminate for the foreseeable future
any serious threat of Hutu rebellion. It is this sense that one can indeed speak of a
'Simbananiye plan.' Id.
192 Id. at 322-24. "Army units commandeered merchants' lorries and mission
vehicles, and drove up to schools removing whole batches of children at a time." Id.
at 324.
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preservation [that made] it imperative for the Tutsi not only to
retain control over the instruments of force but to use force
whenever confronted with [perceived] threats to their own
survival as a minority"193 is no excuse for the genocide.
Nonetheless, it suffices to at least make the events of 1972
somewhat more cognizable if still unconscionable. Predictably
during this Cold War period, the response from the international
community was non-existent. 19 4 As Professor Lemarchand of the
University of Florida observed: "Typical of the general
international indifference surrounding the genocide was the
official stance of the United States during the Nixon
administration which, according to a study of the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, revealed an extraordinary
combination of 'indifference, inertia, and irresponsibility.' "195
Other genocides unfolded in other parts of the world during
this period. Some were on a smaller scale and less well-known,
such as the effort of the Paraguayan government from 1972 to
1974 to exterminate and/or enslave the forest-dwelling Ach6
Indians as agricultural interests expanded into the country's
interior.196 Some were on a much larger scale, such as the
Indonesian Army's campaign of destruction against the East
Timorese people in 1975 immediately after the withdrawal of the
colonial power, Portugal. 197 Representatives of the Catholic
Church in Timor estimated the death toll of Timorese, after the
first twelve months of invasion, at 60,000 (or almost ten percent
of the population).198 The general western response to these
atrocities, especially the American response, was consistently
indifferent. 199
193 Id. at 327.
194 Id. at 327-28.
195 Id. at 317-18 (citing MICHAEL BROWN, GARY FREEMAN & KAY MILLER,
PASSING-BY: THE UNITED STATES AND GENOCIDE IN BURUNDI (1973)).
196 See GENOCIDE IN PARAGUAY 7-8 (Richard Arens ed., 1976) ("Physical
extermination was being supplemented by enslavement and incarceration on Indian
reservations .... Ach6s were being systematically hunted by armed raiding
parties." )
197 See generally James Dunn, Genocide in East Timor, in CENTURY OF
GENOCIDE: EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS AND CRITICAL VIEWS 264 (Samuel Totten et al.
eds., 1997); James Dunn, The East Timor Genocide, in 3 THE WIDENING CIRCLE OF
GENOCIDE 192, 206-07 (Israel W. Charny ed., 1994).
198 See Dunn, supra note 197, at 274.
199 Id. at 274-75; Richard Arens, Introduction, in GENOCIDE IN PARAGUAY 5,
11-12 (Richard Arens ed., 1976).
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None of the other genocides of this period, however,
approached the relative scale, brutality, and widespread
acknowledgment as the genocide that unfolded in the small
southeast Asian country of Cambodia from 1975 to 1979.200 In
the late 1960s, the Worker's Party of Kampuchea, which had
struggled against French colonialism, was overtaken from within
by communists. 2 1 The newly formed communist party staged
uprisings against Prince Sihanouk, who attempted to steer a
middle course between independence and statehood.202 This
policy culminated in an eventual overthrow of the successor
regime of Marshal Nol in 1975.203
The new, at least nominally communist government
immediately proclaimed the State of Democratic Kampuchea,
and a ruling body was organized from Phnom Penh as a central
committee. 204 The chief member who rose to prominence as the
committee's Secretary General was Saloth Sar, better known as
Pol Pot.205 The effects of the coup were immediate. As Yale's
Professor Ben Kiernan notes:
In the first few weeks after Cambodia fell to the Khmer Rouge
in April, 1975, the nations's cities were evacuated, hospitals
emptied, schools closed, factories deserted, money and wages
abolished, monasteries emptied, and libraries scattered.
200 See generally GENOCIDE AND DEMOCRACY IN CAMBODIA 141 (Ben Kiernan
ed., 1993); WILLIAM SHAWCROSS, THE QUALITY OF MERCY: CAMBODIA, HOLOCAUST
AND MODERN CONSCIENCE 328-29 (1984); Ben Kiernan, The Cambodian Genocide
1975-1979, in CENTURY OF GENOCIDE: EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS AND CRITICAL
VIEWS 334 (Samuel Totten, William S. Parsons & Israel W. Charny eds., 1997)
[hereinafter The Cambodian Genocide].
201 The Cambodian Genocide, supra note 200, at 336.
202 HAAS, supra note 160, at 77 ("[Wlhen Sihanouk went to Washington to
enlist support for an independent Cambodia, he received a lecture from Secretary of
State... Dulles that he should support France in the fight against Communism.
[Sihanouk's] argument, that French colonial rule was the most potent recruiting
theme for the Indochinese Communist movements, was rejected.").
203 The Cambodian Genocide, supra note 200, at 336.
204
Internally and externally, Cambodia was sealed off. Its borders were
closed, all neighboring countries militarily attacked, use of foreign
languages banned, embassies and press agencies expelled, local
newspapers and television shut down, radios and bicycles confiscated, mail
and telephones suppressed. Worse, Cambodians had little each other
anyway. They quickly learned that any display of knowledge or skill, if
'contaminated' by foreign influence.., was folly in Democratic
Kampuchea. Human communications were reduced to daily instructions.
Id. at 336-37.
205 Id. at 336.
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Freedom of the press, movement, worship, organization
association, and discussion, all completely disappeared for
nearly four years. So did everyday family life. A whole nation
was kidnapped [sic.], and then besieged from within....
Democratic Kampuchea was a prison camp state, and the 8
million prisoners served most of their time in solitary
confinement. And 1.5 million of the inmates were worked,
starved, and beaten to death.20 6
Seeking a resurrection of the Cambodian race cleansed of all
impurities, Pol Pot's regime launched a countrywide purge of
foreign-educated intellectuals, Buddhists, non-Cambodian
ethnicities, and finally his own people. 207 This amounted to
several religious or ethnically-driven genocides within the larger
context of the atrocities that were perpetrated by the Khmer
Rouge during its reign of terror.20
For example, the genocide of the monks was carried out on
an expedited plan. It was achieved quickly in order to rid
Cambodia of Buddhism altogether. 20 9 It is estimated that only
2,000 of Cambodia's 70,000 Buddhist monks survived the mass
extermination that was targeted at the monasteries. The clear
intent of the government is reflected in a 1975 Central
Committee document which proclaims: "Monks have disappeared
from 90 to 95 percent .... Monasteries... are largely
abandoned. The foundation pillars of Buddhism... have
disintegrated. In the future they will dissolve further. The
political base, the economic base, the cultural base must be
uprooted."210
The genocide of ethnic groups was not limited to a particular
group but carried out against all non-Cambodians. 211  The
Vietnamese were either expelled or extinguished: "Over 100,000
206 Id. at 334.
207 Id. at 339-43. "Given the sacrifices from the population that the nationalist
revival required, the resistance it naturally provoked, and the regime's
preparedness to forge ahead 'at all costs,' genocide was the result." Id. at 339.
208 Gregory H. Stanton, The Cambodian Genocide and International Law, in
GENOCIDE AND DEMOCRACY IN CAMBODIA 141 (Ben Kiernan ed., 1993) ("Cambodia
has been a party to the Genocide Convention since 1950.").
209 The Cambodian Genocide, supra note 200, at 340.
210 Id. (citing Chantou Boua, Genocide of a Religious Group: Pol Pot and
Cambodia's Buddhist Monks, in STATE-ORGANIZED TERROR: THE CASE OF VIOLENT
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[Vietnamese] were driven out by the Pol Pot regime in the first
year after its victory in 1975. The ones who remained in
Cambodia were simply murdered."2 12 Chinese casualties were
even more egregious: "Of the 1975 population of 425,000, only
200,000 Chinese survived the next four years .... Further, the
Chinese language... was banned, and so was any tolerance of a
culturally and ethnically distinguishable Chinese community.
That was to be destroyed 'as such.'"213 The Muslim Chains were
also systematically decimated:
Pol Poti's] army forcibly emptied all 113 Chan villages in the
country. About 100,000 Chains were massacred and the
survivors were dispersed in small groups of several families.
Islamic schools and religion as well as the Cham language,
were banned. Thousands of Muslims were physically forced to
eat pork. Many were murdered for refusing.214
Beyond destroying ethnic and religious minority groups, the
killing frenzy turned on the majority Khmers. This group was
artificially divided into a crazed scheme of "old citizens" who had
lived in the Khmer Rouge areas prior to 1975, and "new citizens"
who were city dwellers and generally supporters of the deposed
Marshal Nol. 215 All cities were evacuated, emptying people into
the countryside; by 1976, the "new citizens" were reclassified as
"deportees" setting them up as the principle victims of the 1977-
1978 countrywide massacres that ultimately claimed fifteen
percent of the rural population and twenty-five percent of the
urban.216
By the time the Vietnamese army invaded and deposed Pol
Pot's Khmer Rouge in 1979,217 the death toll had reached
1,671,000, or a staggering twenty-one percent of the
population. 218 Despite wide-spread recognition of the genocides
212 Id. at 340-41.
213 Id. at 341 (citing Ben Kiernan, Kampuchea's Ethnic Chinese under Pol Pot:
A Case Study of Systematic Social Discrimination, 16 J. CONTEMPORARY ASIA 18
(1986)).
214 Id. at 342.
215 Id. at 342. Because the Khmers constituted a majority of the population and
the massacres were not directed against ethnic or religious groups, but were at least
partially politically motivated, the wholesale slaughter of the Khmers by its own
government cannot be considered genocide under the terms of the treaty definition.
See Stanton, supra note 208, at 140.
216 The Cambodian Genocide, supra note 200.
217 Id. at 336, 339.
218 Id. at 343.
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occurring in Cambodia, the overwhelming majority of states,
including the United States, voted in the U.N. to condemn
Vietnam's invasion of its neighbor.219 Indeed, the Vietnamese
invasion itself was not principally about stopping the unfettered
killing in neighboring Cambodia, so much as it was about
superpower politics. 220 Some scholars argue that such politics
began the cycle, allowing the accession of the Khmer Rouge and
the subsequent genocides. 221
Vietnam's entry into Cambodia and its establishment of a
client regime known as the People's Republic of Kampuchea 222
was ironically both the cause and the result of triangulated
geopolitical strategic thinking in Beijing, Moscow, and
Washington. 223 The ensuing conflict was one that U.S. National
Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski characterized as a "proxy
war."224 Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge faded into the rainforest
to take up opposition against successive governments in Phnom
Penh.225
219 Lobel, supra note 163, at 23.
220 HAAS, supra note 160, at 27, 74-75.
221 Id. at 79 ("Reflecting on the era of U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia under
Nixon and Kissinger, Sihanouk later stated, 'They demoralized America, they lost
all of Indochina to the Communists, and they created the Khmer Rouge.' " (citing
WILLIAM SHAWCROSS, SIDESHOW: NIXON, KISSINGER AND THE DESTRUCTION OF
CAMBODIA (1979))); see also The Cambodian Genocide, supra note 200, at 344.
Pol Pot's regime would not have come to power without the massive
economic and military destabilization of Cambodia by the United States,
beginning in 1966. n 18 March 1969, the U.S. Air Force began a secret B-
52 bombardment of Vietnamese sanctuaries in rural Cambodia. Exactly
one year later, Prince Norodom Sihanouk was overthrown by the U.S.-
backed general Lon Nol. he Vietnam War spilled across, Sihanouk swore
revenge, and a new civil war tore Cambodia apart. The U.S. bombing of the
countryside increased from 1970 until August 15, 1973, when Congress
imposed a halt. Up to 150,000 Cambodians were killed in the American
bombardments.... In the ashes of rural Cambodia arose the CPK regime,
led by Pol Pot.
Pol Pot's forces had profited greatly from the U.S. bombardment .... [T]he
Khmer Rouge used the bombings' devastation and massacre of civilians as
recruitment propaganda, and as an excuse for their brutal, radical
policies ....
The Cambodian Genocide, supra note 200, at 344.
222 SHAWCROSS, supra note 221, at 390.
223 The Cambodian Genocide, supra note 200, at 27.
224 Id. at 27-28.
225 See RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 128, at 239-42.
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Absent any intervention to stop it, the most graphic chapter
in the Cold War saga of genocide perpetration ended.226 The
Genocide Convention, created after the Holocaust in order to
outlaw the crime, accordingly remained on the books-unused
and ignored. Ironically, and sadly, Cambodia itself had been a
party to the treaty since 1950.227
D. Genocide and Reaction After the Cold War (1990-2000)
After the Cold War, client states were generally released
from their fealty to the superpowers. 228 The Soviet empire had
collapsed, and America began to redirect its foreign aid towards
Eastern Europe.229 Thus, the hard-line leaders of smaller states
that were supported' in varying degrees were cut loose.
Subsequently, many such leaders were overthrown by popular
movements within their own countries. 230
This change in climate generally brought about more
willingness on the part of western democracies to intervene
abroad in a military capacity for humanitarian reasons, and to
eventually hold responsible those in power who could historically
hide behind the shield of sovereignty.
226 "The United States and the Western powers stood back, paralyzed by their
defeat in Vietnam from involvement in another ground war in Southeast Asia."
Stanton, supra note 208, at 155.
227 UNITED NATIONS, MILLENNIUM SUMMIT MULTILATERAL TREATY
FRAMEWORK: AN INVITATION TO UNIVERSAL PARTICIPATION 5 (2000).
228
Africa lost attractiveness with the end of the Cold War and the advent of
the post-Cold War era. 1996 Economist survey of the continent
reported... 'all the former colonial powers now regard Africa as marginal
to their own well-being and security. So does Russia. America has all but
disengaged.'
Aka, supra note 160, at 192 (citing Tony Thomas, Africa for the Africans: So Little
Done, So Much to Do, ECONOMIST, Sept. 7, 1996, at 3).
229 See id. at 188.
230 See Reisman, supra note 171.
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1. Political/Military Responses 231
The traditional concept of state sovereignty disallowed
intervention by foreign powers in the internal affairs of a
state.232  On the basis of reciprocity, this prihciple was a
cornerstone of international law in that each state recognized
the inviolability of other states' borders. 233 Indeed, international
border stability is regarded by the U.N. Charter as indispensable
to the maintenance of international peace and security.234 This
is the legal rationale that salved the collective conscience of the
West during its long period of inaction to stop genocides during
the Cold War period. A breach of borders is exactly what must
be done if there is to be any kind of foreign intervention to stop a
genocide from occurring within those borders. Therein is the
dilemma.
Certainly, this past pattern of practice colored the response
of the West, the only group of nations with a capability to project
force globally, when genocide was unleashed in Southern Europe
in 1992 and in Central Africa in 1994. The political reaction was
at first timid, but gained strength. The military action was
virtually non-existent or weak. After the atrocities occurred and
a peace settlement was reached, significant ground forces were
deployed in Europe.
In Bosnia, genocide took the form of what became known as
"ethnic cleansing."235  After the ethnically and religiously
heterogeneous region of Bosnia-Herzegovina declared
independence from Yugoslavia in 1992, hostilities immediately
erupted among three distinct groups: Croats, Muslims, and
231 To support the condemnation in the U.N. of Vietnam's invasion of
Cambodia, Britain, a permanent member of the Security Council,
[11n 1986 gave three reasons that the overwhelming majority of legal
opinion refused to recognize the existence of a right to use force on behalf
of humanitarian intervention: (1) The UN Charter and corpus of modern
international law do not seem to specifically to incorporate such a right. (2)
State practice in the past two centuries, and especially since 1945, at best
provides only a handful of genuine cases of humanitarian intervention,
and, on most assessments, none at all; and (3) on prudential grounds, that
the scope for abusing such a right argues strongly against its creation.
Lobel, supra note 163, at 22-23.
232 See BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 33 (3d
ed. 1999).
233 See id.
234 U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para. 4.
235 See generally, NORMAN CIGAR, GENOCIDE IN BOSNIA: THE POLICY OF
"ETHNIC CLEANSING" 53-61 (1995) (discussing theories and providing examples).
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Serbs. 236 The Bosnian Serbs quickly achieved a string of military
successes that captured large segments of territory within
Bosnia.237 They received direct aid and intermittent direction
from the Serbian leader within the state of the Yugoslav
federation bordering Bosnia, Slobodan Milosevic. This Serbian
leader relied on incitement of nationalist sentiment as an
organizing principle in the vacuum of communism's ideological
collapse. 238
The ensuing military campaign generally comported with
the long-awaited and rhetorically useful plan of cobbling
together an ethnically homogenous "Greater Serbia" from
remnants within the former Yugoslavia.23 9 Part of that plan was
to ostracize and drive out non-Serbs through terror and
destruction 240 in order to create the envisioned ethnic purity.241
Unfortunately, this process of ethnic cleansing included extreme
23G See id. at 38. According to the 1991 census, of the three main groups, the
population consisted of a 44% Muslim, 31% Serb, and 17% Croat mix that was
significantly intertwined geographically. Id. at 5.
Some believe that it was the act of international recognition that sparked
the outbreak of civil war in Bosnia. [Recognition... was the trigger... to
the formal outbreak of a war .... The critical mistake made by the EC as
well as the US was to continue down the path towards
[recognition] ... when every single sign indicated that it would be like
pouring petrol on a smoldering fire."
DAVID OWEN, BALKAN ODYSSEY 46 (1995) (Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar's
characterization of premature recognition as a "potential time-bomb").
237 Yasushi Akashi, The Use of Force in a United Nations Peace-Keeping
Operation: Lessons Learnt From The Safe Areas Mandate, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
312, 314 (1995).
238 See CIGAR, supra note 235, at 33-34 (stating that "[als part of his effort to
solidify popular opinion on his behalf, Milosevic encouraged the Serbs to focus their
wrath, in particular, against those ethnic groups who stood in the way of fulfilling
the [establishment of Greater Serbia]").
239 OWEN, supra note 236, at 77, 87; CIGAR, supra note 235, at 1621, 22-24.
[T]he genocide-or ethnic cleansing, as it has been commonly known-that
befell the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina was not simply the
unintentional and unfortunate by-product of combat or civil war. Rather, it
was a rational policy, the direct and planned consequence of conscious
policy decision, taken by the Serbian establishment in Serbia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina. This policy was implemented in a deliberate and systematic
manner as part of a broader strategy intended to achieve a well-defined,
concrete, political objective, namely, the creation of an expanded,
ethnically pure Greater Serbia.
Id.
240 CIGAR, supra note 235, at 5 (providing examples of the techniques
implemented). "[TIn the town of Kozarac, houses were color-coded according to the
owner's ethnicity and then "destroyed systematically." Id.
241 See id. at 56.
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victimization of Muslims in the captured territories, mass
deportation to prison camps,242 large scale collective massacres
and burials,243 and debasement of the population through mass
rapes, 244  public torture, and religious defilement. 245
Conservative estimates released by the Bosnian government in
early 1994 calculated over 140,000 dead or missing and over
160,000 wounded during the initial phase of the conflict.246
These activities were carried out alternately by the Yugoslav
Army, the Bosnian Serb forces, or special Serb militia units
formed for exactly this purpose. These units, which roamed
throughout the countryside, have been compared to the special
German Einsatzgruppen that followed the regular army into the
U.S.S.R., liquidating "racially and politically undesirable
elements."247 The initial response of the West was extreme
concern followed by fervent hesitation and crippling self-doubt.
After much debate in the U.N. Security Council, small U.N.
forces were deployed around designated "safe areas" and acted as
escorts for humanitarian relief convoys.248 The blue-helmeted
242 See OWEN, supra note 236, at 14.
The men were taken from the village at gunpoint and forced into freight
cars. As many as 180 were jammed, standing, into boxcars measuring
thirty nine by six feet. They were kept that way for three days, without
water or food, as the train moved slowly across the countryside. Nazis
transporting Jews in 1942? No, Serbs transporting Muslim Bosnians in
1992: one glimpse of the worst racial and religious bestiality Europe has
known since World War II.
Id. at 19 (quoting Anthony Lewis, Yesterday's Men, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 1992, at
A19).
243 CIGAR, supra note 235, at 54-55.
244 In response to reports of "rape camps" in which Muslim women and girls
were savagely raped by Serbian soldiers and held captive until either death or
pregnancy, the European Community's investigation found that "as many as 20,000
Muslim women have been systematically raped." Lori Lyman Bruun, Beyond the
1948 Convention-Emerging Principles of Genocide in Customary International
Law, 17 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 193, 201 (1993).
245 See CIGAR, supra note 235, at 56-57. [I]n Bratunac, the local Muslim cleric
reportedly was tortured in front of the townsfolk, who had been rounded up in the
soccer stadium, was ordered to make the sign of the cross, had beer forced down his
throat, and then was executed." Id. at 59.
246 Id. at 9.
247 See id. at 54-55.
248 The multinational United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) had been
deployed in neighboring Croatia after hostilities there had stabilized in March 1992
under UNSC Res. 743, and this force was extended into Bosnia later that year. See
OWEN, supra note 236, at 42-56, 330-31; Akashi, supra note 237, at 312.
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peacekeepers, however, eventually became targets themselves. 249
Thus NATO decided, pursuant to U.N. Security Council
authorization, to support forces on the ground in Bosnia with air
power but under an awkward dual command structure requiring
joint approval for air strikes from the U.N. Secretary General
and the NATO Commander. 250 This proved unworkable in the
field and eventually resulted in placing the power of decision in
military hands. 251
Subsequently, Bosnian-Serb positions were attacked by
massive NATO air strikes in 1994 and 1995 in response to
repeated shelling of civilian safe areas.252 Eventually, NATO's
action empowered the Bosnian federation forces to advance on
Bosnian Serb positions, thus turning the tide of the war.253 At
this point, Slobodan Milosevic took control and represented pan-
Serb interests 254 at the Dayton-Paris peace talks. The talks
finally ended the conflict, establishing a multi-ethnic federation
in Bosnia and providing for military occupation of the country by
NATO forces. 255
The military and political stumbles by the West that were
evident during the Bosnian effort are understandable in that
they were the first tentative efforts of an untested alliance to
249 OWEN, supra note 236, at 326-27 (recounting capture of Dutch soldiers);
Chris Hedges, U.N. Warns Serbs of Bombing if They Attack Dutch Unit, N.Y. TIMES,
July 10, 1995, at Al, A3.
250 See John Darnton, Accord in London: Policy: Allies Warn Bosnian Serbs of
'Substantial' Air Strikes If U.N. Enclave Is Attacked; Accord in London, N.Y. TIMES,
July 22, 1995, at Al, A4; Craig R. Whitney, Conflict in The Balkans: The Policy;
NATO Gives U.N. Officials Veto on Air Strikes in Bosnia, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 1995,
at Al, A8.
251 See John Darnton, Allies Warn Bosnian Serbs of 'Substantial' Air Strikes If
U.N. Enclave Is Attacked; Accord in London, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 1995, at 4; see
also Christopher S. Wren, Russia Fails In U.N. to Bar Raids on Serbs, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 13, 1995, at All.
252 See Yoram Dinstein, The Thirteenth Waldemar A. Solf Lecture in
International Law, 166 MIL. L. REV. 93, 100 (2000).
253 See generally North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO's Role in Bosnia
and Herzegovina, NATO Fact Sheet, at http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/role-
bih.htm (last modified August 2000) (discussing NATO's role in the conflict).
254 See OWEN, supra note 236, at 331.
255 Six days after the agreement was signed on December 14, 1995, NATO's
60,000 man Implementation Force (IFOR) was deployed. This contingent was
replaced by the smaller 32,000 man Stabilization Force (SFOR), deployed between
December 1996 and November 1999. SFOR's current complement is 20,000
personnel. See NATO, supra note 254, at http://www.nato.int/docufacts/2000/role-
bih.htm.
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move into a new situation of controlling genocidal forces in a
hostile country. But, the lack of interest, general
acknowledgment, or even pretense of threatened intervention in
the 1994 Rwandan genocide, while perhaps understandable, is
possibly unforgivable in humanitarian terms.
The roots of conflict in Rwanda find their source in the
ethnic manipulation of colonial times. After decades of
supporting minority Tutsi rule,25 6 Belgian policies shifted in the
1950's to gradually support majority Hutu rule.257
"[This] culminat[ed] in January 1961 with a Hutu-led,
Belgian-assisted coup that formally abolished the monarchy and
led to the proclamation of a de facto republican regime under
Hutu rule. By the time Rwanda acceded to independence [in]
1962, some 200,000 Tutsi had been forced into exile."25 8
It was not until 1991 that the brutally deposed Tutsi were
able to once again form themselves into significant opposition
parties capable of pressuring the Hutu-led regime into
accommodating their needs.25 9 A complicated sequence of events
then occurred that affected the psychology of all parties, which
led to the commission of the genocide. The Arusha Accords,
negotiated in neutral Tanzania between 1992 and 1993, which
granted the disenfranchised Tutsis greater representation in the
Rwandan government, legislature, and army, were derailed with
the assassination of Burundi's first popularly-elected Hutu
president, Melchior Ndadaye, in October by an "all-Tutsi
army."260
The ruling Hutus in neighboring Rwanda received the
message that the Tutsis could not be trusted. In April 1994,
when Rwandan President Habyalimana's plane was shot down,
the Hutu government quickly blamed the Tutsi (although hard-
liners in the government were suspected of killing their own
president in order to avoid power-sharing with the Tutsi), and
this became a sort of justification for the genocidal retribution.261
256 The Tutsis only comprised seventeen percent of the population. ALAN J.
KUPERMAN, THE LIMITS OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: GENOCIDE IN RWANDA 5
(2001).
267 Ren6 Lemarchand, The Rwanda Genocide, in CENTURY OF GENOCIDE:
EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS AND CRITICAL VIEWS 410 (Samuel Totten et al. eds., 1997).
258 Id. at 410.
259 Id. at 411-14.
260 Id. at 414-15.
261 Id. at 415.
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In January of that year, Rwanda had taken its seat as a
non-permanent member of the U.N. Security Council. 262 By the
close of the summer, the death toll had reached between 800,000
and one million Rwandans, mostly Tutsi. 263 When Hutu were
encouraged through government and party radio broadcasts to
take revenge upon the Tutsi for the president's murder, the
embryonic violence started to emerge. 264 Initially, this took the
form of attacks upon Tutsi homes, occasionally burning them,
followed by attempted murders, robberies, and rapes that were
generally unsuccessful because most Hutu were unarmed. The
violence, however, was threatening enough to scare the Tutsi
into taking increasingly defensive postures. 265
Soon the Tutsi fled their homes to form larger and larger
concentrated congregations at gathering places such as schools,
churches, hospitals, and stadiums. 266 By this ill-advised tactic,
they unwittingly sewed the seeds of their own destruction. One
week later, when better-armed Hutu troops and militia arrived
at the sites, their targets were already gathered for slaughter:
Typically, a few grenades would be tossed in on the Tutsi,
followed by light arms fire. Those Tutsi not killed or wounded
by the initial fusillade often attempted to flee, whereupon they
usually were cut down by gunfire or surrounded and killed by
the mob. Militia-led Hutu then would enter the site and hack
to death those still alive.267
Although some rifles were prevalent, it was the gruesome
machete that became the symbol of the Rwandan genocide.
Records show that over half a million were imported from China
in 1993 in anticipation of the bloodbath. 268 The rough and
tumble Hutu militias, their ranks swelled by unemployed and
delinquent Hutus eager to take out their frustrations on Tutsis,
were provided the weapons and the means to continue the
cleansing of the country.269 Radio broadcasts encouraged them to
262 L.R. MELVERN, A PEOPLE BETRAYED: THE ROLE OF THE WEST IN RWANDA'S
GENOCIDE 244 (2000).
263 Id. at 222-23.
264 KUPERMAN, supra note 256, at 15.
265 Id.
266 Id.
267 Id. at 15-16.
268 MELVERN, supra note 262, at 64-65.
269 Id. at 64. His militia was "trained to kill 1,000 human beings every twenty
minutes. Local administrators organized the disposal of bodies in garbage trucks."
Id. at 5.
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do their duty using horrific agricultural euphemisms for
genocide: " 'It is time to gather in the harvest,' 'The baskets are
only half full; they should be filled to the brim.'"270 The militants
carried out the atrocities with astonishing speed.
In the spring and early summer of 1994 a program of
massacres decimated the Republic of Rwanda, killing every
tenth person in a population. Although the killing was low-
tech-performed largely by machete-it was carried out at a
dazzling speed: of an original population of about seven and a
half million, at least eight hundred thousand people were killed
in just one hundred days. Rwandans often speak of a million
deaths, and they may be right. The dead of Rwanda
accumulated at nearly three times the rate of Jewish dead
during the Holocaust. It was the most efficient mass killing
since the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 271
The clergy was also not immune from the exhortations to
Hutu national imperative. For example, the trial of two Hutu
Roman Catholic nuns, convicted for complicity in the commission
of genocide by a Belgian court, revealed that they had offered
7,000 Tutsis up to the killers who were hiding in their convent.
The nuns also "provided petrol so that militiamen could set fire
to a barn in which about 500 Tutsis had taken refuge."272
How could such a catastrophe as this happen in the post-
Cold War world without any intervention whatsoever to stop it?
First, there were no longer any definable interests for the West
in central Africa. Second, the U.N. Security Council was still
seized with the Bosnia question, and it was not altogether clear
in the spring of 1994 how that would work out. Third, there was
no available, readily deployable military alliance in that region
even remotely similar to Europe's NATO. Fourth,
psychologically, U.S. policymakers had still not recovered from
the debacle in Somalia,273 which arguably colored their
270 ARTHUR JAY KLINGHOFFER, THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION OF GENOCIDE
IN RWANDA 45 (1998).
271 PHILIP GOUREVITH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU THAT TOMORROW WE WILL BE
KILLED WITH OUR FAMILIES: STORIES FROM RWANDA 4 (1998).
272 War-Crimes Tribunals: Judging Genocide, ECONOMIST, June 16, 2001, at 24
[hereinafter War Crimes Tribunal].
273 See DAVID WEISSBRODT ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 300 (3d ed.
2001) (noting that Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25), which was issued in
response to the Somalia experience, generated great concern among some scholars
and policy-makers as to its legality and financial costs).
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perceptions about going into Africa without clear entrance and
exit strategies, or definable goals that were short term and
assurances of local support.
These are by no means excuses so much as ex post facto
rationales offered in an attempt to explain the lack of
response.21 4 In a May 5, 1994 White House press briefing,
President Clinton's National Security Advisor, Anthony Lake,
responded to a question about Rwandan intervention this way:
When I wake up every morning and look at the headlines and
the stories and the images on television of these conflicts, I
want to work to end every conflict. I want to work to save every
child out there. And I know the president does, and I know the
American people do. But neither we nor the international
community have the resources nor the mandate to do so. So we
have to make distinctions. We have to ask the hard questions
about where and when we can intervene.., these kinds of
conflicts are particularly hard to come to grips with and to have
an effect on from outside, because basically, of course, their
origins are in political turmoil within these nations. And that
political turmoil may not be susceptible to the efforts of the
international community. So, neither we nor the international
community have either the mandate nor the resources nor the
possibility of resolving every conflict of this kind.275
Returning to the Balkans four years later, the evil of ethnic
cleansing raised its ugly head once again-this time within
Serbia.276 The epicenter of the violence was in Kosovo, the small
southern province wedged between Albania and Macedonia.2 77
274 The world community, and especially the Western powers, were roundly
chastised in subsequent fact-finding reports by the U.N. and the O.A.U. establishing
that even minor, low-level intervention would have likely stopped the bloodshed. Id.
at 301 (citing INGVAR CARLSSON ET AL., REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT INQUIRY INTO
THE ACTIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS DURING THE 1994 GENOCIDE 'IN RWANDA
(1999) & INTERNATIONAL PANEL OF EMINENT PERSONALITIES TO INVESTIGATE THE
1994 GENOCIDE IN RWANDA, RWANDA: THE PREVENTABLE GENOCIDE (2000)).
275 MELVERN, supra note 262, at 190-91. Indeed, U.S. State Department
officials wrangled for a month over whether to call what was happening in Rwanda
'acts of genocide' or 'genocide.' A recently disclosed internal memo stated: "Be
careful. Legal at State [the Office of Legal Adviser at the State Department] was
was worried about this yesterday-Genocide finding could commit [the U.S.G.] to
actually 'do something.' " Neil A. Lewis, Did Machete-Wielding Hutus Commit
Genocide or Just 'Acts of Genocide'?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2001, at A7 (alteration in
original).
276 Leslie A. Burton, Kosovo: To Bomb or Not to Bomb? The Legality is the
Question, 7 ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMP. L. 49 (2001).
277 Id. at 49.
2002]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Traditionally part of Serbia, even after the devastating defeat of
the Serbs by the Muslim Turks in the 1389 Battle of Kosovo, the
province's demographics shifted down through the centuries. By
1998, Serbs were a clear minority and Albanian Muslims
constituted close to ninety percent of the population in Kosovo.278
During the 1980s the Serb minority was vociferous about
discrimination against them by the autonomous Albanian
authorities, which lead Slobodan Milosevic, then president of
Serbia, to rescind Kosovo's self-governing authority and take
direct control of the province.279
Soon thereafter, the region descended into turmoil.
Yugoslavia broke into separate states in 1991 and 1992, and
Bosnia quickly descended into civil war.28 0 Seeing their chance
for a break, the Kosovars held a referendum and voted for
independence. This vote, however, was ignored in Belgrade and
Yugoslav army forces were sent into the province to secure it.281
Two years after the Bosnian situation cooled down, the Albanian
government collapsed in 1997, allowing for an unregulated fresh
flow of arms to militant Muslim separatists who had formed
themselves into the Kosovo Liberation Army.28 2
To counter this new threat, more federal forces rolled into
Kosovo and Milosevic unleashed an ethnic cleansing campaign to
depopulate the province of non-Serbs. 28 3 The terror campaign of
rapes, tortures, and mutilations drove an estimated 800,000
Albanians out of Kosovo 284 and into the neighboring states of
Montenegro, Albania, and Macedonia, which were ill-prepared
for the massive influx of wretched humanity. Those refugees,
however, were the lucky ones. Up to 10,000 were killed
outright. 28 5
An investigative journalist for Newsday managed to gain
interviews from both Albanian and Serbian witnesses about the
278 WEISSBRODT, supra note 273, at 328.
279 Id. at 328-29.
280 Id. at 329.
281 Id.
282 Id.
283 Frances X. Clines, NATO Hunting for Serb Forces; U.S. Reports Signs of
'Genocide,' N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1999, at Al.
284 WEISSBRODT, supra note 273, at 330; Chris Stephen, The Men Who Must
Now Face Justice, THE SCOTSMAN, Oct. 8, 2000, at 19.
285 WEISSBRODT, supra note 273, at 341; Charles M. Sennott, Dissecting a War
Crimes Machine: In Pec, Kosovars and Tribunal Amass Mound of Data, BOSTON
GLOBE, July 1, 1999, at Al.
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atrocities that happened in Kosovo. 286 The stories he uncovered
were chilling, hearkening back to Hitler's Germany:
Late one night at the end of March, Shkelzen Kruezi, an ethnic
Albanian in the Yugoslav army reserves, climbed behind the
wheel of a refrigerator truck at the cold-storage plant in
Prizren's industrial zone. The fully loaded truck had recently
been painted white with a large red cross on the roof to ward off
NATO bombs. Although a full colonel in uniform, Kruezi was
taking directions from his civilian Serb passenger, Spiro
Nikolic, who told him to drive to Balkan Rubber, a factory 12
miles away in Suva Reka. There, Kruezi said, he parked inside
the factory compound and he and his passenger left to rest.
When they returned the next morning the truck was empty.
Gone was their cargo of frozen corpses, nearly all Albanians
killed in the ethnic-cleansing campaign by Yugoslav security
forces. The forces launched their mayhem March 20, and it
accelerated when NATO's air war began March 24.
After the truck left, a cloud of black smoke hung over the
shuttered factory. At least 10 times during the more than 11-
week conflict, smoke rose, said Fisnik Kryezic, 21, a Kosovo
Liberation Army member who kept an eye on the otherwise
inoperative plant from a nearby hill. "It was a terrible smell,
the smell of rubber burning and also a much sharper stench,"
said Sinan Bajraktari, whose house is next door to the complex.
"Smell that smell," a Serbian woman told a close relative of
Bajraktari. "These are Albanians we are burning."287
Clearly this mass deportation plan, together with the
resulting deaths, constituted genocide under the treaty
definition's terms.288 After failed negotiations and duplicitous
conduct by Milosevic, NATO decided, for credibility's sake at
286 Roy Gutman, Atrocities in Kosovo / The Killings, and the Killers / Evidence
of Ethnic Cleansing Machine, NEWSDAY, July 27, 1999, at A4.
287 A cover-up and fear soon followed:
An important part of the coverup was the removal of the very instruments
of removal. According to Krasniqi, the cold-storage plant's deputy
manager, the white refrigerated truck left for Serbia two days before the
arrival of German NATO troops. Nikolic also departed for Serbia. Kruezi
arrived in Albania under a different name and fears that his activities
could earn him an indictment for war crimes. "They mobilized me. They
forced me to go into the army," he said. "I must hide somewhere."
Id. at A4.
288 Kathleen Sarah Galbraith, Note, Moving People: Forced Migration and
International Law, 13 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 597, 615-16 (1999) (arguing that such
mass deportation would meet the requirements of the treaty's terms).
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least, that it had to follow through on its threat to use force to
stop the genocide. 289 As NATO Ambassador Balanzino recalled:
"[E]thnic cleansing in Kosovo began many months before NATO
launched its first strike. It was to stop Milosevic from writing
the final chapter in his campaign to systematically depopulate
Kosovo that NATO decided it could no longer postpone military
action."290
The military operation was massive. NATO flew 32,000
bombing missions, delivering massive payloads of ordnance into
Serbia and Kosovo against both military and non-military
targets.291 Three weeks later, the bombing ended and NATO
troops entered and occupied the province, setting up a
provisional run government run by the U.N.292 Subsequently,
200,000 Serbians left Kosovo and moved to Serbia.293 Evidence
of the atrocities, which will prove vital to the success of later
prosecutions at the Hague Tribunal, immediately began to
surface once the area was secured:
It took a walk of no more than 400 yards... off the main road
to Prizren to the outbuilding of a small farm in the Kosovan
village of Velika Krusa to witness at first hand the gruesome
depravity of ethnic cleansing.
The village, which once had a population of 6,500 was eerily
silent apart from a few dozen refugees who had arrived home
that morning. But, despite what they had already been
through, the ethnic Albanians found their much-longed-for
homecoming almost a burden too far.
Serb paramilitary police and Yugoslav soldiers had dedicated
an entire three weeks to an unimaginable orgy of destruction
and murder. Every single house in this large Muslim village
had been torched and shelled. The mosque had not been spared
either.
But far worse was to come.
289 Michael J. Kelly, Traveling the Road to Rambouillet: Is the Imposition of
Federalism in Kosovo Pragmatic Foreign Policy or Unwise Meddling?, 40 S. TEX. L.
REV. 789 (1999).
290 Sergio Balanzino, NATO's Actions to Uphold Human Rights and Democratic
Values in Kosovo: A Test Case For a New Alliance, 23 FORDHAM INTL L.J. 364, 365
(1999).
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Just behind a burnt-out farmhouse off one of the small cratered
roads, was a quiet courtyard... Across on the other side of the
yard was a building which had once been used to house farm
materials. The stone walls were pock marked with bullet
holes... The scene inside was sickening. In a small room lay
six bodies, charred beyond all recognition. All the skulls bore
bullet marks. The holes in the wall at waist height indicated
that the people-it was impossible to tell their sex-had been
shot while sitting down with short bursts of machine gun fire.
Starving dogs, which roam all over Kosovo, had been there too
and had picked at some of the flesh. The floor was blackened,
which suggested the victims had been set alight by their
captors afterwards ... In the next room, there were the
remains of 15 people who had endured the same horror. A
ceiling had collapsed in on the remains which lay all over the
floor. Burnt clothing, which looked liked short-sleeved shirts,
was stuck to some of the bodies. The smell of death was
everywhere. Nobody knew what to say.
Dutch soldiers ... were informed of the discovery by returning
Albanians .... A forensic team from the International War
Crimes Tribunal was last night on its way to the scene from
Pristina. 294
In a strange and cruel twist of irony, it was Milosevic's
Yugoslav government that was the first to file charges of
genocide against NATO for its bombing campaign against the
Serbs in the Court.295 The Court dismissed the action.296
2. Institutional Responses: International War Crimes
Tribunals
International criminal tribunals were almost unheard of
prior to the last century. In fact, efforts to create such tribunals
following World War I to prosecute the defeated German Kaiser
and the Turkish perpetrators of the Armenian genocide
ultimately came to naught, 297 although a handful of Germans
294 Ciaran Byrne, Bodies Litter a Village Laid Waste by Hatred, THE SCOTSMAN,
June 16, 1999, at 3.
295 WEISSBRODT, supra note 273, at 343.
296 Id. (noting that the I.C.J. dismissed for lack of jurisdiction against the U.S.
and Spain, but is officially still seized of the action against other NATO member
states that submit to its jurisdiction).
297 See Lippman, supra note 109, at 417-22; SCHABAS, supra note 2, at 19.
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and Turks were tried by their own domestic courts.298 After the
undeniable horror of the Holocaust, the Allies established the
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg to prosecute the
surviving Nazi war chiefs.299 This was the first successful
creation of an international criminal tribunal, 00 and resulted in
the conviction and sentencing of several Nazi leaders for what
amounted to genocide within the context of crimes against
humanity.3 01
Nuremberg set the stage for more prosecutions to follow 30 2
and established a political will on the part of the world
community. This newfound political resolve translated to the
establishment of the Tokyo Tribunal to prosecute the Japanese
war criminals who, although not indicted on charges of
genocide,30 3 were held accountable for atrocities such as the
"Rape of Nanking" in 1937 in which 12,000 non-combatant
ethnic Chinese were arbitrarily killed and 2,000 were raped.30 4
No other international criminal tribunals were established
during the Cold War period of mutual strategic stasis.
Individual states, however, could assert universal jurisdiction
over the crime of genocide to prosecute perpetrators in their
domestic courts.30 5 Poland tried former Nazis in its national
courts during the late 1940s;306 Israel did this most prominently
with the capture, trial, and conviction of Adolph Eichmann in
1961-1962.307 Equatorial Guinea tried and executed its former
dictator for genocide in 1979308 and, although clearly politically
motivated, the Vietnamese-installed government of Cambodia
tried and convicted Pol Pot in absentia on charges of genocide,
also in 1979.309
After the Cold War, the world again collectively decided to
pursue those responsible for the commission of genocide via a
298 SCHABAS, supra note 2, at 20-22.
299 Lippman, supra note 109, at 425-31.
300 SCHABAS, supra note 2, at 19.
301 Id. at 36-42; Lippman, supra note 109, at 430.
302 SCHABAS, supra note 2, at 47-50.
303 Id. at 79 n.216.
304 Lippman, supra note 109, at 430.
305 SCHABAS, supra note 2, at 386-88.
306 Id. at 388.
307 Id. at 360-61, 386-88.
308 RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 128, at 146-47.
309 Id. at 147.
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supranational juridical apparatus. 310 Thus, the U.N. Security
Council established ad hoc war crimes tribunals to address the
rampant atrocities committed in both the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR).311 The tribunals were charged with
investigating, indicting, prosecuting, and punishing those who
had been accused during the conflict of committing war crimes,
genocide, and crimes against humanity.31 2
Paradoxically, while the better-funded and staffed Hague
tribunal3 3 initially failed to secure a genocide conviction, it was
the financially and organizationally shaky ICTR314 that was the
first to make such a conviction.315 The ICTR also was the first
court to hold that rape can "legally be considered an aspect of
genocide." 316 Subsequently, and perhaps most significantly, the
ICTR successfully tried and convicted the first head of
government for his role in the gruesome carnage between Hutus
and Tutsis.317 Following is an excerpt from the ICTR's landmark
opinion finding the former Rwandan Prime Minister guilty of
genocide and sentencing him accordingly:
[Tihere was in Rwanda in 1994 a widespread and systematic
attack against the civilian population of Tutsi, the purpose of
which was to exterminate them. Mass killings of hundreds of
thousands of Tutsi occurred in Rwanda, including women and
children, old and young who were pursued and killed at places
where they had sought refuge i.e. prefectures, commune offices,
schools, churches and stadiums ....
Jean Kambanda acknowledges that following numerous
meetings of the Council of Ministers between 8 April 1994 and
17 July 1994, he as Prime Minister, instigated, aided and
abetted the Prefets, Bourgmestres, and members of the
population to commit massacres and killings of civilians, in
particular Tutsi and moderate Hutu. Furthermore, between 24
April 1994 and 17 July 1994, Jean Kambanda and Ministers of
310 Id. at 165-66.
311 Lippman, supra note 109, at 494.
312 RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 128, at 166-68, 173-75.
313 War-Crimes Tribunals, supra note 272, at 24-25.
314 RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 128, at 176; SCHABAS, supra note 2, at 382-
83.
315 van der Vyver, supra note 141, at 287 (citing Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul
Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T (Sept. 2, 1998) (summary available at 37 I.L.M.
1399 (1998)).
316 War-Crimes Tribunals, supra note 272, at 23.
317 Id.
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his Government visited several prefectures... to incite and
encourage the population to commit these massacres ....
[He] acknowledges that on 3 May 1994, he was personally
asked to take steps to protect children who had survived the
massacre at a hospital and he did not respond. On the same
day, after the meeting, the children were killed ....
Jean Kambanda acknowledges that he ordered the setting up of
roadblocks with the knowledge that these roadblocks were used
to identify Tutsi for elimination, and that as Prime Minister he
participated in the distribution of arms and ammunition to
members of political parties, militias and the population
knowing that these weapons would be used in the perpetration
of massacres of civilian Tutsi.
Jean Kambanda acknowledges that he knew or should have
known that persons for whom he was responsible were
committing crimes of massacre upon Tutsi and that he failed to
prevent them or punish the perpetrators. Jean Kambanda
admits that he was an eye witness to the massacres of Tutsi
and also had knowledge of them from regular reports of prefets,
and cabinet discussions ....
Trial Chamber I, for the foregoing reasons... [and] having
found Jean Kambanda guilty [of genocide and crimes against
humanity] ... sentences [him) to life imprisonment[.] 318
The ICTY quickly caught up with the ICTR,3 19 issuing a
flurry of indictments, including eight for genocide. 320 ICTY's
jurisdiction covers crimes in all the territories of former
Yugoslavia. 2 1 Although it has yet to extradite key genocidal
players such as Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic and
General Ratko Mladic,3 22 it has, nevertheless, produced
significant results in the Tadic and Krstic cases.323
Despite the relative success of the ad hoc tribunals, the
question arises as to where the world goes next after these courts
318 Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No.ICTR 97-23-S (Sept. 4, 1998), available at
http://www.ictr.org/wwroot/ENGLISHIcases/Kambanda/judgementfKambanda.html
(visited Feb. 7, 2001).
319 Patricia M. Wald, Judging War Crimes, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 189, 190 (2000).
320 SCHABAS, supra note 2, at 378; Carlotta Gall, Serb on Trial for Genocide of
Albanians in Kosovo, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 6, 2000, at All (stating that "[t]hese courts
[in Kosovo] have begun to try Serbs for genocide and other war crimes").
321 SCHABAS, supra note 2, at 99.
322 See id. at 380.
323 See id. at 209-11; see also David J. Lynch, One of the Worst Places on Earth,
USA TODAY, Nov. 17, 2000, at 19A.
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have finished their work. There is an emerging political/legal
tension among states regarding the preference for continuing to
promulgate such ad hoc tribunals, limited as they are
territorially and by subject matter, and establishing a
permanent, independent international criminal court (discussed
below) to deal with offenses such as genocide. 324
An agreement reached in 2001 between Cambodia and the
U.N. will establish a tribunal in Phnom Penh composed of both
Cambodian and U.N. judges to try surviving members of the
Khmer Rouge for atrocities committed during their reign.325 The
highest ranking defendants are unfortunately unavailable for
prosecution on charges of genocide-Pol Pot is dead and his
foreign minister, leng Sary, has been pardoned by the king. A
similar formula is being negotiated to set up a tribunal in
Freetown to redress the inhuman atrocities visited upon the
people of Sierra Leone by rebel forces during its recently
concluded civil war.326
Thus, simultaneously, more ad hoc tribunals are being
created as the treaty establishing a permanent criminal court
enters into force. Moreover, the invocation of universal
jurisdiction by a Belgian national court in the summer of 2001,
leading to the prosecution and conviction of two individuals on
charges of genocide in Rwanda 27 raises the possibility of re-
energized national courts acting beyond their traditional
territorial boundaries.
324 Critics have been articulate about the weaknesses of the ad hoc tribunal
system. As Professor Sharon Williams of Osgoode Hall explains:
[I]t is not sufficient to act on an ad hoc basis. To do so requires the
selective political consent of the United Nations Security Council, acting
under Chapter VII of the Charter... and there is a possibility that one of
the five permanent members will veto the action. Albeit, the Security
Council's necessary actions in this way led to the expeditious formation of
the [ICTY] and [ICTRI, a permanent court not hampered by geographical
limits and time is necessary.
Sharon A. Williams, The Rome Statute on the International Criminal Court: From
1947-2000 and Beyond, 38 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 297, 299-300 (2000).
325 Trials in Cambodia, Better Late than Never, ECONOMIST, July 14, 2001, at
40 (noting that human rights advocates are worried that this will be a weaker
version of the ICTY and ICTR because ill-trained Cambodian lawyers will hold
majorities on the panels and do not grasp the finer points of international law);
RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 128, at 275-77.
326 Trials in Cambodia, supra note 325, at 40; War-Crimes Tribunals, supra
note 272, at 25.
327 War-Crimes Tribunals, supra note 272, at 24.
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III. ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
On July 17, 1998, the United Nations Diplomatic Conference
of Plenipotentiaries, meeting in Rome, adopted a treaty by a vote
of 120 to 7,328 establishing the first 329 permanent International
Criminal Court (the ICC). 330 Although the idea of international
criminal culpability has existed for some time, the modern effort
to create the ICC was the culmination of initial discussions
begun in the early 1950s to found a post-Nuremberg entity in
which criminal cases could be brought against individuals who
had perpetrated heinous crimes in violation of international
law. 331
Widely hailed as a key component in the future
administration of criminal justice internationally, 332 the treaty
contained a provision whereby it would automatically enter into
force, and thereby formally establish the ICC, on the first day of
the month sixty days after the deposit of the sixtieth
ratification. 333 Given this threshold, the treaty entered into force
on July 1, 2002, and it currently has 139 signatories and 76
parties.334
A. Genocide Included as a Crime
The crime of genocide was included among other crimes in
the Rome Statute's conferral of jurisdictional competence on the
Court.335 The definition of the crime is taken verbatim from the
1948 Genocide Convention.33 6  The U.N. Preparatory
328 See UNITEIh NATIONS, Documents relating to International Criminal Court,
available at http://www.un.org/icc/docs.htm (last visited July 20, 2002).
329 Barbara Crossette, U.S. Accord Being Sought on U.N. Dues and on Court,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2000, at A6.
330 UNITED NATIONS, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July
17, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 999 [hereinafter Rome Statute]; BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R.
TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW: SELECTED DOCUMENTS 2001-2002 at 921 (2001).
331 See generally RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 128, at 177; Marcus R.
Mumford, Building upon a Foundation of Sand: A Commentary on the International
Criminal Court Treaty Conference, 8 J. INT'L L. & PRAC. 151, 160-63 (1999); Leila
Nadya Sadat, The Establishment of the International Criminal Court: From the
Hague to Rome and Back Again, 8 J. INT'L L. & PRAC. 97 (1999).
332 Mumford, supra note 331, at 151.
333 Rome Statute, supra note 330, at 1068.
334 UNITED NATIONS, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, at
http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partI/chapterxviii/treaty
10.asp (last visited July 20, 2002) [hereinafter United Nations].
335 Rome Statute, supra note 330, art. 5.
336 See id. art. 6.
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Commission, however, has broken out the elements of the crime
individually as separate crimes of genocide:337
ARTICLE 6 GENOCIDE
Introduction
With respect to the last element listed for each crime:
- The term "in the context of' would include the initial acts
in an emerging pattern;
- The term "manifest" is an objective qualification;
- Notwithstanding the normal requirement for a mental
element provided for in article 30, and recognizing that
knowledge of the circumstances will usually be addressed
in proving genocidal intent, the appropriate requirement,
if any, for a mental element regarding this circumstance
will need to be decided by the Court on a case-by-case
basis.
Article 6 (a) Genocide by killing
Elements
1. The perpetrator killed* one or more persons.
2. Such person or persons belonged to a particular national,
ethnical, racial or religious group.
3. The perpetrator intended to destroy, in whole or in part,
that national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such.
4. The conduct took place in the context of a manifest
pattern of similar conduct directed against that group or
was conduct that could itself affect such destruction.
*The term "killed" is interchangeable with the term "caused death."
ARTICLE 6 (B) GENOCIDE BY CAUSING SERIOUS BODILY OR MENTAL
HARM
Elements
1. The perpetrator caused serious bodily or mental harm to
one or more persons.*
2. Such person or persons belonged to a particular national,
ethnical, racial or religious group.
3. The perpetrator intended to destroy, in whole or in part,
that national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such.
337 PREPARATORY COMMISSION FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT,
Report of the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court,
Addendum, Part II: Finalized Draft Text of the Elements of Crimes, U.N. Doc.
PCNICC/2000/lAdd.2 (June 30, 2000), available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/
statute/elements/elemfra.htm.
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4. The conduct took place in the context of a manifest
pattern of similar conduct directed against that group or
was conduct that could itself affect such destruction.
*This conduct may include, but is not necessarily restricted to, acts of
torture, rape, sexual violence or inhuman or degrading treatment.
ARTICLE 6 (C) GENOCIDE BY DELIBERATELY INFLICTING
CONDITIONS OF LIFE CALCULATED TO BRING ABOUT
PHYSICAL DESTRUCTION
Elements
1. The perpetrator inflicted certain conditions of life upon
one or more persons.
2. Such person or persons belonged to a particular national,
ethnical, racial or religious group.
3. The perpetrator intended to destroy, in whole or in part,
that national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such.
4. The conditions of life were calculated to bring about the
physical destruction of that group, in whole or in part.*
5. The conduct took place in the context of a manifest
pattern of similar conduct directed against that group or
was conduct that could itself affect such destruction.
*The term "conditions of life" may include, but is not necessarily restricted
to, deliberate deprivation of resources indispensable for survival, such as
food or medical services, or systematic expulsion from homes.
ARTICLE 6 (D) GENOCIDE BY IMPOSING MEASURES INTENDED TO
PREVENT BIRTHS
Elements
1. The perpetrator imposed certain measures upon one or
more persons.
2. Such person or persons belonged to a particular national,
ethnical, racial or religious group.
3. The perpetrator intended to destroy, in whole or in part,
that national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such.
4. The measures imposed were intended to prevent births
within that group.
5. The conduct took place in the context of a manifest
pattern of similar conduct directed against that group or
was conduct that could itself affect such destruction.
ARTICLE 6 (E) GENOCIDE BY FORCIBLY TRANSFERRING CHILDREN
Elements
1. The perpetrator forcibly transferred one or more
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persons.*
2. Such person or persons belonged to a particular national,
ethnical, racial or religious group.
3. The perpetrator intended to destroy, in whole or in part,
that national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such.
4. The transfer was from that group to another group.
5. The person or persons were under the age of 18 years.
6. The perpetrator knew, or should have known, that the
person or persons were under the age of 18 years.
7. The conduct took place in the context of a manifest
pattern of similar conduct directed against that group or
was conduct that could itself affect such destruction.
*The term "forcibly" is not restricted to physical force, but may include
threat of force or coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, duress,
detention, psychological oppression or abuse of power, against such person
or persons or another person, or by taking advantage of a coercive
environment.
Thus, the crime of genocide, although defined similarly in
the Rome Statute and the Genocide Convention, is now
articulated with much more clarity through its elemental
subdivision in the ICC's supporting documents; however the
status of political groups remains unprotected.
B. Prospects for Enforcement
Prospects for successful enforcement against the crime of
genocide by the ICC hinge on three issues: (1) interpretation of
the Court's jurisdictional limitations; (2) depoliticization of the
legal process; and (3) willingness of states to participate in the
judicial and prosecutorial apparatus.
Article 5 of the Rome Statute confers competence on the ICC
to undertake cases involving only genocide, crimes against
humanity, war crimes, and aggression.338 This narrow list,
therefore, neither criminalizes terrorism as such nor does it
capture the traditional jus cogens crimes over which states have
historically asserted universal jurisdiction, such as piracy and
slavery.339  Given the broad definition of crimes against
humanity, however, and the qualification that they can be
committed in times of peace, the acts themselves (murder, rape,
338 Rome Statute, supra note 330, art. 5
339 See id.; William F. Wright, Limitations on the Prosecution of International
Terrorists by the International Criminal Court, 8 J. INT'L L. & PRAc. 139, 145
(1999).
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torture, etc.) that compose commission of those crimes can be
prosecuted and punished.340
Article 12 empowers the Court to exercise its jurisdiction on
states that are a party to the Rome Statute. The jurisdiction
covers events that take place within the territory of a member
party, and the acts of member party nationals. Jurisdiction may
also lie where a state accepts the jurisdiction of the Court with
respect to a particular crime.341 Prior to such an exercise, a
referral system must trigger an investigation by the Prosecutor,
who in turn must decide whether to proceed. In the case of a
state party linked to the territory of the crime or the suspected
national, the referral can come from a state party or by self-
initiation from the Prosecutor proprio muto with the approval
and authorization of the Pre-Trial Chamber. 342 If, however, the
referral comes from the U.N. Security Council, 343then "the Court
can exercise jurisdiction even when neither the state in whose
territory the crimes have been committed nor the state of
nationality of the accused is a State Party."344
Perhaps inevitably, politics can intervene in this legal
process. The U.N. Security Council is empowered under Article
16 to truncate any investigation or prosecution if a resolution is
adopted under the U.N. Security Council's Chapter VII
authority. 345 This deferral lasts for twelve months and may be
renewed indefinitely.3 46 Nonetheless, the U.N. Security Council
deferral system is still preferable from a procedural point of view
to granting the five permanent Council members individual veto
power over each prosecution as originally proposed. 347
340 Rome Statute, supra note 330, art. 7.
341 Id. art. 12.
342 Id. art. 13-15.
343 Id. art. 13(b).
34 Young Sok Kim, The Preconditions to the Exercise of the Jurisdiction of the
International Criminal Court: With a Focus on Article 12 of the Rome Statute, 8 J.
INT'L L. & PRAC. 47, 55 (1999).
345 Rome Statute, supra note 330, art. 16.
346 Id.; see also Brian D. Keatts, Comment, The International Criminal Court:
Far from Perfect, 20 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 137 (2000).
347 Jelena Pejic, Conceptualizing Violence: Present and Future Developments in
International Law: Panel II: Adjudicating Violence: Problems Confronting
International Law and Policy on War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity: The
Tribunal and the ICC: Do Precedents Matter?, 60 ALB. L. REV. 841, 858 (1997)
(stating that "[tihe Security Council... might be paralyzed by a veto in deciding to
refer a matter to the court. t is imaginable that a permanent member of the Council
might wield its veto power to shield either its own, or an allied national from
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The willingness of state parties to participate in the ICC's
enforcement mechanism is ultimately a question of political
will.348 If they can muster the political fortitude to see through
the implementation of the requirements domestically, and
support the Court when requests are made by its Prosecutor,
then enforcement can become a reality. There is, however, no
provision in the statute itself to force compliance by states that
are parties. As with most treaties, there is no central enforcing
authority, and affirmative punishment for non-compliance is
lacking. Indeed, this is often the general problem with
international law. 349 International legal regimes are usually
reliant for their success on the good will and consent of the
states that belong to them. Absent that, failure can be
imminent.
The commitment of non-states parties who may only be
signatories to the convention not to actively undermine the ICC
is also important. Although the United States declined to
become a party to the treaty because of its opposition to the final
language, which allows for the remote possibility of U.S.
nationals (such as soldiers serving abroad) to come under the
ICC's jurisdiction, 350 it did sign the document along with Israel
and Iran on New Year's Eve of 2000,351 the last day that the
Rome Statute was open for signature.
This signature carries with it an obligation under
international law to avoid undermining the "object and purpose"
of the treaty.352 Naturally, the question arises as to what this
international justice"); see also Jonathan I. Charney, Progress in International
Criminal Law?, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 452, 454-55 (1999).
348 Charney, supra note 347, at 455 (explaining that "[a] key obstacle to the
ICC is that its activities could touch on highly political interests over which some
states are not willing to relinquish control, even to facilitate prosecution of
international crimes.").
349 MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 2-3 (3d ed.
1999).
350 See generally Kim, supra note 344, at 73 ("[Flor example, if a U.S. citizen
committed a crime against humanity in State A, and State A was a State Party to
the ICC, the ICC could exercise its jurisdiction over the U.S. citizen without the
consent of the United States, provided that other requirements ... are met.");
Ambassador David Scheffer, America's Stake in Peace, Security and Justice, 8 J.
INT'L L. & PRAC. 1 (1999).
351 United Nations, supra note 334.
352 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23,
1969, Art. 18, 1155 UNTS 333, 336 (stating that the 'object and purpose' clause is
contained in article 18 of The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which
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means. In the broadest sense, it could mean complying with
prosecutorial requests and/or turning over evidence and suspects
to the ICC. Failure to do so upon reasonable request could be
interpreted as actively undermining the treaty's object and
purpose. 353  In the narrowest sense, it could mean simply
avoiding the ICC altogether, ignoring its requests, power, and
jurisdiction, but at the same time not trying to dismantle it
either.
Nonetheless, the ICC cannot arbitrarily invoke its
jurisdiction when a national court is already seized of a matter
since its jurisdiction is specifically complementary. 354 In other
words, the ICC is designed to work in practice as a prosecutorial
gap-filler. "In every instance, national courts-and not the
ICC-would be the preferred forum for the trial of accused war
criminals. Only if national courts were either [unable] or
[unwilling] would the ICC proceed."355 Thus, while political fears
of national governments about the ICC are largely unjustified,
they unfortunately may remain for a while, hampering further
international prosecution of genocide in the post-Bosnia, post-
Rwanda world.
IV. THE EROSION OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND THE
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MILOSEVIC PROSECUTION
While it remains unclear how effective the ICC will be in
deterring and prosecuting genocide, sovereigns must now,
nonetheless, think twice before inciting or committing this
grievous crime, for trends are moving against them. Notions of
state sovereignty, inviolability of borders, and sovereign
entered into force in 1980); CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 233, at 113 (explaining
that the United States is a signatory to this treaty but did not ratify it; however, the
U.S. State Department has acknowledged the binding effect of its rules as
essentially a codification of existing customary law; therefore, the U.S. follows its
provisions); Michael J. Kelly, Clinton's Decision Commits America, LANSING ST. J.,
Feb. 22, 2001, at 8A [hereinafter Kelly, Clinton's Decision]; Michael J. Kelly,
Imperfect Justice, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Feb. 7, 2001, at B7.
353 Kelly, Clinton's Decision, supra note 352.
354 van der Vyver, supra note 141, at 335-36.
355 See id. at 341 (quoting Jerome J. Shestack & David Stoelting, The
International Criminal Court: Setting the Record Straight, CICC MONITOR, July 16,
1988, at 3); see also Michael A. Newton, Comparative Complementarity: Domestic
Jurisdiction Consistent with the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
167 MIL. L. REV. 20, (2001) (providing further commentary on the principle of
complementarity contained in the Rome Statute).
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immunity are rapidly eroding on parallel tracks. Although
certainly not irrelevant, the concept of nation-state sovereignty,
gleaned from the seventeenth century Westphalian system, is
under considerable pressure from increasing numbers of
secessionist groups within states either clamouring for, or
achieving independence. 356 Moreover, just cause has emerged as
a practically internationally recognized excuse for western
powers to cross theoretically unbreachable frontiers to either
capture sovereigns, as in the case of Noriega in Panama, or
otherwise affect government policy, as in the case of Serbia on
behalf of Kosovo. Part and parcel of this process, inevitably, is
the erosion of sovereign immunity.
Whereas sovereignty theory traditionally linked these
concepts, perhaps most eloquently articulated when France's
King Louis XIV remarked 'Tetat qest Moi," the gradual erosion of
sovereign immunity has longer historical roots than the others.
The first crack in this wall appeared when King John signed the
Magna Carta at Runnymeade in 1215, placing him under the
law. American jurisprudence has likewise wrestled with the
concept, recalling Justice Sutherland's observation that
sovereignty finds its source in international law3 57 and Justice
Jackson's famous stratification of the president's sovereign
power depending on whether he acts in accordance with
Congress, in its silence, or in derogation of its wishes.358
But it was during the world's emergence from the Cold War
that all these related concepts began to rapidly deplete, leading
to a sequence of events that allowed the international
community to move forward in its application of immutable rules
of conduct by sovereigns within their own borders. After the
Gulf War, President Bush, albeit belatedly in 1991, ordered the
cessation of Iraqi military activity north of the 36th parallel to
stop Saddam Hussein's renewed brutalisation of the Kurdish
minority there, thus placing a large portion of President
356 Michael J. Kelly, Political Downsizing: The Re-Emergence of Self-
Determination, and the Movement Toward Smaller, Ethnically Homogenous States,
47 DRAKE L. REV. 209, 253 (1999)
357 See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936)
(discussing United States sovereignty in light of international treaties,
understandings, compacts, and principles).
358 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring) (discussing the sovereign power of the President).
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Hussein's country off-limits to his sovereignty.3 59 Similar action
was previously called for to stop Hussein's use of poison gas
against the Kurds in 1988,360 but none materialized. Clearly, the
difference between no action in 1988 and action in 1991 to
similar events track the continuance and cessation of the Cold
War. A sea of change in attitude toward sovereignty was
occurring.361
Differences in the operation of evolving legal theory were
played out on the field of Southeastern Europe. Sovereignty was
not implicated in the Bosnian intervention because NATO was
invited to become involved by Bosnian President Izabegovitch
with the blessing of the U.N. Security Council. But sovereignty
was clearly implicated in the Kosovo intervention four years
later when NATO conducted punitive air strikes against
Yugoslav positions and cities--definitely not at the invitation of
President Milosevic. 362
359 See Kelly, supra note 356, at 277 (noting that the creation of safe zones for
the Kurdish people limiting Iraq's sovereignty in Northern Iraq (quoting William
Safire, Essay, Woodrow Wilson Lives, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1998, at A17)); Orrin G.
Hatch, Safe Haven's Aren't Enough, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 1991, at A23 (discussing
United States control of Iraq and its occupation of one fifth of Iraq's territory);
William Safire, Editorial, Duty to Intervene, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1991, at A17
(discussing that George Bush Sr. designated Kuristdan off-limits to Hussein and
directed the military to take actions to aid refugees).
360
Not just a whiff but the stench of genocide drifts from the Kurdish areas of
Iraq and the green hills of Burundi, homeland of the Hutu tribe. Those
who commit such acts should know the world watches, that sovereignty
cannot legitimize genocide .... Burundi is indeed sovereign, and so is Iraq.
In a world in which states jealously guard their sovereignty, no
international police can be summoned if a country slaughters within its
own frontiers .... Enough silence.
See Editorial, Murder Within Sovereign Borders, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 1988, at A20.
361 In fact, the Gulf War may be seen as the seminal event that actually
encompassed the diverging concepts. No one intervened in 1988 because of
sovereignty, and one of the reasons articulated for the American-led coalition to
enter the Gulf War was the restoration of Kuwaiti sovereignty. Moreover, the
decision was made not to eliminate Iraq's sovereign, and he was never prosecuted
for war crimes, genocide or crimes against humanity. The war itself, however, is
bookended by two events immediately before and after that cast doubt on the
inviolability of sovereignty: America's trampling of Panama's sovereignty in 1989
when it invaded the country to capture Manuel Noriega, and America's designation
prohibiting Iraqi military activity in the Northern 'no-fly zone' in 1991. See
Woodrow Wilson Lives, N.Y.TIMES, Sept. 28, 1998, at A17.
362 See Kelly, supra note 289, at 799 (noting that stopping genocide in Kosovo
involved intervention that violated that borders of a sovereign state).
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The Kosovo operation was a military intervention by an
international alliance against a sovereign state that was
conducting internal "ethnic cleansing." This intervention
occurred without prior authorization from the U.N. Security
Council (China and Russia objected due to their own 'internal
matters' of Tibet and Chechnya).363 It led to occupation of an
internationally acknowledged internal province of Serbia.364 The
decision to go forward, clearly a violation of traditional sovereign
prerogative and border inviolability, was a defining moment for
NATO-and a politically courageous one.365  Thus, it is the
Kosovo intervention that many consider to be reflective of the
seismic paradigm shift in the once sacrosanct notion of state
sovereignty, as SUNY-Buffalo's Professor Westbrook notes:
At some fundamental level, international law scholars appear
to have subordinated the doctrine of state sovereignty to
international law's prohibition on genocide, a position which
has been explicitly taken by Michael Glennon: 'Intrastate
genocide is no longer entitled to the protection of sovereignty.'
Kosovo appears to teach two lessons .... First, genocide is
barbarism, and the civilized world need not respect the
sovereignty of barbarians, even when they pose no threat to
security. Warfare against barbarians is permissible...
Warfare may even.., be required-hence the "new
interventionism."
If barbarian (at least genocidal) states are not sovereign, they
cease to be states. The second lesson is the converse of the first:
statehood is defined in terms of participation in the civilized
order. Whereas international law was once understood to be the
product of express or tacit agreement among states, the state
itself has come to be defined by its conformity to the basic
requirements of international law. Failure to conform to such
requirements, for example, by slaughtering one's minorities,
results in the forfeiture of sovereignty and so loss of
statehood.366
363 See id. (noting that stopping genocide in Kosovo implicated uninvited
violation of sovereign state borders, and opposition within the council); GENOCIDE IN
TIBET, A STUDY IN COMMUNIST AGGRESSION (Rodney Gilbert ed., 1975) (discussing
the political history of Tibet); MARY CRAIG, TEARS OF BLOOD, A CRY FOR TIBET
(1992).
364 See Kelly, supra note 289, at 799.
365 See id.
366 David A. Westbrook, Essay, Law Through War, 48 BUFF. L. REv. 299, 328-
29 (2000).
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This very point was reinforced by the United Nations
Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, in his address to the U.N.
Human Rights Convention, thus signalling the subordination of
state sovereignty interests to human rights interests, at least for
the most heinous violations of those rights in callous disregard of
international prohibitions:
Secretary General Kofi Annan... unveiled a doctrine with
profound implications for international relations in the new
millennium. The air strikes against Yugoslavia [to protect
Albanians in Kosovo], he said... showed that the world would
no longer permit nations intent on committing genocide to 'hide'
behind the United Nations [Charter, which has traditionally
safeguarded national sovereignty. The protection of human
rights, he said, must 'take precedence over concerns of state
sovereignty .... He was, he acknowledged ... embracing an
'evolving' international norm. 367
So the question shifts to whether sovereign immunity has
eroded even further than the concept of sovereignty? The
answer is yes, although this erosion occurred with a much longer
historical paper trail, therefore, making it arguably more
justified. The Nuremberg Principles that emanated from the
post-World War II trial of Nazi leaders, adopted by the U.N.
General Assembly, specifically provided that heads of state or
other public officials were not immune from prosecution nor were
they deserving of mitigated punishment.368
This concept blossomed in the 1990s. Domestically, the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals denied Manuel Noriega's head
of state immunity defense in his trial and appeal on cocaine
367 Miller, Sovereignty, supra note 80.
368 The Nuremberg Principles provide:
I. Any person who commits a crime under international law is
responsible therefore and liable to punishment;
II. The fact that domestic law does not punish an act which is an
international crime does not free the perpetrator of such crimes from
responsibility under international law;
III. The fact that a person who committed an international crime acted as
Head of State or public official does not free him from responsibility
under international law or mitigate punishment;
IV. The fact that a person acted pursuant to order of his Government or of
a superior does not free him from responsibility under international
law. it may, however be considered in mitigation of punishment;
V. Any person charged with a crime under international law has the
right to a fair trial on the facts and law.
Mumford, supra note 331, at 161.
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trafficking in 1997.369 Internationally, as noted earlier, in 1998,
Rwanda's deposed head of government, Jean Kambanda, was
tried and convicted of genocide by the ICTR.370  Sovereign
immunity was of no avail.
In 1999, responding to a Spanish request for extradition, the
British House of Lords determined that former Chilean dictator
Augusto Pinochet, physically in England, "did not enjoy former
head of state immunity for acts of torture that he or his
government committed during his reign."371 Although he was
allowed to return to Chile on the grounds that he was unfit for
trial, the House of Lords decision dealt a blow to traditional
notions of impunity, which dictators cling to as a shield from
justice.372
On this point, the University of Colorado's Professor Bradley
and the University of Chicago's Professor Goldsmith remarked,
"[The] Pinochet [case] is significant because it shows that
international law and the mechanisms of its enforcement are
changing. Recent developments in international law, especially
in the areas of human rights and criminal law, have placed
substantial pressure on traditional notions of sovereignty,
including notions of sovereign immunity."373
Indeed, during the Pinochet deliberations, other autocratic
leaders of questionable and sometimes brutal repute began to
worry about their own untouchability:
At the same time that Pinochet was being detained by British
authorities in London, the French government was hosting
Democratic Republic of Congo president Laurent Kabila, who
stands accused of playing an active role in the Rwandan
genocide. Kabila was reportedly nervous about traveling to
369 See United States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir. 1997)
(affirming the district court's denial of head of state immunity to Noriega).
370 Prosecutor v. Kambandak, Case No. ICTR 97-23-S, part IV (Sept. 4, 1998)
available at http://www.ictr.org (last visited July 20, 2002) (holding Jean
Kambanda guilty of genocide).
371 Christopher L. Blakesley, Autumn of the Patriarch: The Pinochet
Extradition Debacle and Beyond-Human Rights Clauses Compared to Traditional
Derivative Protections Such as Double Criminality, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1, 15 (2000).
372 See Stephen Kim Park, Article, Dictators in the Dock: Retroactive Justice in
Consolidating Democracies, A Comparative Analysis of Chile and South Korea, 25
FLETCHER F. 127, 129 (2001) (discussing the Pinochet prosecution as a move toward
justice for leaders who commit atrocities).
373 Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Pinochet and International Human
Rights Litigation, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2129, 2183 (1999).
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Europe and inquired about formal assurances of diplomatic
immunity prior to leaving his home country.374
Now, in 2001, with the trial of former Serbian and Yugoslav
president Slobodan Milosevic on charges of genocide, 375 a nail
can be put in the proverbial coffin of immunity for heads of state
that perpetrate this atrocity. Although Mr. Milosevic, a wily
attorney himself,376 has attempted to wrangle out of the ICTY's
jurisdiction by filing an action with a Dutch district court
arguing that the ICTY, created by the U.N. Security Council,
was illegal, the court dismissed the case. 377 He will likely try
other appeals to higher Dutch courts as well as the European
Court of Human Rights.3 78
Continuation of such legalistic tactics, together with
expansion of the indictment to include genocide, by which the
prosecution hopes to build on its recent conviction of General
Krstic for the genocidal massacre in Srebrenica during the
Bosnian conflict, indicates that Milosevic's trial will be a long,
drawn-out, and exhaustive one that could take years.3 79
Ultimately, however, although the form of prosecution,
arguments rendered, evidence admitted, and rules employed are
important in and of themselves, they are not dispositive of the
incredible expansion of international law in this regard. It is the
very fact of Milosevic's arrest and prosecution as a former head
of state that is of utmost importance. The outcome of the trial is
of secondary significance. Amenability to a court's jurisdiction
equates to legal responsibility for one's actions while in office.
While there is no formal recognition of stare decisis in
international law, cases can become reflective of existing norms
374 Michael J. Kelly, Case Studies "Ripe" for the International Criminal Court:
Practical Applications for the Pinochet, Ocalan, and Libyan Bomber Trials, 8
DETROIT Co. L. J. INT'L L. & PRAC. 21, 24 n.17 (1999).
375 Indictment attached as Appendix II. See Marlise Simons, Genocide Trial for
Milosevic, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2001, at sec. 4, 2 (stating that Milosevic would be
charged with genocide and other war crimes).
376 See Roger Cohen & Marlise Simons, At Arraignment, Milosevic Scorns His
U.N. Accusers, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2001, at Al (noting Milosevic's intention to act as
his own council and his attempts to assert that the ICTY was an illegal tribunal).
377 Marlise Simons, Milosevic Loses Appeal, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2001, at A6.
378 See id. (noting that Milosevic's Dutch lawyers stated they would appeal or
go to the European Court of Human Rights).
379 See Marlise Simons, Milosevic to Face Charges Covering 3 Wars in Balkans,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2001, at Al (noting that the inclusion of genocide in
indictments against Milosevic will draw out Milosevic's trial).
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and thereby persuasively mandatory in their own right.380
Milosevic attempted to redirect the prosecution's case by
focusing on recasting the Kosovo conflict as a war against
terrorism, styling the Kosovo Liberation Army as terrorists.38 1
This tactic is likely to fail. Another chief argument asserts that
his actions reflected the desire of the masses: "[Mly conduct was
the expression of the will of the people. The prosecution is
accusing the population of supporting me, and let me say that
my behavior here is an expression of the will of the citizens as
well, the will of the people."382 This tactic will also fail. Just as
Hitler could not have clothed his actions in the desire of the
masses, so too Milosevic will not be allowed the same
moral/political justification.
Just as the arrest and detention of Augusto Pinochet three
years ago was a bellwether, indicative of the slide of sovereign
immunity now cited by Peruvian lawyers in their extradition
request to Japan for former president Alberto Fujimori to stand
trial for massacres under his regime,38 3 the arrest and trial of
Milosevic in and of itself-regardless of a conviction-is the
clarion call of the new century, heralding the end of impunity for
sovereigns with genocidal blood on their hands. Yale's Professor
Fiss notes the significance: "The aspiration of the world after
World War II was for some form of universal jurisdiction for a
limited number of crimes, including genocide ... [blut it is only
in the decade of the 1990's that this aspiration has been given
some substance, and Mr. Milosevic's trial is the culmination."38 4
CONCLUSION
Genocides, once they are committed do not tend to go away.
Modern Armenians and modern Ukrainians, now in their own
380 See Raj Bahla, The Myth About Stare Decisis and International Trade Law,
14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 845, 852-53 (1999) (discussing the problem in identifying
binding precedent in international law).
381 See Ian Fisher & Marlise Simons, Defiant, Milosevic Begins His Defense by
Assailing NATO, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2002, at Al (stating that Milosevic claimed to
have fought a war against Albanian separatists that he claims were terrorists).
382 The Accused: Expressing the 'Will of the People', N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2002,
at A8.
383 Clifford Krauss, Peru, Pressing Japan, Issues an Order for Fujimori's Arrest,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2001, at B3 (discussing an international arrest order issued
for Alberto K Fujimori by Peru).
384 Cohen & Simons, supra note 376, at A6 (quoting Owen Fiss, Professor of
Law, Yale Law School).
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independent nations since the collapse of the Soviet Union on
Christmas Day 1991, are actively raising awareness about the
long ignored plight of their ancestors who perished in the early
part of the last century. To be certain, the latent effects of the
Holocaust continue to powerfully and hauntingly affect
humanity's collective memory even today:
The concentration camp is part of the history of modern society.
The destructive power of modern technology was tested on the
battlefields of mass war, with the slaughterhouses of the
concentration camps serving as a proving ground for the
destructive power of modern organization. The modern era
liberated humanity from incomprehensible forces, yet at the
same time immensely increased the power of human beings to
kill. Measured against this hypertrophy, earlier forms of power
seem fragmentary, irrational, crude in their means, and limited
in scope. 385
In a legal sense, reverberations of genocide's enormous
cruelty have found their way into the courtroom, demanding
redress. Claims against banks for recovery of accounts and
assets seized and deposited by Hitler's Nazi regime, claims
against German corporations that used slave labor under the
Reich, and claims to recover stolen property have all been
brought within the past ten years-sometimes en masse as class-
action suits in both American and foreign courts.386 This is
certainly appropriate where either the actual survivors or the
victims' children can directly benefit.
Cambodians are only now coming to terms with prosecuting
their own devastating version of genocide that occurred in the
'killing fields' of Kampuchea in the 1970s through establishment
of a mixed national/international tribunal to punish the
surviving perpetrators. In Australia, modern aborigines are
raising the argument that government-sponsored forced
relocation and resettlement of aboriginal children with Anglo
families in the 1960s and 1970s constitutes genocide. In
385 SOFSKY, supra note 96, at 276 (emphasis omitted).
386 See generally THE PLUNDER OF JEWISH PROPERTY DURING THE HOLOCAUST:
CONFRONTING EUROPEAN HISTORY (Avi Beker ed., 2001); THE LEGACIES OF THE
HOLOCAUST: HEARING BEFORE THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
supra note 1 (discussing the difficulties in providing restitution for Holocaust
victims); Findings and Recommendations of the Presidential Advisory Commission
on Holocaust Assets in the United States, Plunder and Restitution: The U.S. and
Holocaust Victims' Assets (Dec. 2000).
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America, modern Native Americans are raising similar
arguments about the U.S. government's brutal settlement of the
South and West, relocation along the 'trail of tears' to
reservations west of the Mississippi, and subsequent policies
that ensured continued cultural impoverishment. 387
What is the lesson? Genocides do not fade quietly away into
the history books. Past atrocities visited upon a people linger in
the collective memory of humanity as if mass death takes on an
ethereal life of its own. We must endeavour not to ignore them,
as we have done, but to intervene and forestall them where we
can. Once a bloodbath is interrupted, we must then seek to not
only mourn those who perished, but investigate, prosecute, try,
convict, and punish the perpetrators, be they uneducated thugs,
savvy politicians, or even Catholic nuns as in Rwanda.
With the fall of communism and the collapse of dictatorships
like dominoes all across the globe, twenty-first century society is
on track to become more enlightened and dominated by the rule
of law, just as America has become. Consequently, it is
important to support those institutions, such as the
International Criminal Court, that perpetuate this ideal and
help export it to more societies. At the same time, we must take
care to monitor and suppress the spread of weapons of mass
destruction: biological, chemical, and nuclear. For these may
become the new tools of genocide, as Saddam Hussein
graphically demonstrated in 1988 with his release of poison
against the Iraqi minority Kurdish population, decimating the
population by 5,000.388
Heretofore, inconceivable genocides could be committed
instantaneously without any actual inhuman brutalities
occurring in a face-to-face manner on the ground.389 President
Nixon once remarked, "I can go into my office and pick up the
387 See Robert K Hitchcock & Tara M. Twedt, Physical and Cultural Genocide
of Various Indigenous Peoples, in CENTURY OF GENOCIDE: EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS
AND CRITICAL VIEWS 372-91 (Samuel Totten et al. eds., 1997); Katz, supra note 110,
at 24-27 (discussing the creation of Indian reservations and treatment of Native
Americans by the United States government).
388 See Alan Cowell, Kurds Fall Back from Iraqi Forces, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2,
1991, at A8 (noting that government forces used chemical weapons at Halabja and
killed an estimated 5,000 people).
389 See SCHABAS, supra note 2, at 203-05 (noting the International Court of
Justice's finding that where the requisite intent is present, genocide may be
committed by the use of nuclear weapons).
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telephone and in 25 minutes 70 million people will be dead."3 90
Indeed, as the International Court of Justice recognized, if the
intent is present, nuclear genocides of staggering proportions can
be carried out long-distance, continents away.391
It has been a long road down a particularly brutal path
through the twentieth century toward the definition,
criminalization, and punishment of genocide. Now, as the last
vestiges of former sovereigns' immunity defense against genocide
wane with the Milosevic trial at The Hague, the world
community can look forward to a better century, secure in the
knowledge that genocides are indeed cognizable crimes and
perpetrators, whatever their position, are punishable, even if
they cannot readily be gotten when hiding behind strong armies.
Justice is patient. And once they are captured, the old artificial
shield of legal impunity cannot save them.
390 Paul A. Hemesath, Note, Who's Got the Button? Nuclear War Powers
Uncertainty in the Post-Cold War Era, 88 GEO. L.J. 2473, 2473 (2000) (citing First
Use of Nuclear Weapons: Preserving Responsible Control: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Int'l Sec. & Scientific Affairs of the Comm. on Int'l Relations of the
House ofRep., 94th Cong. 218 (1976)).
391 See SCHABAS, supra note 2, at 474-75 (discussing the ICJ's determination
that nuclear attack allowed for an inference of intent to destroy a protected group
given the potential enormity of casualties).
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APPENDIX I
CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF
THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE
ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
OF THE UNITED NATIONS ON 9 DECEMBER 1948
THE CONTRACTING PARTIES,
HAVING CONSIDERED the declaration made by the General As-
sembly of the United Nations in its resolution 96 (I) dated 11 De-
cember 1946 that genocide is a crime under international law,
contrary to the spirit and aims of the United Nations and con-
demned by the civilized world,
RECOGNIZING that at all periods of history genocide has in-
flicted great losses on humanity, and
BEING CONVINCED that, in order to liberate mankind from
such an odious scourge, international co-operation is required,
HEREBY AGREE AS HEREINAFTER PROVIDED:
Article I
The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether com-
mitted in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under interna-
tional law which they undertake to prevent and to punish.
Article II
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the follow-
ing acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the
group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calcu-
lated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in
part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the
group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another
group.
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Article III
The following acts shall be punishable:
(a) Genocide;
(b) Conspiracy to commit genocide;
(c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide;
(d) Attempt to commit genocide;
(e) Complicity in genocide.
Article IV
Persons committing genocide or any of the other acts enumer-
ated in article III shall be punished, whether they are constitu-
tionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals.
Article V
The Contracting Parties undertake to enact, in accordance
with their respective Constitutions, the necessary legislation to
give effect to the provisions of the present Convention, and, in par-
ticular, to provide effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide
or any of the other acts enumerated in article III.
Article VI
Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts enu-
merated in article III shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the
State in the territory of which the act was committed, or by such
international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect
to those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its
jurisdiction.
Article VII
Genocide and the other acts enumerated in article III shall
not be considered as political crimes for the purpose of extradition.
The Contracting Parties pledge themselves in such cases to
grant extradition in accordance with their laws and treaties in
force.
Article VIII
Any Contracting Party may call upon the competent organs of
the United Nations to take such action under the Charter of the
United Nations as they consider appropriate for the prevention
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and suppression of acts of genocide or any of the other acts enu-
merated in article III.
Article IX
Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the in-
terpretation, application or fulfillment of the present Convention,
including those relating to the responsibility of a State for geno-
cide or for any of the other acts enumerated in article III, shall be
submitted to the International Court of Justice at the request of
any of the parties to the dispute.
Article X
The present Convention, of which the Chinese, English,
French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall
bear the date of 9 December 1948.
Article XI
The present Convention shall be open until 31 December 1949
for signature on behalf of any Member of the United Nations and
of any nonmember State to which an invitation to sign has been
addressed by the General Assembly.
The present Convention shall be ratified, and the instruments
of ratification shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the
United Nations.
After 1 January 1950, the present Convention may be acceded
to on behalf of any Member of the United Nations and of any non-
member State which has received an invitation as aforesaid. In-
struments of accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-Gen-
eral of the United Nations.
Article XII
Any Contracting Party may at any time, by notification ad-
dressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, extend
the application of the present Convention to all or any of the terri-
tories for the conduct of whose foreign relations that Contracting
Party is responsible.
Article XIII
On the day when the first twenty instruments of ratification
or accession have been deposited, the Secretary-General shall
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draw up a process-verbal and transmit a copy thereof to each
Member of the United Nations and to each of the non-member
States contemplated in article XI.
The present Convention shall come into force on the ninetieth
day following the date of deposit of the twentieth instrument of
ratification or accession.
Any ratification or accession effected subsequent to the latter
date shall become effective on the ninetieth day following the de-
posit of the instrument of ratification or accession.
Article XIV
The present Convention shall remain in effect for a period of
ten years as from the date of its coming into force.
It shall thereafter remain in force for successive periods of
five years for such Contracting Parties as have not denounced it at
least six months before the expiration of the current period.
Denunciation shall be effected by a written notification ad-
dressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
Article XV
If, as a result of denunciations, the number of Parties to the
present Convention should become less than sixteen, the Conven-
tion shall cease to be in force as from the date on which the last of
these denunciations shall become effective.
Article XVI
A request for the revision of the present Convention may be
made at any time by any Contracting Party by means of a notifica-
tion in writing addressed to the Secretary-General.
The General Assembly shall decide upon the steps, if any, to
be taken in respect of such request.
Article XVII
The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall notify all
Members of the United Nations and the non-member States con-
templated in article XI of the following:
(a) Signatures, ratifications and accessions received in accor-
dance with article 11;
(b) Notifications received in accordance with article 12;
(c) The date upon which the present Convention comes into
force in accordance with article 13;
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(d) Denunciations received in accordance with article 14;
(e) The abrogation of the Convention in accordance with arti-
cle 15;
(f) Notifications received in accordance with article 16.
Article XVIII
The original of the present Convention shall be deposited in
the archives of the United Nations.
A certified copy of the Convention shall be transmitted to
each Member of the United Nations and to each of the non-mem-
ber States contemplated in article XI.
Article XIX
The present Convention shall be registered by the Secretary-
General of the United Nations on the date of its coming into force.
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APPENDIX II
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
CASE No. IT-01-51-I
THE PROSECUTOR OF THE TRIBUNAL AGAINST SLOBODAN
MILOSEVIC1
INDICTMENT
The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia, pursuant to her authority under Article 18 of
the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia ("the Statute of the Tribunal"), charges:
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC
with GENOCIDE, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, GRAVE
BREACHES OF THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS and VIOLA-
TIONS OF THE LAWS OR CUSTOMS OF WAR as set forth
below:
THE ACCUSED
1. SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC, son of Svetozar Milosevic, was
born on 20 August 1941 in Pozarevac, in the present-day Republic
of Serbia, one of the constituent republics of the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia ("FRY"). In 1964, he graduated from the Law
Faculty of the University of Belgrade and began a career in man-
agement and banking. Until 1978, he held the posts of deputy di-
rector and later general director at Tehnogas, a major oil company
in the then Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ("SFRY").
Thereafter, he became president of Beogradska banka (Beobanka),
one of the largest banks in the SFRY, a post he held until 1983.
2. SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC, joined the League of Communists
of Yugoslavia in 1959. In 1984, he became Chairman of the City
Committee of the League of Communists of Belgrade. In 1986, he
was elected Chairman of the Presidium of the Central Committee
of the League of Communists of Serbia and was re-elected in 1988.
On 16 July 1990, the League of Communists of Serbia and the
Socialist Alliance of Working People of Serbia united, forming a
new party named the Socialist Party of Serbia ("SPS"). On 17 July
1990, SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC was elected President of the SPS
1 Prosecutor v. Milosevic, No. IT-01-51-I (Int'l Crim. Trib. Fmr. Yugoslavia 2001),
available at http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/mil-iiOll122e.htm.
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and remained in that post except during the period from 24 May
1991 to 24 October 1992.
3. SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC was elected President of the Presi-
dency of the then Socialist Republic of Serbia on 8 May 1989 and
re-elected on 5 December 1989. After the adoption of a new Consti-
tution, on 28 Sepember 1990, the Socialist Republic of Serbia be-
came the Republic of Serbia, and SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC was
elected to the newly established office of President of the Republic
of Serbia in multi-party elections, held in December 1990. He was
re-elected to this office in elections held on 20 December 1992.
4. After serving two terms as President of the Republic of Ser-
bia, SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC was elected President of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia on 15 July 1997, beginning his official du-
ties on 23 July 1997. Following his defeat in the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia's presidential election of Sepember 2000, SLOBODAN
MILOSEVIC relinquished his position on 6 October 2000.
INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
Article 7(1) of the Statute of the Tribunal
5. SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC is individually criminally responsi-
ble for the crimes referred to in Articles 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the Statute
of the Tribunal as described in this indictment, which he planned,
instigated, ordered, committed, or in whose planning, preparation,
or execution he otherwise aided and abetted. By using the word
"committed" in this indictment, the Prosecutor does not intend to
suggest that the accused physically committed any of the crimes
charged personally. "Committed" in this indictment refers to par-
ticipation in a joint criminal enterprise as a co-perpetrator.
6. SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC participated in the joint criminal
enterprise as set out below. The purpose of this joint criminal en-
terprise was the forcible and permanent removal of the majority of
non-Serbs, principally Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats, from
large areas of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereinaf-
ter referred to as "Bosnia and Herzegovina"), through the commis-
sion of crimes which are in violation of Articles 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the
Statute of the Tribunal.
7. The joint criminal enterprise was in existence by 1 August
1991 and continued until at least 31 December 1995. The individ-
uals participating in this joint criminal enterprise included
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC, Radovan KARADZIC, Momcilo KRAJIS-
NIK, Biljana PLAVSIC, General Ratko MLADIC, Borisav JOVIC,
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Branko KOSTIC, Veljko KADIJEVIC, Blagoje ADZIC, Milan
MARTIC, Jovica STANISIC, Franko SIMATOVIC, also known as
"Frenki," Radovan STOJICIC, also known as "Badza," Vojislav
SESELJ, Zeljko RAZNATOVIC, also known as "Arkan," and other
known and unknown participants.
8. The crimes enumerated in Counts 1 to 29 of this indictment
were within the object of the joint criminal enterprise. Alterna-
tively, the crimes enumerated in Counts 1 to 15 and 19 to 29 were
natural and foreseeable consequences of the execution of the ob-
ject of the joint criminal enterprise and the accused was aware
that such crimes were the possible outcome of the execution of the
joint criminal enterprise.
9. In order for the joint criminal enterprise to succeed in its
objective, SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC worked in concert with or
through other individuals in the joint criminal enterprise. Each
participant or co-perpetrator within the joint criminal enterprise,
sharing the intent to contribute to the enterprise, played his or
her own role or roles that significantly contributed to achieving
the objective of the enterprise. The roles of the participants or co-
perpetrators include, but are not limited to, the following:
10. Radovan KARADZIC was President of the Serbian Demo-
cratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Srpska demokratska
stranka Bosne i Hercegovine or "SDS") throughout the period of
the indictment. On 27 March 1992, KARADZIC became the Presi-
dent of the Bosnian Serb "National Security Council." On 12 May
1992, he was elected President of the three-member Presidency of
the self-proclaimed Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
(hereinafter referred to as "Republika Srpska") and remained in
this position after the Presidency was expanded to five members
on 2 June 1992. On 17 December 1992, KARADZIC was elected
President of Republika Srpska and remained in that position
throughout the period of this indictment. In his capacity as a
member of the Bosnian Serb National Security Council, member
of the Presidency, as President of Republika Srpska, and in his
position of leadership within the SDS party and organs of the
Republika Srpska government, Radovan KARADZIC, together
with others, commanded, directed, or otherwise exercised effective
control over the Territorial Defence ("TO"), the Bosnian Serb army
("VRS") and the police forces of Republika Srpska who partici-
pated in the crimes specified in this indictment.
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11. Momcilo KRAJISNIK, a close associate of Radovan
KARADZIC, was a member of the SDS Main Board from 12 July
1991. On 24 October 1991, the day of the founding of the "Assem-
bly of the Serbian People of Bosnia and Herzegovina," (hereinafter
referred to as the "Bosnian Serb Assembly") KRAJISNIK was
elected its President. From 27 March 1992, KRAJISNIK was a
member of the Bosnian Serb National Security Council. He be-
came a member of the five-member Presidency on 2 June 1992.
When the Bosnian Serb Assembly elected Radovan KARADZIC
President of Republika Srpska on 17 December 1992, KRAJISNIK
ceased to be a member of the Presidency, but continued to be one
of the most important political leaders in Republika Srpska and
remained the President of its National Assembly until 19 October
1996. In his capacity as a member of the Bosnian Serb National
Security Council as a member of the Presidency of Republika Srp-
ska, and in his position of leadership within the SDS party and
organs of the Republika Srpska government, Momcilo KRAJIS-
NIK, together with others, commanded, directed, or otherwise ex-
ercised effective control over the TO, the VRS and the police forces
of Republika Srpska who participated in the crimes specified in
this indictment.
12. Biljana PLAVSIC, a high-ranking SDS politician, on 28
February 1992, became one of two Acting Presidents of the Ser-
bian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, together with Nikola
KOLJEVIC. As an Acting President, 'Biljana PLAVSIC became an
ex officio member of the Bosnian Serb National Security Council.
On 12 May 1992, she was elected as a member of the three-mem-
ber Presidency and remained in this position after it was ex-
panded to five members. When the Bosnian Serb Assembly elected
Radovan KARADZIC President of Republika Srpska on 17 Decem-
ber 1992, it also elected Biljana PLAVSIC one of two Vice-Presi-
dents, a position she held until 19 July 1996. In her capacity as
Vice-President, member of the Bosnian Serb National Security
Council as a member of the Presidency of Republika Srpska, and
in her position of leadership within the SDS party and organs of
the Republika Srpska government, Biljana PLAVSIC, together
with others, commanded, directed, or otherwise exercised effective
control over the TO, the VRS and the police forces of Republika
Srpska who participated in the crimes specified in this indictment.
13. General Ratko MLADIC, a military career officer previ-
ously stationed in Macedonia and Kosovo, became the commander
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of the 9 th Corps (Knin Corps) of the Yugoslav People's Army
("JNA") in June 1991 and participated in the fighting in Croatia.
On 4 October 1991, the SFRY Presidency promoted him to Major
General. Subsequently, in May 1992, he assumed command of the
forces of the Second Military District of the JNA in Sarajevo. From
12 May 1992 until November 1996, he was the Commander of the
Main Staff of the VRS and in this capacity, together with others,
commanded, directed, or otherwise exercised effective control over
the VRS and other units acting in co-ordination with the VRS who
participated in the crimes specified in this indictment.
14. Borisav JOVIC was successively the Vice-President, Presi-
dent and then a member of the SFRY Presidency from 15 May
1989 until April 1992, as well as the President of the SPS from
May 1991 until October 1992, and a high ranking official of the
SPS until November 1995. Borisav JOVIC and Branko KOSTIC,
the Vice-President and then Acting President of the Presidency of
the SFRY, together with others during the relevant period, com-
manded, directed, or otherwise exercised effective control over the
JNA and members of the TO and paramilitary units acting in co-
ordination with, and under supervision of, the JNA.
15. General Veljko KADIJEVIC, as Federal Secretary for Na-
tional Defence from 15 May 1988 until 6 January 1992, com-
manded, directed, or otherwise exercised effective control over the
JNA and other units acting in co-ordination with the JNA.
16. General Blagoje ADZIC, in his capacity as JNA Chief of
Staff from 1990 to 28 February 1992 and Acting Federal Secretary
for National Defence from mid-1991 to 28 February 1992, Federal
Secretary for National Defence from 28 February 1992 to 27 April
1992 and JNA Chief of Staff from 27 April 1992 to 8 May 1992,
together with others, commanded, directed, or otherwise exercised
effective control over the JNA and other units acting in co-ordina-
tion with the JNA.
17. Jovica STANISIC, in his capacity as chief of the State Se-
curity (Drzavna bezbednost or "DB") of the Republic of Serbia from
March 1991 to October 1998, commanded, directed, or otherwise
exercised effective control over members of the DB, who partici-
pated in the perpetration of the crimes specified in this indict-
ment. In addition, he provided arms, funds, training, or other sub-
stantial assistance or support to Serb paramilitary units and
police units that were subsequently involved in the crimes speci-
fied in this indictment.
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18. Franko SIMATOVIC, also known as "Frenki," as head of
the special operations component of the DB of the Republic of Ser-
bia, commanded, directed, or otherwise exercised effective control
over agents of the DB who perpetrated crimes specified in this in-
dictment. In addition, he provided arms, funds, training, or other
substantial assistance or support to Serb paramilitary units and
police units that were subsequently involved in the crimes
charged in this indictment.
19. Radovan STOJICIC, also known as "Badza," as Deputy
Minister of Interior of Serbia and head of Public Security Service,
commanded, directed or otherwise exercised effective control over
special forces of the Serbian MUP and volunteer units who partici-
pated in the crimes specified in this indictment. In addition, he
provided arms, funds, training, or other substantial assistance or
support to Serb paramilitary units and police units that were sub-
sequently involved in the crimes specified in this indictment.
20. Milan MARTIC, as "Secretary of the Secretariat of Inter-
nal Affairs" of the so-called Serbian Autonomous Region ("SAO")
Krajina from 4 January 1991 until 29 May 1991; as "Minister of
Defence" of the SAO Krajina from 29 May 1991 to 27 June 1991;
and as "Minister of Internal Affairs" for the SAO Krajina (later
"Republic of Serbian Krajina") from 27 June 1991 to January
1994, established, commanded, directed, and otherwise exercised
effective control over members of his police force (referred to as
"Martic's Police," "Martic's Militia," "Marticevci," "SAO Krajina
Police" or "SAO Krajina Militia") who were subsequently involved
in the crimes specified in this indictment.
21. Zeljko RAZNATOVIC, also known as "Arkan," in 1990 es-
tablished and commanded the Serbian Volunteer Guard, a
paramilitary unit commonly known as "Arkanovci" or "Arkan's
Tigers," who during the time relevant to this indictment operated
in Bosnia and Herzegovina and were involved in the crimes
charged in this indictment. In addition, he maintained a signifi-
cant military base in Erdut, Croatia, where he functioned as com-
mander. Other paramilitary groups and TO units were trained at
this base and were subsequently involved in the crimes charged in
this indictment.
22. Vojislav SESELJ, as President of the Serbian Radical
Party (SRS) from at least February 1991 throughout the time rele-
vant to this indictment recruited or otherwise provided substan-
tial assistance or support to Serb paramilitary units, commonly
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known as "Seseljevci" or "Seselj's men," who perpetrated crimes as
specified in this indictment. In addition, he openly espoused and
encouraged the creation of a "Greater Serbia" by violence and
other unlawful means, and actively participated in war propa-
ganda and spreading inter-ethnic hatred.
23. From 1987 until late 2000, SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC was
the dominant political figure in Serbia and the SFRY/FRY. He ac-
quired control of all facets of the Serbian government, including
the police and the state security services. In addition, he gained
control over the political leaderships of Kosovo, Vojvodina, and
Montenegro.
24. In his capacity as the President of Serbia and through his
leading position in the SPS party, SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC exer-
cised effective control or substantial influence over the above
listed participants in the joint criminal enterprise and either
alone or acting in concert with them and additional known and
unknown persons effectively controlled or substantially influenced
the actions of the Federal Presidency of the SFRY and later the
FRY, the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs ("MUP"), the JNA,
the Yugoslav Army ("VJ") and the VRS, as well as Serb paramili-
tary groups.
25. SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC, acting alone and in concert with
other members of the joint criminal enterprise participated in the
joint criminal enterprise in the following ways:
a) He exerted effective control over elements of the JNA and
VJ which participated in the planning, preparation, facilitation
and execution of the forcible removal of the majority of non-Serbs,
principally Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats, from large ar-
eas of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
b) He provided financial, logistical and political support to the
VRS. These forces subsequently participated in the execution of
the joint criminal enterprise through the commission of crimes
which are in violation of Articles 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the Statute of the
Tribunal.
c) He exercised substantial influence over, and assisted, the
political leadership of Republika Srpska in the planning, prepara-
tion, facilitation and execution of the take-over of municipalities
in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the subsequent forcible removal of
the majority of non-Serbs, principally Bosnian Muslims and Bos-
nian Croats, from those municipalities.
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d) He participated in the planning and preparation of the
take-over of municipalities in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the
subsequent forcible removal of the majority of non-Serbs, princi-
pally Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats, from those municipal-
ities. He provided the financial, material and logistical support
necessary for such take-over.
e) He participated in the formation, financing, supply, sup-
port and direction of special forces of the Republic of Serbia Minis-
try of Internal Affairs. These special forces participated in the exe-
cution of the joint criminal enterprise through the commission of
crimes which are in violation of Articles 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the Statute
of the Tribunal.
f) He participated in providing financial, logistical and politi-
cal support and direction to Serbian irregular forces or paramilita-
ries. These forces participated in the execution of the joint crimi-
nal enterprise through the commission of crimes which are in
violation of Articles 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the Statute of the Tribunal.
g) He controlled, manipulated or otherwise utilised Serbian
state-run media to spread exaggerated and false messages of eth-
nically based attacks by Bosnian Muslims and Croats against
Serb people intended to create an atmosphere of fear and hatred
among Serbs living in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzego-
vina which contributed to the forcible removal of the majority of
non-Serbs, principally Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats, from
large areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
26. SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC knowingly and wilfully partici-
pated in the joint criminal enterprise, while being aware of the
foreseeable consequences of this enterprise. On this basis, he
bears individual criminal responsibility for these crimes under Ar-
ticle 7(1) of the Statute of the Tribunal, in addition to his responsi-
bility under the same Article for having planned, instigated, or-
dered or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation
and execution of these crimes.
Article 7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal
27. SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC, while holding positions of supe-
rior authority, is also individually criminally responsible for the
acts or omissions of his subordinates, pursuant to Article 7(3) of
the Statute of the Tribunal. A superior is responsible for the crimi-
nal acts of his subordinates if he knew or had reason to know that
his subordinates were about to commit such acts or had done so,
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and the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable mea-
sures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators.
28. From at least March 1991 until 15 June 1992, SLOBODAN
MILOSEVIC exercised effective control over the four members of
the "Serbian Bloc" within the Presidency of the SFRY. These four
individuals were Borisav JOVIC, the representative of the Repub-
lic of Serbia; Branko KOSTIC, the representative of the Republic
of Montenegro; Jugoslav KOSTIC, the representative of the Au-
tonomous Province of Vojvodina; and Sejdo BAJRAMOVIC, the
representative of the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and
Metohija. SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC used Borisav JOVIC and
Branko KOSTIC as his primary agents in the Presidency and
through them he directed the actions of the "Serbian Bloc." From 1
October 1991, in the absence of the representatives of the Presi-
dency from Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia and Bosnia and Herze-
govina, the four members of the "Serbian Bloc" exercised the pow-
ers of the Presidency, including that of collective "Commander-in-
Chief' of the JNA. This "Rump Presidency" acted without dissen-
sion to execute SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC's policies. The Federal
Presidency had effective control over the JNA as its "Commander-
in-Chief' and other units under the supervision of the JNA.
Generals Veljko KADIJEVIC and Blagoje ADZIC, who directed
and supervised the JNA forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina, were
in constant communication and consultation with the accused.
29. On 27 April 1992, the Supreme Defence Council was
formed. Throughout the time relevant to this indictment,
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC was a member of the Supreme Defence
Council and exercised substantial influence and control over other
members of the Council. The Supreme Defence Council and the
President of the FRY had de jure control over the JNA and later
the VJ. In addition to his de jure powers, at all times relevant to
this indictment, SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC exercised de facto control
over the JNA and the VJ through his control over the high rank-
ing officers of these armies.
30. SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC is therefore individually crimi-
nally responsible, under Article 7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal,
for the participation of the members of the JNA and the VJ and
other units under the supervision of the JNA and the VJ in the
crimes described in this indictment.
31. From the time SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC came to power in
Serbia, he exercised control over key officials in the Serbian MUP,
[Vol. 76:257
THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE
among them Radmilo BOGDANOVIC and Zoran SOKOLOVIC,
who were both, at different times, the Minister of Internal Affairs
of Serbia. He also exercised control over Jovica STANISIC and
Franko SIMATOVIC, both high-ranking officials in the DB.
Through these officials, SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC exercised effec-
tive control over agents of the MUP, including the DB, who di-
rected and supported the actions of the special forces and Serb
paramilitary groups operating in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The ac-
cused SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC is therefore individually criminally
responsible, under Article 7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal, for
the participation of the members of the Serbian MUP, including
the DB, in the crimes described in this indictment.
THE CHARGES
COUNTS 1 and 2
GENOCIDE OR COMPLICITY IN GENOCIDE
32. From on or about 1 March 1992 until 31 December 1995,
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC, acting alone or in concert with other
members of the joint criminal enterprise, planned, instigated, or-
dered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted the planning,
preparation and execution of the destruction, in whole or in part,
of the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat national, ethnical, ra-
cial or religious groups, as such, in territories within Bosnia and
Herzegovina, including: Bijeljina; Bosanski Novi; Bosanski
Samac; Bratunac; Brcko; Doboj; Foca; Sarajevo (Ilijas); Kljuc; Ko-
tor Varos; Sarajevo (Novi Grad); Prijedor; Rogatica; Sanski Most;
Srebrenica; Visegrad; Vlasenica and Zvornik. The destruction of
these groups was effected by:
a) The widespread killing of thousands of Bosnian Muslims
and Bosnian Croats, during and after the take-over of territories
within Bosnia and Herzegovina, including those listed above, as
specified in SCHEDULE A to this indictment. In many of the territo-
ries, educated and leading members of these groups were specifi-
cally targeted for execution, often in accordance with pre-prepared
lists. After the fall of Srebrenica in July 1995, almost all captured
Bosnian Muslim men and boys, altogether several thousands,
were executed at the places where they had been captured or at
sites to which they had been transported for execution.
b) The killing of thousands of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian
Croats in detention facilities within Bosnia and Herzegovina, in-
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cluding those situated within the territories listed above, as speci-
fied in SCHEDULE B to this indictment.
c) The causing of serious bodily and mental harm to
thousands of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats during their
confinement in detention facilities within Bosnia and Herzego-
vina, including those situated within the territories listed above,
as specified in SCHEDULE C to this indictment. Members of these
groups, during their confinement in detention facilities and dur-
ing their interrogation at these locations, police stations and mili-
tary barracks, were continuously subjected to, or forced to wit-
ness, inhumane acts, including murder, sexual violence, torture
and beatings.
d) The detention of thousands of Bosnian Muslims and Bos-
nian Croats in detention facilities within Bosnia and Herzegovina,
including those situated within the territories listed above, under
conditions of life calculated to bring about the partial physical de-
struction of those groups, namely through starvation, contami-
nated water, forced labour, inadequate medical care and constant
physical and psychological assault.
By these acts and omissions, SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC
committed:
Count 1: GENOCIDE, punishable under Articles 4(3)(a) and
7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal; or
Count 2: COMPLICITY IN GENOCIDE, punishable under
Articles 4(3)(e) and 7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal.
COUNT 3
PERSECUTIONS
33. From on or about 1 March 1992 until 31 December 1995,
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC, acting alone or in concert with members
of the joint criminal enterprise, planned, instigated, ordered, com-
mitted or otherwise aided and abetted the planning, preparation
or execution of persecutions of non-Serbs, principally Bosnian
Muslims and Bosnian Croats, within the territories of Banja
Luka; Bihac; Bijeljina; Bileca; Bosanska Dubica; Bosanska
Gradiska; Bosanska Krupa; Bosanski Novi; Bosanski Petrovac;
Bosanski Samac; Bratunac; Brcko; Cajnice; Celinac; Doboj; Donji
Vakuf; Foca; Gacko; Gorazde, Sarajevo (Hadzici); Sarajevo
(Ilidza); Sarajevo (Ilijas); Kljuc; Kalinovik; Kotor Varos;
Nevesinje; Sarajevo (Novi Grad); Sarajevo (Novo Sarajevo); Sara-
jevo (Pale); Prijedor; Prnjavor; Rogatica; Rudo; Sanski Most;
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Sekovici; Sipovo; Sokolac; Srebrenica; Teslic; Trebinje; Sarajevo
(Trnovo); Visegrad; Vlasenica; Sarajevo (Vogosca) and Zvornik.
34. Throughout this period, Serb forces, comprised of JNA,
VJ, VRS units, local TO units, local and Serbian MUP police units
and paramilitary units from Serbia and Montenegro, attacked and
took control of towns and villages in these territories. After the
take-over, the Serb forces in co-operation with the local Serb au-
thorities established a regime of persecutions designed to drive
the non-Serb civilian population from these territories.
35. These persecutions were committed on the discriminatory
grounds of political affiliation, race or religion and included:
a) The extermination or murder of thousands of Bosnian Mus-
lim, Bosnian Croat and other non-Serb civilians, including women
and the elderly, in those territories listed above, the details of
which are set out in SCHEDULES A AND B to this indictment.
b) The prolonged and routine imprisonment and confinement
of thousands of Bosnian Muslim, Bosnian Croat and other non-
Serb civilians in detention facilities within and outside of Bosnia
and Herzegovina, the details of which are set out in SCHEDULE C
to this indictment.
c) The establishment and perpetuation of inhumane living
conditions against Bosnian Muslim, Bosnian Croat and other non-
Serb civilians, within the above mentioned detention facilities.
These living conditions were brutal and characterised by inhu-
mane treatment, overcrowding, starvation, forced labour and sys-
tematic physical and psychological abuse, including torture, beat-
ings and sexual assault.
d) The prolonged and frequent forced labour of Bosnian Mus-
lim, Bosnian Croat and other non-Serb civilians, from these deten-
tion facilities. The forced labour included digging graves and
trenches and other forms of manual labour at the frontlines.
e) The cruel and inhumane treatment of Bosnian Muslim,
Bosnian Croat and other non-Serb civilians during and after the
take-over of the municipalities specified above. Such inhumane
treatment included, but was not limited to, sexual violence, tor-
ture, physical and psychological abuse and forced existence under
inhumane living conditions.
f) The imposition of restrictive and discriminatory measures
against Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Croats and other non-Serbs,
such as, the restriction of freedom of movement; removal from po-
sitions of authority in local government institutions and the po-
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lice; dismissal from jobs; arbitrary searches of their homes; denial
of the right to judicial process and the denial of the right of equal
access to public services, including proper medical care.
g) The beating and robbing of Bosnian Muslim, Bosnian Croat
and other non-Serb civilians.
h) The forcible transfer and deportation of thousands of Bos-
nian Muslim, Bosnian Croat and other non-Serb civilians, from
the territories listed above, to locations outside of Serb held terri-
tories as described in paragraphs 40 and 41 and SCHEDULE D to
this indictment.
i) The appropriation and plunder of property belonging to
Bosnian Muslim, Bosnian Croat and other non-Serb civilians.
j) The intentional and wanton destruction of homes, other
public and private property belonging to Bosnian Muslims and
Bosnian Croats, their cultural and religious institutions, histori-
cal monuments and other sacred sites, as described in paragraph
42.
k) The obstruction of humanitarian aid, in particular medical
and food supplies into the besieged enclaves Bihac, Gorazde,
Srebrenica and Zepa, and the deprivation of water from the civil-
ians trapped in the enclaves designed to create unbearable living
conditions.
By these acts and omissions, SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC
committed:
Count 3: Persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds,
a CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY, punishable under Articles 5(h)
and 7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal.
COUNTS 4 to 7
EXTERMINATION, MURDER AND WILFUL KILLING
36. From on or about 1 March 1992 until 31 December 1995,
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC, acting alone or in concert with other
members of the joint criminal enterprise, planned, instigated, or-
dered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted the planning,
preparation or execution of the extermination, murder and wilful
killings of non-Serbs, principally Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian
Croats living in the territories of Banja Luka; Bihac; Bijeljina;
Bileca;; Bosanska Gradiska; Bosanska Krupa; Bosanski Novi;
Bosanski Petrovac; Bosanski Samac; Bratunac; Brcko; Cajnice;
Celinac; Doboj; Foca; Gacko; Sarajevo (Ilijas); Kljuc; Kalinovik;
Kotor Varos; Nevesinje; Sarajevo (Novi Grad); Prijedor; Prnjavor;
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Rogatica; Rudo; Sanski Most; Sokolac; Srebrenica; Teslic;
Visegrad; Vlasenica and Zvornik. The extermination, murder and
wilful killings of these groups were affected by:
a) The killing of Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Croats and other
non-Serbs in their towns and villages, during and after the take-
over of the territories listed above including those specified in
SCHEDULE A to this indictment.
b) The killing of Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Croats and other
non-Serbs in detention facilities and during their deportation or
forcible transfers, including those specified in SCHEDULE B to this
indictment.
By these acts and omissions, SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC
committed:
Count 4: Extermination, a CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY,
punishable under Articles 5(b) and 7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute of
the Tribunal.
Count 5: Murder, a CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY, punisha-
ble under Articles 5(a) and 7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute of the
Tribunal.
Count 6: Wilful killing, a GRAVE BREACH OF THE GE-
NEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949, punishable under Articles 2(a)
and 7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal.
Count 7: Murder, a VIOLATION OF THE LAWS OR CUS-
TOMS OF WAR, as recognised by Common Article 3(1)(a) of the
Geneva Conventions of 1949, punishable under Articles 3 and 7(1)
and 7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal.
COUNTS 8 to 15
UNLAWFUL CONFINEMENT, IMPRISONMENT, TORTURE,
WILFULLY CAUSING GREAT SUFFERING, OTHER
INHUMANE ACTS
37. From on or about 1 March 1992 until 31 December 1995,
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC, acting alone or in concert with members
of the joint criminal enterprise, planned, instigated, ordered, com-
mitted or otherwise aided and abetted the planning, preparation
or execution of the unlawful confinement or imprisonment under
inhumane conditions of Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Croats and
other non-Serbs within the territories of Banja Luka; Bihac;
Bijeljina; Bileca; Bosanska Dubica; Bosanska Krupa; Bosanski
Novi; Bosanski Petrovac; Bosanski Samac; Bratunac; Brcko; Caj-
nice; Celinac; Doboj; Donji Vakuf; Foca; Gacko; Kljuc; Kalinovik;
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Kotor Varos; Nevesinje; Prijedor; Prnjavor; Rogatica; Rudo; San-
ski Most; Sokolac; Teslic; Visegrad; Vlasenica and Zvornik.
38. Serb military forces, comprised of JNA, VJ, VRS, TO and
paramilitary units acting in co-operation with local police staff
and local Serb authorities, arrested and detained thousands of
Bosnian Muslim, Bosnian Croat and other non-Serb civilians from
the territories listed above. These civilians were held in short and
long-term detention, of which the major facilities are specified in
SCHEDULE C to this indictment.
39. The living conditions in these detention facilities were
brutal and characterised by inhumane treatment, overcrowding,
starvation, forced labour, inadequate medical care and systematic
physical and psychological assault, including torture, beatings
and sexual assault.
By these acts and omissions, SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC
committed:
Count 8: Imprisonment, a CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY,
punishable under Articles 5(e) and 7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute of
the Tribunal.
Count 9: Torture, a CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY, punisha-
ble under Articles 5(f) and 7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute of the
Tribunal.
Count 10: Inhumane acts, a CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY,
punishable under Articles 5(i) and 7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute of
the Tribunal.
Count 11: Unlawful Confinement, a GRAVE BREACH OF
THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949, punishable under Arti-
cles 2(g) and 7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal.
Count 12: Torture, a GRAVE BREACH OF THE GENEVA
CONVENTIONS OF 1949, punishable under Articles 2(b) and
7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal.
Count 13: Wilfully causing great suffering, a GRAVE
BREACH OF THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949, punisha-
ble under Articles 2(c) and 7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute of the
Tribunal.
Count 14: Torture, a VIOLATIONS OF THE LAWS OR CUS-
TOMS OF WAR as recognised by Common Article 3(1)(a) of the
Geneva Conventions of 1949, punishable under Articles 3 and 7(1)
and 7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal.
Count 15: Cruel Treatment, a VIOLATIONS OF THE LAWS
OR CUSTOMS OF WAR as recognised by Common Article 3(1)(a)
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of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, punishable under Articles 3
and 7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal.
COUNTS 16 to 18
DEPORTATION AND INHUMANE ACTS
(FORCIBLE TRANSFERS)
40. From on or about 1 March 1992 until 31 December 1995,
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC, acting alone or in concert with members
of the joint criminal enterprise, planned, instigated, ordered, com-
mitted or otherwise aided and abetted the planning, preparation
or execution of the unlawful forcible transfer, also qualifying as
deportation where indicated hereinafter, of tens of thousands of
Bosnian Muslim, Bosnian Croat and other non-Serb civilians from
their legal domiciles in the territories of Banja Luka (deportation);
Bihac; Bijeljina; Bileca (deportation); Bosanska Dubica; Bosanska
Gradiska; Bosanska Krupa; Bosanski Novi; Bosanski Petrovac;
Bosanski Samac (deportation); Bratunac; Brcko; Cajnice; Celinac;
Doboj; Donji Vakuf; Foca; Gacko (deportation); Sarajevo (Hadzici);
Sarajevo (Ilidza); Sarajevo (Ilijas); Kljuc; Kalinovik; Kotor Varos;
Nevesinje; Sarajevo (Novi Grad); Sarajevo (Novo Sarajevo); Sara-
jevo (Pale); Prijedor; Prnjavor; Rogatica; Rudo (deportation); San-
ski Most; Sekovici; Sipovo; Sokolac; Srebrenica; Teslic; Trebinje;
Sarajevo (Trnovo); Visegrad; Vlasenica; Sarajevo (Vogosca) and
Zvornik (deportation), to other areas both inside and outside Bos-
nia and Herzegovina. The details of such acts and omissions are
described in SCHEDULE D.
41. In order to achieve this objective, Serb forces comprised of
JNA, VJ, VRS and TO, paramilitary units acting in co-operation
with local police staff, local Serb authorities and special forces of
the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs under the effective control
of SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC or other members of the joint criminal
enterprise, subjugated villages and towns in Bosnia and Herzego-
vina and participated with members of the SDS in the disarming
of the non-Serb population. The towns and villages, including ar-
eas in which the inhabitants complied and offered no resistance,
were then attacked. These attacks were intended to compel the
non-Serb population to flee. After taking control of the towns and
villages, the Serb forces often rounded-up the remaining non-Serb
civilian population and forcibly removed them from the area. On
other occasions, the Serb forces in co-operation with the local Serb
authorities imposed restrictive and discriminatory measures on
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the non-Serb population and engaged in a campaign of terror de-
signed to drive them out of the territory. The majority of non-
Serbs that remained were eventually deported or forcibly trans-
ferred from their homes.
By these acts and omissions SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC
committed:
Count 16: Deportation, a CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY,
punishable under Articles 5(d) and 7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute of
the Tribunal.
Count 17: Inhumane Acts (Forcible Transfers), a CRIME
AGAINST HUMANITY, punishable under Articles 5(i) and 7(1)
and 7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal.
Count 18: Unlawful Deportation or Transfer, a GRAVE
BREACH OF THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949, punisha-
ble under Articles 2(g) and 7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute of the
Tribunal.
COUNTS 19 to 22
WANTON DESTRUCTION, PLUNDER OF PUBLIC OR
PRIVATE PROPERTY
42. From on or about 1 March 1992 until 31 December 1995,
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC, acting alone or in concert with members
of the joint criminal enterprise, planned, instigated, ordered, com-
mitted or otherwise aided and abetted the planning, preparation
or execution of the wanton destruction and plunder of the public
and private property of the Bosnian Muslim, Bosnian Croat and
other non-Serb populations within the territories of Banja Luka;
Bihac; Bijeljina; Bileca; Bosanska Dubica; Bosanska Gradiska;
Bosanska Krupa; Bosanski Novi; Bosanski Petrovac; Bosanski
Samac; Bratunac; Brcko; Cajnice; Celinac; Doboj; Donji Vakuf;
Foca; Gacko; Sarajevo (Hadzici); Sarajevo (Ilidza); Sarajevo
(Ilijas); Kljuc; Kalinovik; Kotor Varos; Nevesinje; Sarajevo (Novi
Grad); Sarajevo (Novo Sarajevo); Sarajevo (Pale); Prijedor;
Prnjavor; Rogatica; Rudo; Sanski Most; Sekovici; Sipovo; Sokolac;
Srebrenica; Teslic; Sarajevo (Trnovo); Trebinje; Visegrad; Vlasen-
ica; Sarajevo (Vogosca), and Zvornik. This intentional and wanton
destruction and plunder was not justified by military necessity
and included:
a) The appropriation and plunder of property belonging to
Bosnian Muslim, Bosnian Croat and other non-Serb civilians, in-
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cluding the coerced signing of documents relinquishing property
rights.
b) The intentional and wanton destruction of homes and other
property owned by Bosnian Muslim, Bosnian Croat and other non-
Serb civilians. Such destruction was employed as a means to com-
pel non-Serbs to flee their legal domiciles and to prevent their sub-
sequent return.
c) The intentional and wanton destruction of religious and
cultural buildings of the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat com-
munities including, but not limited to, mosques, churches, librar-
ies, educational buildings and cultural centres.
By these acts and omissions, SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC
committed:
Count 19: Extensive destruction and appropriation of prop-
erty, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully
and wantonly, a GRAVE BREACH OF THE GENEVA CONVEN-
TIONS OF 1949, punishable under Articles 2(d) and 7(1) and 7(3)
of the Statute of the Tribunal.
Count 20: Wanton destruction of villages, or devastation not
justified by military necessity, a VIOLATION OF THE LAWS OR
CUSTOMS OF WAR, punishable under Articles 3(b) and 7(1) and
7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal.
Count 21: Wilful destruction or wilful damage done to historic
monuments and institutions dedicated to education or religion, a
VIOLATION OF THE LAWS OR CUSTOMS OF WAR, punisha-
ble under Articles 3(d) and 7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute of the
Tribunal.
Count 22: Plunder of public or private property, a VIOLA-
TION OF THE LAWS OR CUSTOMS OF WAR, punishable under
Articles 3(e) and 7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal.
COUNTS 23 to 29
MURDER, WILFUL KILLING, WILFULLY CAUSING GREAT
SUFFERING, CRUEL TREATMENT, ATTACKS
ON CIVILIANS
43. Between April 1992 and November 1995, SLOBODAN
MILOSEVIC, acting alone or in concert with members of the joint
criminal enterprise, planned, instigated, ordered, committed, or
otherwise aided and abetted the planning, preparation, or execu-
tion of a military campaign of artillery and mortar shelling and
sniping onto civilian areas of Sarajevo and upon its civilian popu-
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lation, killing and wounding thousands of civilians of all ages and
both sexes.
44. In this time period, the Sarajevo Romanija Corps of the
VRS, under the effective control of Radovan KARADZIC and Gen-
eral Ratko MLADIC, launched an extensive, forty-four month
shelling and sniping attack on Sarajevo, mostly from positions in
the hills surrounding the city with an unobstructed view of
Sarajevo.
45. The Sarajevo Romanija Corps conducted a protracted
campaign of shelling and sniping upon Sarajevo during which ci-
vilians were either specifically targeted or the subject of reckless
fire into areas where civilians were known to have been. Among
the victims of this campaign were civilians who were, amongst
other things, tending vegetable plots, queuing for bread or water,
attending funerals, shopping in markets, riding on trams, gather-
ing wood. Specific instances of sniping are described in SCHEDULE
E attached to this indictment. Specific instances of shelling are set
forth in SCHEDULE F.
By these acts and omissions, SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC
committed:
Count 23: Murder, a CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY, punish-
able under Articles 5(a) and 7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute of the
Tribunal.
Count 24: Inhumane acts, a CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY,
punishable under Articles 5(i) and 7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute of
the Tribunal.
Count 25: Wilful killing, a GRAVE BREACH OF THE GE-
NEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949, punishable under Articles 2(a)
and 7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal.
Count 26: Wilfully causing great suffering, a GRAVE
BREACH OF THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949, punisha-
ble under Articles 2(c) and 7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute of the
Tribunal.
Count 27 Murder, a VIOLATION OF THE LAWS OR CUS-
TOMS OF WAR, as recognised by Common Article 3(1)(a) of the
Geneva Conventions of 1949, punishable under Articles 3 and 7(1)
and 7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal.
Count 28: Cruel treatment, a VIOLATION OF THE LAWS
OR CUSTOMS OF WAR, as recognised by Common Article 3(1)(a)
of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, punishable under Articles 3
and 7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal.
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Count 29: Attacks on civilians, a VIOLATION OF THE LAWS
OR CUSTOMS OF WAR, as recognised by Article 51 (2) of Addi-
tional Protocol I and Article 13 (2) of Additional Protocol II to the
Geneva Conventions of 1949, punishable under Articles 3 and 7(1)
and 7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal.
GENERAL LEGAL ALLEGATIONS
46. All acts and omissions alleged in this indictment occurred
on the territory of the former Yugoslavia.
47. At all times relevant to this indictment, a state of interna-
tional armed conflict and partial occupation existed in Bosnia and
Herzegovina.
48. All acts and omissions charged as Grave Breaches of the
Geneva Conventions of 1949 occurred during the international
armed conflict and partial occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
All such acts and omissions were committed against persons pro-
tected under the Geneva Conventions.
49. All acts and omissions charged relative to the destruction
of property as Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949
involved "protected property" under the relevant provisions of the
Geneva Conventions.
50. At all times relevant to this indictment SLOBODAN
MILOSEVIC was required to abide by the laws and customs gov-
erning the conduct of armed conflicts, including the Geneva Con-
ventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocols thereto.
51. All conduct charged as Crimes against Humanity was part
of a widespread or systematic attack directed against the Bosnian
Muslim, Bosnian Croat and other non-Serb civilian populations
within large areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
ADDITIONAL FACTS
52. In November 1990, multi-party elections were held in Bos-
nia and Herzegovina. At the Republic level, the SDA (Stranka
Demokratske Akcije-Party of Democratic Action) the party of the
Bosnian Muslims won 86 seats; the SDS, the party of the Bosnian
Serbs, won 72 seats and the HDZ (Hrvatska demokratska
zajednica-Croatian Democratic Community) won 44 seats in the
Assembly.
53. The central idea within the SDS political platform, as ar-
ticulated by its leaders, including Radovan KARADZIC, Momcilo
KRAJISNIK and Biljana PLAVSIC, was the unification of all
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Serbs within one state. The SDS regarded the separation of Bos-
nia and Herzegovina from the SFRY as a threat to the interests of
the Serbs.
54. On 5 February 1991 the Assembly of the Republic of Ser-
bia passed a "Law on Ministries" submitted by SLOBODAN
MILOSEVIC. This law established twenty "Ministries" of the Ser-
bian government, including the Ministry for Links with Serbs
outside Serbia. This Ministry assisted the SDS to establish the
Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
55. The results of the November 1990 elections meant that, as
time went on, the SDS would be unable through peaceful means to
keep the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in what was becom-
ing a Serb-dominated Yugoslavia. As a result, Serb people within
certain areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with Serb majorities, be-
gan to organise themselves into formal regional structures that
they referred to as "Associations of Municipalities." In April 1991
the Association of Municipalities of Bosnian Krajina, centred in
Banja Luka, was formed.
56. In March 1991, the collective Presidency of the SFRY
reached a deadlock on several issues including the issue of insti-
tuting a state of emergency in Yugoslavia. The representatives on
the Presidency from the Republic of Serbia, the Republic of Monte-
negro, the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina, and the Autono-
mous Province of Kosovo and Metohija all resigned from their
posts. In a televised address on 16 March 1991, SLOBODAN
MILOSEVIC, in his capacity as President of the Republic of Ser-
bia, declared that Yugoslavia was finished and that Serbia would
no longer be bound by decisions of the Federal Presidency.
57. On 25 March 1991, SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC and Franjo
TUDMAN met in Karadjordjevo and discussed the partition of
Bosnia and Herzegovina between Serbia and Croatia.
58. On 25 June 1991, Slovenia and Croatia declared their in-
dependence. On 26 June, the JNA intervened in Slovenia. In the
summer of 1991, fighting broke out in Croatia.
59. In August 1991 Radovan KARADZIC instituted a system
of secret communication between the local boards of the SDS and
the Main Staff and with the Republic of Serbia. This secret com-
munication protocol was declared mandatory for the transmission
of reports and orders.
60. From autumn 1991, the JNA began to withdraw its forces
out of Croatia. Forces under the control of the JNA began to re-
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deploy in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Many of these troops were
deployed to areas in which there was no garrison or other JNA
facility.
61. As the war continued in Croatia it appeared increasingly
likely that Bosnia and Herzegovina would also declare its inde-
pendence from the SFRY. The SDS, realising it could not prevent
the secession of Bosnia and Herzegovina from the SFRY, began
the creation of a separate Serbian entity within Bosnia and Herze-
govina. During the period from Sepember to November 1991, sev-
eral Serbian Autonomous Regions (SAO) were formed, some of
them on the basis of the Associations of Municipalities referred to
above.
62. On 12 Sepember 1991, the Serbian Autonomous Region of
Herzegovina was proclaimed. On 16 Sepember 1991, the Autono-
mous Region of Krajina was proclaimed by the Assembly of the
Association of Municipalities of Bosnian Krajina. By 21 November
1991, the Serbian Autonomous Regions and Autonomous Regions
consisted of the Autonomous Region of Krajina, the SAO Herzego-
vina, the SAO Romanija-Birac, the SAO Semberija, and SAO
Northern Bosnia.
63. On 3 October 1991, the four members of the SFRY Presi-
dency from Serbia and Montenegro (Borisav JOVIC, Jugoslav
KOSTIC, Sejdo BAJRAMOVIC and Branko KOSTIC) assumed
the function of the SFRY Presidency, circumventing the roles and
responsibilities of the Presidency members from Slovenia, Croa-
tia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia.
64. On 15 October 1991, at the meeting of the SDS Party
Council the decision was reached to form a separate assembly, en-
titled the "Assembly of the Serbian People of Bosnia and Herzego-
vina" to secure Serb interests.
65. On or around 22 October 1991, SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC,
together with other members of the joint criminal enterprise, con-
tinued to advocate for a unitary Serb state governed from Bel-
grade, Serbia. On the same date the "Rump Presidency" called for
the mobilisation of reservists in Serbia and "other regions that
want to stay in Yugoslavia."
66. On or about 26 October 1991, Radovan KARADZIC de-
clared a full mobilisation of the TO and the formation of field units
in the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
67. On 24 October 1991, the Assembly of the Serbian People
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, dominated by the SDS, decided to con-
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duct a "Plebiscite of the Serbian People in Bosnia and Herzego-
vina" in order to decide whether to stay in the common state of
Yugoslavia with Serbia, Montenegro, the Serbian Autonomous Re-
gion of Krajina, SAO Western Slavonia and SAO Eastern Slavo-
nia, Baranja and Western Srem.
68. On 9 and 10 November 1991, the Bosnian Serbs held the
plebiscite on the issue of whether Bosnia and Herzegovina should
stay in Yugoslavia or become an independent state. The results
overwhelmingly showed that the Bosnian Serbs wanted to stay in
Yugoslavia.
69. On 21 November 1991, the Assembly of the Serbian Peo-
ple of Bosnia and Herzegovina, proclaimed as part of the territory
of the federal Yugoslav state all those municipalities, local com-
munities and populated places, in which over 50% of the people of
Serbian nationality had voted, during the plebiscite, to remain in
that state as well as those places where citizens of other nationali-
ties had expressed themselves in favour of remaining in
Yugoslavia.
70. On 11 December 1991, the Assembly of the Serbian People
delivered a detailed request to the JNA to protect with all availa-
ble means as "integral parts of the State of Yugoslavia" the terri-
tories of Bosnia and Herzegovina in which the plebiscite of the
Serbian people and other citizens on remaining in a joint Yugoslav
state had been conducted.
71. On 19 December 1991, the SDS issued instructions for the
"Organisation and Activity of the Organs of the Serbian People in
Bosnia and Herzegovina in Extraordinary Circumstances" which
provided a plan for the SDS take-over of municipalities in Bosnia
and Herzegovina.
72. On 9 January 1992, the Assembly of the Serbian People of
Bosnia and Herzegovina adopted a declaration on the Proclama-
tion of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The terri-
tory of that republic was declared to include "the territories of the
Serbian Autonomous Regions and Districts and of other Serbian
ethnic entities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the regions
in which the Serbian people remained in the minority due to the
genocide conducted against it in World War Two", and it was de-
clared to be a part of the federal Yugoslav state. On 12 August
1992, the name of the Bosnian Serb Republic was changed to
Republika Srpska.
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73. From 29 February to 2 March 1992, Bosnia and Herzego-
vina held a referendum on independence. At the urging of the
SDS, the majority of Bosnian Serbs boycotted the vote. The refer-
endum resulted in a pro-independence majority.
74. On 18 March 1992, during the 11th session of the Assem-
bly of the Serbian People, a conclusion was reached to "prepare for
the next session proposals for the take-over of power in the Repub-
lic of Serbian People of Bosnia and Herzegovina."
75. From March 1992 onwards, Serb regular and irregular
forces seized control of territories within Bosnia and Herzegovina,
including those specified in this indictment.
76. On 6 April 1992, the United States and the European
Community formally recognized the independence of Bosnia and
Herzegovina.
77. On 27 April 1992, Serbia and Montenegro proclaimed a
new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and declared it the successor
state of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
78. On 12 May 1992, at the 16th Assembly of the Serbian Peo-
ple in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Radovan KARADZIC announced
the six strategic objectives of the Serbian People in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. These objectives included the eradication of the
Drina River as a border between the Serbian states. During the
same session, General Ratko MLADIC told the Assembly that it
would not be possible to separate Serbs from non-Serbs and have
the non-Serbs simply leave the territory. He warned that attempt-
ing this process would amount to genocide.
79. On 15 May 1992, the United Nations Security Council in
its resolution number 752 demanded that all interference from
outside Bosnia and Herzegovina by units of the JNA cease imme-
diately and that those units either be withdrawn, be subjected to
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SCHEDULE A
KILLINGS NOT ASSOCIATED WITH DETENTION FACILITIES
No MUNICIPALITY VICTIMS (KILLED) DATE
1 BANJA LuKA In Culum-Kostic, 5 non-Serbs were 15 Aug 92
killed.
2 BiHAC In Orasce and Duljci, approximately 20-22 Sep 92
18 non-Serbs were killed.
3 BIJELJINA In Bijeljina, at least 48 Bosnian Mus- 01-02 Apr 92
lim and/or Bosnian Croat men, wo-
men, and children were killed.
4 BosANsKA GRADISKA Killing of at least 4 Bosnian Muslim 15 Aug 92
civilians near the market place in
Bosanska Gradiska.
5 BosArsKi Novi In Blagaj Japra, 7 Bosnian Muslim 09 Jun 92
men were killed during the expulsion
of Bosnian Muslims.
In Alici, 27 Bosnian Muslim men were 23 Jun 92
killed.
6 BosANsKi PETROVAC Killing of at least 2 Bosnian Muslims 20 Sep 92
near Hujici.
7 BRATUNAC In Glogova, approximately 65 Bosnian 09 May 92
Muslim and Bosnian Croat civilians
killed by members of the JNA, acting
together with Serb paramilitary forces.
8 BRCKO In Brcko, approximately 12 Bosnian 04 May 92
Muslim males and other non-Serbs
were killed at the Hotel Posavina.
9 CELINAC Rifet MUJKANOVIc, shot to death by 31 Jul 92
Serb soldier.
Killing of 2 non-Serb civilians by Serb 02 Aug 92
soldiers.
10 DOBOJ In Gornja Grapska, approximately 34 10 May 92
Bosnian Muslim civilians were killed
during shelling of village.
11 FOCA In Djidjevo, at least 11 Bosnian Mus- 20 Apr 92
lim men were executed by Serb
soldiers.
In Filipovici, at least 5 Bosnian Mus- 26 Apr 92
lims were killed by Serb soldiers in a
military warehouse.
In Jelec, 18 Bosnian Muslims, includ- 04-10 May 92
ing elderly people and 8 members of
one family, were executed by JNA
soldiers.
In Brod, 14 Bosnian Muslim men from 22 Jun 92
Trnovaca were executed by Serb
soldiers.
12 GACKO At least 5 non-Serbs were killed in the 17 Jun 92
village of Meduljici
2 Muslim males killed by Serbs in a 18 Jun 92
field near Mount Zelengora
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At least 8 Muslims killed by Serb 18-23 Jun 92
soldiers near Mount Zelengora
13 KLJuC In Pudin Han, 11 Bosnian non-Serb ci- 27 May 92
vilians were killed during the Serb at-
tack on the village.
In Prhovo, 38 Bosnian Muslim villag- 01 Jun 92
ers, including women and children,
were killed by shooting and grenades.
Near Peci, 9 Bosnian Muslim men 01 Jun 92
were killed by Serb soldiers.
In Velagici, approximately 100 Bosni- 01 Jun 92
an Muslim men were killed.
14 KoTOR VAROS In Kotor Varos town, approximately 25 Jun 92
13 non-Serbs were killed in and
around the Medical Centre.
In a barn in Dabovci, at least 15 Bos- Aug 92
nian Muslim men were killed.
In Vrbanjci 7 Bosnian Muslim men 25 Jun 92
were killed in and around the Alagic
caf6.
In Grabovice, a large number of Bosni- Nov 92
an Muslim and Bosnian Croat detain-
ees were held in the Grabovice School,
beaten and never seen again.
15 NEVESINJE At or near Lipovaca and Dubrovaci, at Jun-Jul 92
least 34 Bosnian Muslim men, women,
and children were killed.
Near Kiser, approximately 17 Bosnian Mid-Jul 92
Muslim civilians were killed by Serb
soldiers.
16 PRIJEDOR In the Brdo region numerous non- Jul 92
Serbs were killed.
In Hambarine and Behlici, at least 3 11 Jun-01 Jul 92
Bosnian Muslims were killed.
In Kamicani, approximately 8 non- 26 May 92
Serbs were killed in Mehmed Sahoric's
house.
In Jaskic, at least 19 Bosnian Muslim 14 Jun 92
men were killed.
In Biscani, about 40 non-Serbs were 20 Jul 92
killed.
In Carakovo, at least 19 Bosnian Mus- 23 Jul 92
lims were killed.
In Brisevo, at least 68 non-Serbs were 24 Jul 92
killed during the attack.
In Kipe iron ore mine (near Ljubija), 25 Jul 92
at least 8 Bosnian Muslim men were
executed.
In Ljubija, at least 3 Bosnian Muslim 25 Jul 92
men were executed at the football sta-
dium.
In Tomasica, 4 non-Serbs were killed. 03 Dec 92
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17 PRNJAVOR In Kremna, 8 Bosnian Muslim civil- Apr 92
ians from Derventa were killed.
In Lisnja, 4 Bosnian Muslim men were May 92
executed.
18 RUDO At least 50 non-Serb civilians were May 92
killed during the take over in mass ex-
ecutions at Setovo, Vranj, Mrsovo, and
massacres in Srpci and Sjeverin.
Approximately 40 elderly non-Serb ci- May 92
vilians were killed.
A number of Muslims were killed on 02 Aug 92
the hill of Vranja.
19 SANSKI MOST In Hrustovo, at least 24 Bosnian Mus- 31 May 92
lim women and children were killed.
On or near Vrhpolje bridge, at least 13 31 May 92
Bosnian Muslim men from Begici were
killed.
In Sanski Most, a number of non- 22 Jun 92
Serbs were killed near the Partisan
cemetery.
In Kenjari, 19 Bosnian Muslim men 27 Jun 92
were killed in Dujo Banovic's house.
In Budin, 12 members of one family 01 Aug 92
were killed.
In Donji Kruhari near Skrljevita, 5 02 Nov 92
Bosnian Croat men were killed.
In Trnova near Sanski Most town, ap- 20 Sep 95
proximately 11 non-Serb men were ex-
ecuted by members of Arkan's Tigers.
In Sasina, at least 65 non-Serb men 21 Sep 95
were executed by members of Arkan's
Tigers under the direct command of
Arkan.
20 SoKoLAc Approximately 7 non-Serb villagers 21 Jul 92
were killed by Serbs in massacre at
Tocionik village.
In the village of Meljine, 3 elderly 31 Jul 92
non-Serb women were killed.
In the village of Zulj, two non-Serbs 01 Aug 92
were killed.
21 SREBRENICA Following the take-over of Srebrenica, Jul 95
several thousand Bosnian Muslim men
were executed by Bosnian Serb forces,
including at the following locations:
1) Cerska Valley, approximately 150 13 Jul 95
Bosnian Muslim men;
2) Kravica warehouse (Zvornik Munici- 13 Jul 95
pality), approximately 1,000 Bosnian
Muslim men;
3) Orahovac (Zvornik Municipality), 14 Jul 95
approximately 1,000 Bosnian Muslim
men;
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4) Petkovci Dam (Zvornik Municipali- 14-15 Jul 95
ty), approximately 1,500 - 2,000 Bosni-
an Muslim men;
5) Branjevo Military Farm (Zvornik 16 Jul 95
Municipality), approximately 1,000 -
1,200 Bosnian Muslim men;
6) Pilica Cultural Dom (Zvornik Mu- 16 Jul 95
nicipality), approximately 500 Bosnian
Muslim men;
7) Kozluk (Zvornik Municipality), at 15-16 Jul 95
least 340 Bosnian Muslim men.
22 VISEGRAD Near Vidova Gora, at least 11 non- Jun 92
Serbs, including women and children,
were executed and thrown into the
Drina.
In Nova Mahala (Visegrad town), over 14 Jun 92
60 Bosnian Muslim and/or Bosnian
Croat civilians from Koritnik were
burnt to death in a house ignited by
Serb paramilitaries led by Milan
Lukic.
In Bikavac settlement, approximately 27 Jun 92
70 Bosnian Muslim and other non-
Serb civilians were burnt to death in a
house ignited by Serb paramilitaries
led by Milan Lukic.
23 VLASENICA In Drum (Vlasenica town), approxi- Jun 92
mately 22 Bosnian Muslim men were
killed.
In Zaklopaca, at least 58 Bosnian 16 May 92
Muslim men, women and children
were executed during the Serb attack
on the village.
24 ZVORNIK In Zvornik town, 15 Bosnian Muslim 09 Apr 92
and Bosnian Croat males were execut-
ed by Arkan's soldiers.
In Drinjaca, at least 55 Bosnian Mus- 30 May 92
lim men were killed.
25 Ilijas (Greater In Ljesevo, 21 Bosnian Muslims were 04 Jun 92Sarajevo) 
killed.
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SCHEDULE B
KILLINGS ASSOCIATED WITH DETENTION FACILITIES
No MUNICIPALITY VICTIMS (KILLED) DATE
1 BANJA LuKA In Manjaca camp, 2 non-Serb men were 6 Jun-18 Sep 92
killed.
At Manjaca camp, approximately 7 non- 03-04 Jun 92
Serbs were killed after being transported
from Hasan Kikic Sports Hall in Sanski
Most.
Between Krings camp and Manjaca 04 Jul 92
camp, approximately 20 non-Serb men
were killed during transportation be-
tween the camps.
At Manjaca camp, at least 8 non-Serb 06 Aug 92
men were killed in front of camp after
their transportation from Omarska camp
2 BILECA In SUP Detention facility, 2 non-Serb de- 25 Jun-18 Dec 92
tainees were killed.
3 BOSANSKA KRUPA In Petar Kocic Elementary School, ap- 1-10 Aug 92
proximately 11 non-Serb detainees were
killed.
4 BOSANSKI SAMAC In Crkvina camp, approximately 17 non- 06 May 92
Serb detainees were killed.
5 BRATUNAC In Vuk Karadzic school, at least 14 non- 10-16 May 92
Serb men were killed.
6 BRCKO In Luka Camp, approximately 30-35 Bos- 11-16 May 92
nian Muslim detainees were executed.
7 CAJNICE At Mostina Hunting Lodge, 53 non-Serbs 19 May 92
were killed.
8 FOCA In Livade camp, a number of non-Serb 13-18 Apr 92
detainees were killed.
At KP Dom prison, at least 266 Bosnian Jun-Dec 92
Muslim detainees were killed.
9 GACKO 5 Bosnian men were killed in the SUP 03 Jul 92
building in Gacko.
10 KALINOVIK Approximately 23 Muslim men and boys 05 Aug 92
from the Gunpowder warehouse were
shot in a field near Ratine.
11 KLjuC In Biljani, at least 30 elderly Muslim 10 Jul 92
men were killed.
12 PRIJEDOR In Trnopolje camp, at least 2 non-Serbs 28 May-Oct 92
were killed.
In Omarska camp, hundreds of Bosnian May-Aug 92
Muslims and Bosnian Croats were killed.
In Keraterm camp, approximately 150 24 Jul 92
non-Serbs were killed.
On Vlasic mountain in Skender Vakuf 21 Aug 92
municipality, approximately 200 Bosnian
Muslim and/or Bosnian Croat males from
Trnopolje camp were killed.
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13 ROGATICA Near Crvenka, at least 10 Bosnian Mus- 15 Jun 92
lim males from Visegrad were executed.
14 RUDO At least one elderly Muslim man was In or around 1992
killed in detention facility in JNA bar-
racks in Rudo.
At least one Muslim man was killed in In or around 1992
the detention camp in the JNA barracks.
15 SANSKI MOST Near Hrastova Glavica, approximately 05 Aug 92
100 non-Serb men were taken from Ker-
aterm and Omarska camps were killed.
In Sanski Most town, at least 2 non-Serb 18-21 Sep 92
men were killed in the Hotel Sana by
Arkan's Tigers.
At Sanakeram ceramics factory, at least 30 Sep-09 Oct 92
10 non-Serb men were killed.
16 SoKoLAc In village of Novoseoci, approximately 44 22 Sep 92
non-Serb men were detained and killed.
17 TESLIC In Teslic town, at least 5 non-Serb men Jun 92
were killed at the Territorial Defence
building.
In Pribinic camp, at least 7 or 8 non-Serb Jun-Oct 92
detainees were killed.
18 VLASENICA At Susica camp, at least 6 non-Serb male 21-23 Jun 92
detainees were killed.
19 ZVORNIK At Ekonomija farm, Karakaj, approxi- 12-14 May 92
mately 6 non-Serb detainees were killed.
At Novi Izvor building, at least 2 non- May 92
Serb male detainees were killed.
At Celopek Dom Kulture, at least 30 09-26 Jun 92
non-Serb male detainees were killed.
At Karakaj Technical School, approxi- 01-03 Jun 92
mately 110 Bosnian Muslim males were
killed.
At Gero's slaughter-house, approximately 07 Jun 92
190 non-Serb detainees were killed.
20 Novi Grad Near Srednje, 47 Bosnian Muslim men 14 Jun 92
(Sarajevo) from Rajlovac camp were killed.
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SCHEDULE C
DETENTION FACILITIES
No MUNICIPALITY DETENTION CAMP DATES
1 BANJA LuKA Former JNA Barracks Mali Logor Aug-Sep 92
(Military Remand Prison)
Viz Tunjice Penitentiary Jun-Nov 92
Manjaca Camp Jun-Dec 92
2 BIHAC Traktorski Servis, Ripac (Garages Jul-Oct 92
and Houses)
3 BIJELJINA Batkovici Detention Centre Jul 92-Jun 95
New Slaughterhouse (Nova Klaoni- From Mar 92
ca)
4 BILECA SUP Detention facility 10 Jun-19 Dec 92
Student Hostel (Dacki Dom) 25 Jun-05 Oct 92
5 BOSANSKA DUBICA SUP Building Jun-Sep 92
6 BOSANSKA KRUPA Petar Kocic Elementary School Apr-Sep 92
Jesenica Primary School Apr-Sep 92
7 BOSANSKI SAMAC Crkvina Camp May-Oct 92
8 BOSANSKI NovI Bosanska Kostajnica Police Station May-Jul 92
Mlakve Football Stadium Jun-Jul 92
Bosanski Novi Fire Station Jul-Aug 92
9 BOSANSKI PETROvAC Kozila Camp May-Aug 92
10 BRCKO JNA Barracks Brcko Apr-Jul 92
Luka Detention Centre 04 May-13 Jul 92
11 BRATUNAC Vuk Karadzic School Jul 92
12 CAJNICE Mostina Hunting Lodge Apr-May 92
Cajnice SUP Building Jun-Jul 93
13 CELINAC Municipal Building in Celinac 01 Aug 92
14 DOBOJ Spreca Prison Apr 92-Feb 93
Percin's Disco (Restaurant Kod May-Aug 92
Perco)
Ammunition Warehouse, Bare May 92
SUP Station May-Aug 92
JNA Hangars near Bosanska Plan- May 92-Jun 93
tation (Bosanka Camp)
Seslija Camp Mar-Oct 93
15 DoNJI VAKUF Vrbas Promet Camp 11 Jun 92
"The House," a house across the 07 Jun 92
street from the MUP building
SUP Building 16 Jun 92
TO Warehouse 16 Jun 92
16 FOCA Foca High School (Sredsnjoskola Jun 92
Centar)
Partisan Sports Hall Jul 92
Livade Camp Apr 92
KP Dom Prison Apr 92-Oct 94
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17 GACKO Dom Kulture Avtovac. 01 Jun 92
SUP Building 08 Jun 92-05 Jul 92
Hotel Connected to Power Plant 01 May 92
Hotel "Metohija" 01 May 92
18 KALINOVIK Kalinovik School (Primary/Elemen- Jul 92-Sep 92
tary)
Gunpowder Warehouse Between Je- 05 Jul 92
lasica and JazIcI.
19 KLJuC Nikola Mackic Elementary School May 92
20 KOTOR VAROS Kotor Varos Prison Jun-Nov 92
Kotor Varos Sawmill Jun 92
Kotor Varos Police Station May-Sep 92
Kotor Varos Elementary School Aug-Sep 92
21 NEVESINJE Central Heating Factory (Kilavci) Jun-Jul 92
22 PRIJEDOR Omarska Camp May-Aug 92
Keraterm Camp May-Aug 92
Miska Glava Jul 92
Prijedor Barracks May-Jun 92
Trnopolje Camp May-Dec 92
23 PRNJAVOR Stari Mlin Oct 92-Mar 94
Sloga Shoe Factory May-Dec 92
Ribnjak Nov 92-Jan 93
24 ROGATICA Veljko Vlahovic School May 92-Early 93
Rasadnik Jun 92-Jun 93
25 RUDO Basement of the Cultural Centre Jun 93-Feb 94
26 SANSKU MOST Krings Factory May-Aug 92
Hasan Kikic School May-Jun 92
Betonirka Cement Factory May-Jul 92
Boiler Room of Old Hotel 21-25 Sep 95
27 SoKoLAc KTK Leather Factory Jul-Dec 92




28 TESLIC Pribinic (Old Post Office) Jun-Oct 92
TO Building Jun 92
SUP Building Jun 92
29 VISEGRAD Detention Centre in Tourist Hotel 01 May 92
in Vilina Vlas.
Uzamnica, a Former Military Ware- Aug 92-Oct 94
house and Barracks.
30 VLASENICA Susica Territorial Defence Installa- Jun 92
tion
31 ZVORNIK Celopek Dom Kulture May-Jul 92
Karakaj Technical School May-Jul 92
Novi Izvor Building, Zvornik Town Apr-Sep 92
Ekonomija Farm, Karakaj Jun-Aug 92
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No MUNICIPALITY AND REFUGEES DEPORTATIONS
1 Banja Luka 19359 Hungary




- Bosanska Krupa 1439
- Buzim 389
- Krupa na Uni 1
6 Bosanska Dubica 3310
7 Bosanska Gradiska 7516
8 Bosanski Novi 6288
9 Bosanski Petrovac:
- Bosanski Petrovac 778
- Petrovac unknown











- Doboj Istok 405
-Doboj Jug 310
16 Donji Vakuf 1729
17 Foca:
- Foca/Srbinje 8258
- Foca FBiH 1039
18 Gacko 1899 Macedonia
19 Gorazde:
- Gorazde FBiH 2563





22 Kotor Varos 6870





27 Rudo 1614 Macedonia
28 Sanski Most:
- Sanski Most 6257
















- Srpska Ilidza 60
39 Novi Grad Sarajevo 9008
40 Novo Sarajevo:
- Novo Sarajevo 7097








- Trnovo RS 744
- Trnovo FBiH 415
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1 Fadila ZGODIC, a woman aged 52 years, was shot and wound- 07 Nov 92
ed in the hip while carrying bread near Darovalaca Krvi Street,
presently Kolodvorska Street, in the area of Novo Sarajevo.
2 Anisa PITA, a girl aged 3 years, was shot and wounded in the 13 Dec 92
right leg as she was taking off her shoes while on the porch of
her residence on Zagrici Street in the Sirokaca area of Saraje-
vo.
3 The victim, a girl aged 9 years, was shot and wounded in the 17 Apr 93
back as she played in the front garden of her house in the
Sedrenik area of Sarajevo.
4 Muhamed HAZNADAREVIC, a man aged 52 years, was shot 25 Jun 93
and wounded in the back and chest while trying to tend a vege-
table plot in Slatinski Put 5, presently Slatinski Put 13, Kobilja
Glava, north of Sarajevo.
5 Almasa KONJHODZIC, a woman aged 56 years, was shot dead 27 Jun 93
near the junction of Dure Dakovica and Kranjcevica Street,
presently Alipasina and Kranjcevica, while walking with her
family.
6 Munira ZAMETICA, a woman aged 48 years, was shot dead 11 Jul 93
while collecting water from the Dobrinja River in area of
Dobrinja II and III.
7 Hajrija DIZDAREVIC, a woman aged 66 years, was shot dead On or about
in her apartment at Kranjcevica 11/5, presently Dzamijska 17 Jul 93
Street, during her prayers.
8 Mejra JUSOVIC, a woman aged 45 years, was shot and wound- 24 Jul 93
ed while pulling a load of wood towards her home near
Rasadnjak, Sedrenik area, Sarajevo.
9 Vildana KAPUR, a woman aged 21 years, was shot and wound- 05 Aug 93
ed in the leg while transporting water home along Stara cesta,
Hotonj area.
10 Nafa TARIC, a woman aged 35 years, and her daughter Elma 03 Sep 93
TARIC, aged 8 years, were shot by a single bullet while walk-
ing together in Ivana Krndelja Street, in the centre of Sarajevo.
The bullet wounded the mother in the left thigh and wounded
the daughter on the hand and in the abdomen.
11 Sacir BOSNIC, a man aged 56 years, was shot dead while gath- 07 Sep 93
ering wood across the road from the Hambina Carina Reservoir
and adjacent to Zelengorska Street, presently Hambina Carina
Street, at Sirokaca, Skenderija.
12 Edina TRTO, a woman aged 25 years, was shot dead while 26 Sep 93
walking in front of Ivana Krndelja Street 6, presently Azize
Sacerbegovic 12, Sarajevo.
13 Faruk KADRIC, a boy aged 16 years, was shot and wounded in 04 Oct 93
the neck while riding as a passenger in his father's truck along
Ante Babica Street, in the west end of Sarajevo.
14 Edin RAMOVIC, a man aged 29 years, was shot and wounded 07 Oct 93
in the left upper arm while walking in Stara cesta Road, in the
Bare area of Sarajevo.
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15 Ramiz VELIC and Milan RISTIC, aged 50 and 56 years respec- 02 Nov 93
tively, were wounded by a burst of gunfire while they were
working clearing rubbish along Brace Ribara Street, presently
Porodice Ribar Street, in the Hrasno area of Sarajevo.
16 Ramiza KUNDO, a woman aged 38 years, was shot and wound- 02 Nov 93
ed in the left leg while she and another woman were returning
from a water well carrying buckets of water near Brijesko Brdo
Street, presently Bulbulistan Street, in the west end of Saraje-
vo.
17 Fatima OSMANOVIC, a woman aged 44 years, was shot and 13 Nov 93
wounded in the right side of her face while she was carrying
water in Brijesko brdo Street, presently Bulbulistan Street, in
the west end of Sarajevo.
18 Sanija DZEVLAN, a woman aged 32 years, was shot and 06 Jan 94
wounded while riding a bicycle across a bridge in Nikola
Demonja Street, Dobrinja.
19 Edin HUSOVIC, a man aged 17 years, was shot and wounded 10 Jan 94
in the abdomen while standing outside a pizza restaurant Seste
Proleterske Brigade Street, presently Bulevar Mese Selimovica.
20 Hetema MUKANOVIC, a woman aged 38 years, was shot and 11 Jan 94
killed in her apartment on the first floor of Obala 27. Jula 89/1,
presently Aleja Lipa 64, in the Hrasno area of Sarajevo. At the
time she was sitting with her husband and neighbours, drink-
ing coffee by candlelight.
21 Ivan FRANJIC, a man aged 63 years, was walking with two 13 Mar 94
others on Ante Babica Street in Vojnicko PolIje, in the west end
of Sarajevo. He was shot and wounded in the stomach while
one of his companions Augustin VUCIC was shot and later died
from his injuries.
22 Sadeta PLIVAC, a woman aged 53 years and Hajra 25 May 94
HAFIZOVIC a woman aged 62 years, were both shot and
wounded in their legs while passengers in a crowded bus near
the junction of Nikolje Demonje and Bulevar AVNOJ, presently
Nikolje Demonje and Bulevar Branioca Dobrinja, in Dobrinja.
23 Fatima SALCIN, a woman aged 44 years, was shot and wound- 13 Jun 94
ed in the hand when walking with her father-in-law in Ive An-
drica Street, in the Mojmilo area of Sarajevo.
24 Sanela MURATOVIC, a girl aged 16 years, was shot and 26 Jun 94
wounded in the right shoulder while walking with a girlfriend
in Dure Jaksica Street, presently Adija Mulabegovica, in the
west end of Sarajevo.
25 Jasmina KUCINAR, a pregnant woman aged 31 years, and her 6-10 Jul 94
son Damir KUCINAR, aged 4 years, were lightly wounded in
the legs by a shot penetrating a crowded tram in which they
were travelling. The tram was travelling west on Zmaja od
Bosne Street towards Alipasino Polje. Mensur JUSIC, a man
aged 36 years, sustained a slight leg wound and Belma SUKIC
nee LIKIC, a woman aged 23 years, was wounded in the left
armpit in the same attack. The tram was near the Holiday Inn
hotel at the time of the incident.
26 Rasid DZONKO, a man aged 67 years, was shot and wounded 17 Jul 94
in the back whilst sitting watching television in his apartment
situated at Milanka Vitomira Street, presently Senada Mandica
Dende Street 5 in Vojnicko Polje, in the west end of Sarajevo.
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27 Seid SOLAK, a boy aged 13 years, shot and wounded in the ab- 22 Jul 94
domen whilst window shopping with his mother and sister in
Miljenka Cvitkovica Street, presently Ferde Hauptmana, in the
Cengic Vila area of Sarajevo.
28 Alma CUTUNA, a woman aged 43 years, was wounded in the 08 Oct 94
right upper leg while travelling on a tram on Zmaj od Bosne
Street in Sarajevo.
29 Adnan KASAPOVIC, a boy aged 16 years, was shot in the chest 24 Oct 94
and killed while walking in an alley adjoining Dordje Andrijevi-
ca Kuna Street.
30 Fata GUTA, a woman aged 59 years, was shot and wounded in 08 Nov 94
the hand while she was going with jerri-cans to collect water
from the Moscanica spring in Gazin Han, to the east of Saraje-
vo.
31 Sanja SMJECANIN, a pregnant woman aged 28 years, was 09 Nov 94
shot and wounded while travelling with her husband and sis-
ter-in-law in a car on Zmaj od Bosne Street.
32 Dzenana SOKOLOVIC, a woman aged 31 years, and her son 18 Nov 94
Nermin DIVOVIC, a boy aged 7 years, were fired on while
walking in Zmaj od Bosne Street. Ms. SOKOLOVIC was
wounded with a bullet in the abdomen. The bullet passed
through her and hit her son in the head, killing him. They had
been walking home from Hrasno, where they had gone to col-
lect firewood the previous day.
33 Hajrudin HAMIDIC, a man aged 52 years, was wounded in the 21 Nov 94
arm and face when the tram he was driving westbound on
Zmaj od Bosne was fired on.
34 Sanela DEDOVIC, a girl aged 12 years, was wounded in the 22 Nov 94
left ankle while she was walking to school. The incident oc-
curred at the junction of Sedrenik Street and Red'epa Gorusa-
novica Street, in the north east corner of Sarajevo.
35 Hafiza KARACIC, a woman aged 31 years and Sabina SABAN- 23 Nov 94
IC, a woman aged 26 years, were both wounded in the right
shoulder when the tram they were travelling on came under
fire on Zmaj od Bosne, between the Technical School and Mar-
shal Tito Barracks.
36 Lejla BAJRAMOVIC, a woman aged 24 years, was sitting in a 08 Dec 94
friend's apartment in Franca Lehara Street, near the centre of
Sarajevo, when she was shot in the head and killed. The shot
came through the apartment window.
37 Dervisa SELMANOVIC, a woman aged 49 years, was shot and 10 Dec 94
wounded in the right knee while she was gathering firewood in
the backyard of a house in Sedrenik Street, in the north east
end of Sarajevo.
38 Malkan PLEHO, a man aged 62 years, was shot and wounded 11 Dec 94
in the right lower leg while climbing the front steps to his
house in Sedrenik, in the north east end of Sarajevo.
39 Halid DEMIROVIC, a man aged 62 years, was shot and wound- 13 Dec 94
ed in the right heel while he was gathering firewood on Pasino
Brdo, in the north east corner of Sarajevo.
40 Senad KESMER, a man aged 31 years, Alma CEHAGIC, a wo- 27 Feb 95
man aged 19 years, Alija HOL.AN, a man aged 55 years, and
others, were shot and wounded while travelling in a westbound
tram on Zmaj od Bosne Street. The tram was near the Tito
Barracks at the time.
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41 Azem AGOVIC, a man aged 46 years and Alen GICEVIC, a 03 Mar 95
man aged 33 years, were shot and wounded while travelling in
an eastbound tram on Zmaj od Bosne Street. The tram was
near the Holiday Inn at the time.
42 Tarik ZUNIC, a boy aged 14 years, wounded in the hand while 06 Mar 95
he was walking home from school at Sedrenik Street, in the
north east of Sarajevo. He emerged from behind a protective
screen, about 100 metres from home, when he was hit.
43 Vahid BALTA, a man aged 52 years, was walking with his wife 06 Mar 95
in Sedrenik Street, in the north east of Sarajevo, when he was
shot in the ankle.
44 A young man was crossing the junction of Nikole Demonje and 18 Mar 95
Bulevar Avnoj Streets in the Dobrinja area, when he was shot
in the left side and killed.
45 Semsa COVRK, a woman aged 27 years, was shot and wounded 03 May 95
in the abdomen while walking in Josipa Krasa Street, Novi
Grad, holding her young son's hand at the time.
46 A man was shot and killed in Dinarska Street, Hrasno Brdo. 13 May 95
47 Durgut COBIC, a man aged 80 years, was shot and wounded in 25 May 95
the shoulder when he opened the balcony of his apartment door
Kunovska Street 41, Dobrinja.




1 2 shells were fired upon a crowd of approximately 200 persons 01 Jun 93
who were watching and participating in a football game in a
parking lot bordered on three sides by residential apartment
blocks and on the fourth side by the Lukavica Road in Dobrinja
3B, a residential settlement. At least 12 people, including 3 chil-
dren under the age of 15 years, were killed and at least 70 people,
including 10 children, were wounded. The origin of fire was VRS-
held territory approximately to the east-southeast.
2 An 82 mm mortar shell was fired upon about 100 civilians who 12 Jul 93
were waiting to access a communal water pump in the front yard
of a residence at 39 Hakije Turajlica (previously Aleja Branka
Bulica then Spasenije Cane Babovic) in Dobrinja, a residential
settlement. At least twelve people were killed and fourteen people
were wounded. The origin of fire was VRS-held territory approxi-
mately to the west-north-west.
3 Three mortar shells landed in the area of Alipasino Polje, the first 22 Jan 94
in a park behind, and the second and third in front of residential
apartment buildings at 3 Geteova Street (previously Centinjska
Street) and at 4 Bosanska Street (previously Klara Cetkin Street),
where children were playing. The second and third shells killed
six children under the age of 15 years and wounded one adult and
four such children. The origin of fire was from VRS-held territory
approximately to the west.
4 A salvo of three 120 mm mortar shells hit civilians in the 04 Feb 94
Dobrinja residential area. The first landed to the front of a block
of flats at Oslobodilaca Sarajeva Street hitting persons who were
distributing and receiving humanitarian aid and children attend-
ing religious classes. The second and third landed among persons
trading at a market in an open area to the rear of the apartment
buildings at Mihajla Pupina Street and Oslobodilaca Sarajeva
Street. Eight people, including 1 child under the age of 15 years,
were killed and at least 18 people, including 2 children were
wounded. The origin of fire was from VRS-held territory, approxi-
mately to the east.
5 A 120 mm mortar shell hit a crowded open air market called 05 Feb 94
"Markale," situated in a civilian area of Old Town Sarajevo, kill-
ing 66 people and wounding over 140 people, including 3 children
under the age of 15 years. The origin of fire was VRS-held territo-
ry approximately to the north-northeast.
6 A 120 mm mortar shell impacted on the Igman Road amongst a 30 Oct 94
group of civilians at a bus stop. 1 person was killed and 15 were
I injured. The origin of fire was Vojkovici VRS territory.
7 Three mortar shells struck Livanjska Street, a street of civilian 08 Nov 94
dwellings. 2 persons were killed and 6 were injured. The origin of
fire was Poljine direction VRS territory.
8 One 120 mm mortar shell hit Partizanska Street 18 in Hrasnica. 17 Nov 94
2 children aged 8 years and 2 years were killed and 3 adults were
injured.
9 An 82 mm mortar shell hit adjacent to a civilian dwelling killing 12 Dec 94
an elderly man and injuring his elderly wife. The origin of fire
was VRS territory.
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10 Two 76 mm shells in quick succession hit a flea market in the old 22 Dec 94
commercial quarter of Bascarsija in Old Town. 2 persons were
killed and 7 were injured. The origin of fire was Trebevic, VRS
positions.
11 A modified aircraft bomb hit a residential area in Hrasnica at the 07 Apr 95
foot of Mount Igman destroying one dwelling, severely damaging
eleven other dwellings. 1 person was killed and 3 injured. The ori-
gin of fire was Ilidza, VRS territory.
12 A 60 mm mortar shell hit a concrete area near the Sarajevo rail- 12 Apr 95
way station. 7 people were injured. The origin of fire was Zlatiste,
VRS territory.
13 A missile landed and exploded on the asphalt of Safeta Zajke 24 May 95
street at approximately 9.45, killing 2 and injuring 5 people. The
missile came from the southeast, direction of Lukavica..
14 A modified air-bomb landed at Majdanska Street bb. 2 civilians 24 May 95
were killed and 6 were wounded. The origin of fire was from the
southeast VRS territory of Pavlovac.
15 A modified air-bomb struck a building near apartment blocks in 26 May 95
Safeta Hodzica Street, destroying the top 3 floors of an apartment
building. This explosion was followed by several artillery rounds
landing in the same area. Serious damage was caused to a num-
ber of buildings. 2 people were seriously injured and 15 persons
were slightly injured. The fire was determined to have come from
VRS territory to the west-southwest.
16 At about 10.00 hours, a modified aircraft bomb was fired from the 16 Jun 95
northwest. The bomb landed and exploded on the building of the
UMC and Oncology Department at Dositejeva street 4-a. There
was a lot of damage and 3 persons were slightly injured.
17 At about 15.20 hours, a modified aircraft bomb, most probably 16 Jun 95
fired from Lukavica, exploded next to 10, Trg Medjunarodnog Pri-
jateljstva, slightly injuring 7 people and causing considerable
damage to neighboring buildings.
18 At 17.20 hours, a modified aircraft bomb was fired from the 16 Jun 95
northwest. It exploded on the builder house at Cobanija Street 7.
2 people were wounded.
19 A 120 mm mortar shell struck a line of civilians, numbering ap- 18 Jun 95
proximately 50-70, waiting for water distribution in Marka
Oreskovica Street, Dobrinja. 7 people were killed and 12 injured.
The origin of fire was Nedzarici, VRS territory.
20 A projectile was fired into the street Bulevar Mese Selimovica, 29 Jun 95
probably from the direction of Rajlovac. There were no victims.
21 At about 13.30 hours, a high impact missile landed just outside 01 Jul 95
the house number 5 in Radenko Abazovica. It was fired from the
western part of the city (Ilidza - Rajlovac). There were no victims.
22 At about 21.30 hours, a rocket projectile with a concussion war- 01 Jul 95
head exploded in Bunicki Potok street. 13 people were injured.
The projectile came from Ilidza.
23 A 120 mm mortar shell hit close to a dwelling at Vrbanjusa 95 (a 19 Jul 95
residential area). 1 boy was killed. The origin of fire was VRS ter-
ritory in the south.
24 A rocket missile with concussion warhead, coming from the direc- 23 Jul 95
tion of Ilidza/Blazuj, landed on the house Sokolovici, Bjelasnicka
Street 54. 2 persons were killed and 11 were lightly wounded.
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25 A modified explosive device exploded at the staircase between the 22 Aug 95
2nd and the 3rd floor of the BITAS building in Zmaja od Bosne
Street 64. 1 person died, another received light injuries. The ori-
gin of fire was VRS territory in the southwest.
26 A 120 mm mortar shell landed in Mula-Mustafe Baseskije Street 28 Aug 95
outside the entrance to the City Market. 43 people were killed
and 75 were injured. The origin of fire was Trebevic, VRS territo-
ry.
